"u.s.a"california penal code

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186.9. As used in this chapter:
(a) "Conducts" includes, but is not limited to, initiating,
concluding, or participating in conducting, initiating, or concluding
a transaction.
(b) "Financial institution" means, when located or doing business
in this state, any national bank or banking association, state bank
or banking association, commercial bank or trust company organized
under the laws of the United States or any state, any private bank,
industrial savings bank, savings bank or thrift institution, savings
and loan association, or building and loan association organized
under the laws of the United States or any state, any insured
institution as defined in Section 401 of the National Housing Act (12
U.S.C. Sec. 1724(a)), any credit union organized under the laws of
the United States or any state, any national banking association or
corporation acting under Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 601) of
Title 12 of the United States Code, any agency, agent or branch of a
foreign bank, any currency dealer or exchange, any person or business
engaged primarily in the cashing of checks, any person or business
who regularly engages in the issuing, selling, or redeeming of
traveler's checks, money orders, or similar instruments, any broker
or dealer in securities registered or required to be registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 or with the Commissioner of Corporations under Part 3
(commencing with Section 25200) of Division 1 of Title 4 of the
Corporations Code, any licensed transmitter of funds or other person
or business regularly engaged in transmitting funds to a foreign
nation for others, any investment banker or investment company, any
insurer, any dealer in gold, silver, or platinum bullion or coins,
diamonds, emeralds, rubies, or sapphires, any pawnbroker, any
telegraph company, any person or business regularly engaged in the
delivery, transmittal, or holding of mail or packages, any person or
business that conducts a transaction involving the transfer of title
to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, any personal
property broker, any person or business acting as a real property
securities dealer within the meaning of Section 10237 of the Business
and Professions Code, whether licensed to do so or not, any person
or business acting within the meaning and scope of subdivisions (d)
and (e) of Section 10131 and Section 10131.1 of the Business and
Professions Code, whether licensed to do so or not, any person or
business regularly engaged in gaming within the meaning and scope of
Section 330, any person or business regularly engaged in pool selling
or bookmaking within the meaning and scope of Section 337a, any
person or business regularly engaged in horse racing whether licensed
to do so or not under the Business and Professions Code, any person
or business engaged in the operation of a gambling ship within the
meaning and scope of Section 11317, any person or business engaged in
controlled gambling within the meaning and scope of subdivision (e)
of Section 19805 of the Business and Professions Code, whether
registered to do so or not, and any person or business defined as a
"bank," "financial agency," or "financial institution" by Section
5312 of Title 31 of the United States Code or Section 103.11 of Title
31 of the Code of Federal Regulations and any successor provisions
thereto.
(c) "Transaction" includes the deposit, withdrawal, transfer,
bailment, loan, pledge, payment, or exchange of currency, or a
monetary instrument, as defined by subdivision (d), or the
electronic, wire, magnetic, or manual transfer of funds between
accounts by, through, or to, a financial institution as defined by
subdivision (b).
(d) "Monetary instrument" means United States currency and coin;
the currency, coin, and foreign bank drafts of any foreign country;
payment warrants issued by the United States, this state, or any
city, county, or city and county of this state or any other political
subdivision thereof; any bank check, cashier's check, traveler's
check, or money order; any personal check, stock, investment
security, or negotiable instrument in bearer form or otherwise in a
form in which title thereto passes upon delivery; gold, silver, or
platinum bullion or coins; and diamonds, emeralds, rubies, or
sapphires. Except for foreign bank drafts and federal, state, county,
or city warrants, "monetary instrument" does not include personal
checks made payable to the order of a named party which have not been
endorsed or which bear restrictive endorsements, and also does not
include personal checks which have been endorsed by the named party
and deposited by the named party into the named party's account with
a financial institution.
(e) "Criminal activity" means a criminal offense punishable under
the laws of this state by death or imprisonment in the state prison
or from a criminal offense committed in another jurisdiction
punishable under the laws of that jurisdiction by death or
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
(f) "Foreign bank draft" means a bank draft or check issued or
made out by a foreign bank, savings and loan, casa de cambio, credit
union, currency dealer or exchanger, check cashing business, money
transmitter, insurance company, investment or private bank, or any
other foreign financial institution that provides similar financial
services, on an account in the name of the foreign bank or foreign
financial institution held at a bank or other financial institution
located in the United States or a territory of the United States.



186.10. (a) Any person who conducts or attempts to conduct a
transaction or more than one transaction within a seven-day period
involving a monetary instrument or instruments of a total value
exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or a total value exceeding
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) within a 30-day period,
through one or more financial institutions (1) with the specific
intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of any criminal
activity, or (2) knowing that the monetary instrument represents the
proceeds of, or is derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds
of, criminal activity, is guilty of the crime of money laundering.
The aggregation periods do not create an obligation for financial
institutions to record, report, create, or implement tracking systems
or otherwise monitor transactions involving monetary instruments in
any time period. In consideration of the constitutional right to
counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 15 of Article I of the California
Constitution, when a case involves an attorney who accepts a fee for
representing a client in a criminal investigation or proceeding, the
prosecution shall additionally be required to prove that the monetary
instrument was accepted by the attorney with the intent to disguise
or aid in disguising the source of the funds or the nature of the
criminal activity.
A violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment in a
county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison, by a
fine of not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)
or twice the value of the property transacted, whichever is greater,
or by both that imprisonment and fine. However, for a second or
subsequent conviction for a violation of this section, the maximum
fine that may be imposed is five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000)
or five times the value of the property transacted, whichever is
greater.
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, for purposes of this section,
each individual transaction conducted in excess of five thousand
dollars ($5,000), each series of transactions conducted within a
seven-day period that total in excess of five thousand dollars
($5,000), or each series of transactions conducted within a 30-day
period that total in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000), shall constitute a separate, punishable offense.
(c) (1) Any person who is punished under subdivision (a) by
imprisonment in the state prison shall also be subject to an
additional term of imprisonment in the state prison as follows:
(A) If the value of the transaction or transactions exceeds fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) but is less than one hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($150,000), the court, in addition to and
consecutive to the felony punishment otherwise imposed pursuant to
this section, shall impose an additional term of imprisonment of one
year.
(B) If the value of the transaction or transactions exceeds one
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) but is less than one
million dollars ($1,000,000), the court, in addition to and
consecutive to the felony punishment otherwise imposed pursuant to
this section, shall impose an additional term of imprisonment of two
years.
(C) If the value of the transaction or transactions exceeds one
million dollars ($1,000,000), but is less than two million five
hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000), the court, in addition to and
consecutive to the felony punishment otherwise imposed pursuant to
this section, shall impose an additional term of imprisonment of
three years.
(D) If the value of the transaction or transactions exceeds two
million five hundred thousand dollars ($2,500,000), the court, in
addition to and consecutive to the felony punishment otherwise
prescribed by this section, shall impose an additional term of
imprisonment of four years.
(2) (A) An additional term of imprisonment as provided for in this
subdivision shall not be imposed unless the facts of a transaction
or transactions, or attempted transaction or transactions, of a value
described in paragraph (1), are charged in the accusatory pleading,
and are either admitted to by the defendant or are found to be true
by the trier of fact.
(B) An additional term of imprisonment as provided for in this
subdivision may be imposed with respect to an accusatory pleading
charging multiple violations of this section, regardless of whether
any single violation charged in that pleading involves a transaction
or attempted transaction of a value covered by paragraph (1), if the
violations charged in that pleading arise from a common scheme or
plan and the aggregate value of the alleged transactions or attempted
transactions is of a value covered by paragraph (1).
(d) All pleadings under this section shall remain subject to the
rules of joinder and severance stated in Section 954.

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186.11. (a) (1) Any person who commits two or more related
felonies, a material element of which is fraud or embezzlement, which
involve a pattern of related felony conduct, and the pattern of
related felony conduct involves the taking of, or results in the loss
by another person or entity of, more than one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000), shall be punished, upon conviction of two or more
felonies in a single criminal proceeding, in addition and
consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony offenses of
which he or she has been convicted, by an additional term of
imprisonment in the state prison as specified in paragraph (2) or
(3). This enhancement shall be known as the aggravated white collar
crime enhancement. The aggravated white collar crime enhancement
shall only be imposed once in a single criminal proceeding. For
purposes of this section, "pattern of related felony conduct" means
engaging in at least two felonies that have the same or similar
purpose, result, principals, victims, or methods of commission, or
are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, and
that are not isolated events. For purposes of this section, "two or
more related felonies" means felonies committed against two or more
separate victims, or against the same victim on two or more separate
occasions.
(2) If the pattern of related felony conduct involves the taking
of, or results in the loss by another person or entity of, more than
five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), the additional term of
punishment shall be two, three, or five years in the state prison.
(3) If the pattern of related felony conduct involves the taking
of, or results in the loss by another person or entity of, more than
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), but not more than five
hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), the additional term of
punishment shall be the term specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subdivision (a) of Section 12022.6.
(b) (1) The additional prison term and penalties provided for in
subdivisions (a), (c), and (d) shall not be imposed unless the facts
set forth in subdivision (a) are charged in the accusatory pleading
and admitted or found to be true by the trier of fact.
(2) The additional prison term provided in paragraph (2) of
subdivision (a) shall be in addition to any other punishment provided
by law, including Section 12022.6, and shall not be limited by any
other provision of law.
(c) Any person convicted of two or more felonies, as specified in
subdivision (a), shall also be liable for a fine not to exceed five
hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or double the value of the
taking, whichever is greater, if the existence of facts that would
make the person subject to the aggravated white collar crime
enhancement have been admitted or found to be true by the trier of
fact. However, if the pattern of related felony conduct involves the
taking of more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), but not
more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), the fine shall
not exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or double the
value of the taking, whichever is greater.
(d) Any person convicted of two or more felonies, as specified in
subdivision (a), shall be liable for the costs of restitution to
victims of the pattern of fraudulent or unlawful conduct, if the
existence of facts that would make the person subject to the
aggravated white collar crime enhancement have been admitted or found
to be true by the trier of fact.
(e) (1) If a person is alleged to have committed two or more
felonies, as specified in subdivision (a), and the aggravated white
collar crime enhancement is also charged, any asset or property that
is in the control of that person, and any asset or property that has
been transferred by that person to a third party, subsequent to the
commission of any criminal act alleged pursuant to subdivision (a),
other than in a bona fide purchase, whether found within or outside
the state, may be preserved by the superior court in order to pay
restitution and fines imposed pursuant to this section. Upon
conviction of two or more felonies, as specified in subdivision (a),
this property may be levied upon by the superior court to pay
restitution and fines imposed pursuant to this section if the
existence of facts that would make the person subject to the
aggravated white collar crime enhancement have been admitted or found
to be true by the trier of fact.
(2) To prevent dissipation or secreting of assets or property, the
prosecuting agency may, at the same time as or subsequent to the
filing of a complaint or indictment charging two or more felonies, as
specified in subdivision (a), and the enhancement specified in
subdivision (a), file a petition with the criminal division of the
superior court of the county in which the accusatory pleading was
filed, seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
the appointment of a receiver, or any other protective relief
necessary to preserve the property or assets. This petition shall
commence a proceeding that shall be pendent to the criminal
proceeding and maintained solely to affect the criminal remedies
provided for in this section. The proceeding shall not be subject to
or governed by the provisions of the Civil Discovery Act as set forth
in Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The petition shall allege that the defendant has
been charged with two or more felonies, as specified in subdivision
(a), and is subject to the aggravated white collar crime enhancement
specified in subdivision (a). The petition shall identify that
criminal proceeding and the assets and property to be affected by an
order issued pursuant to this section.
(3) A notice regarding the petition shall be provided, by personal
service or registered mail, to every person who may have an interest
in the property specified in the petition. Additionally, the notice
shall be published for at least three successive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the county where the property affected by
an order issued pursuant to this section is located. The notice shall
state that any interested person may file a verified claim with the
superior court stating the nature and amount of their claimed
interest. The notice shall set forth the time within which a claim of
interest in the protected property is required to be filed.
(4) If the property to be preserved is real property, the
prosecuting agency shall record, at the time of filing the petition,
a lis pendens in each county in which the real property is situated
which specifically identifies the property by legal description, the
name of the owner of record as shown on the latest equalized
assessment roll, and the assessor's parcel number.
(5) If the property to be preserved are assets under the control
of a banking or financial institution, the prosecuting agency, at the
time of the filing of the petition, may obtain an order from the
court directing the banking or financial institution to immediately
disclose the account numbers and value of the assets of the accused
held by the banking or financial institution. The prosecuting agency
shall file a supplemental petition, specifically identifying which
banking or financial institution accounts shall be subject to a
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or other
protective remedy.
(6) Any person claiming an interest in the protected property may,
at any time within 30 days from the date of the first publication of
the notice of the petition, or within 30 days after receipt of
actual notice, file with the superior court of the county in which
the action is pending a verified claim stating the nature and amount
of his or her interest in the property or assets. A verified copy of
the claim shall be served by the claimant on the Attorney General or
district attorney, as appropriate.
(7) The imposition of fines and restitution pursuant to this
section shall be determined by the superior court in which the
underlying criminal offense is sentenced. Any judge who is assigned
to the criminal division of the superior court in the county where
the petition is filed may issue a temporary restraining order in
conjunction with, or subsequent to, the filing of an allegation
pursuant to this section. Any subsequent hearing on the petition
shall also be heard by a judge assigned to the criminal division of
the superior court in the county in which the petition is filed. At
the time of the filing of an information or indictment in the
underlying criminal case, any subsequent hearing on the petition
shall be heard by the superior court judge assigned to the underlying
criminal case.
(f) Concurrent with or subsequent to the filing of the petition,
the prosecuting agency may move the superior court for, and the
superior court may issue, the following pendente lite orders to
preserve the status quo of the property alleged in the petition:
(1) An injunction to restrain any person from transferring,
encumbering, hypothecating, or otherwise disposing of that property.

(2) Appointment of a receiver to take possession of, care for,
manage, and operate the assets and properties so that the property
may be maintained and preserved. The court may order that a receiver
appointed pursuant to this section shall be compensated for all
reasonable expenditures made or incurred by him or her in connection
with the possession, care, management, and operation of any property
or assets that are subject to the provisions of this section.
(3) A bond or other undertaking, in lieu of other orders, of a
value sufficient to ensure the satisfaction of restitution and fines
imposed pursuant to this section.
(g) (1) No preliminary injunction may be granted or receiver
appointed by the court without notice that meets the requirements of
paragraph (3) of subdivision (e) to all known and reasonably
ascertainable interested parties and upon a hearing to determine that
an order is necessary to preserve the property pending the outcome
of the criminal proceedings. A temporary restraining order may be
issued by the court, ex parte, pending that hearing in conjunction
with or subsequent to the filing of the petition upon the application
of the prosecuting attorney. The temporary restraining order may be
based upon the sworn declaration of a peace officer with personal
knowledge of the criminal investigation that establishes probable
cause to believe that aggravated white collar crime has taken place
and that the amount of restitution and fines established by this
section exceeds or equals the worth of the assets subject to the
temporary restraining order. The declaration may include the hearsay
statements of witnesses to establish the necessary facts. The
temporary restraining order may be issued without notice upon a
showing of good cause to the court.
(2) The defendant, or a person who has filed a verified claim as
provided in paragraph (6) of subdivision (e), shall have the right to
have the court conduct an order to show cause hearing within 10 days
of the service of the request for hearing upon the prosecuting
agency, in order to determine whether the temporary restraining order
should remain in effect, whether relief should be granted from any
lis pendens recorded pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (e), or
whether any existing order should be modified in the interests of
justice. Upon a showing of good cause, the hearing shall be held
within two days of the service of the request for hearing upon the
prosecuting agency.
(3) In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order in a proceeding brought by a prosecuting
agency in conjunction with or subsequent to the filing of an
allegation pursuant to this section, the court has the discretion to
consider any matter that it deems reliable and appropriate, including
hearsay statements, in order to reach a just and equitable decision.
The court shall weigh the relative degree of certainty of the
outcome on the merits and the consequences to each of the parties of
granting the interim relief. If the prosecution is likely to prevail
on the merits and the risk of the dissipation of assets outweighs the
potential harm to the defendants and the interested parties, the
court shall grant injunctive relief. The court shall give significant
weight to the following factors:
(A) The public interest in preserving the property or assets
pendente lite.
(B) The difficulty of preserving the property or assets pendente
lite where the underlying alleged crimes involve issues of fraud and
moral turpitude.
(C) The fact that the requested relief is being sought by a public
prosecutor on behalf of alleged victims of white collar crimes.
(D) The likelihood that substantial public harm has occurred where
aggravated white collar crime is alleged to have been committed.
(E) The significant public interest involved in compensating the
victims of white collar crime and paying court-imposed restitution
and fines.
(4) The court, in making its orders, may consider a defendant's
request for the release of a portion of the property affected by this
section in order to pay reasonable legal fees in connection with the
criminal proceeding, any necessary and appropriate living expenses
pending trial and sentencing, and for the purpose of posting bail.
The court shall weigh the needs of the public to retain the property
against the needs of the defendant to a portion of the property. The
court shall consider the factors listed in paragraph (3) prior to
making any order releasing property for these purposes.
(5) The court, in making its orders, shall seek to protect the
interests of any innocent third persons, including an innocent
spouse, who were not involved in the commission of any criminal
activity.
(6) Any petition filed pursuant to this section is part of the
criminal proceedings for purposes of appointment of counsel and shall
be assigned to the criminal division of the superior court of the
county in which the accusatory pleading was filed.
(7) Based upon a noticed motion brought by the receiver appointed
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (f), the court may order an
interlocutory sale of property named in the petition when the
property is liable to perish, to waste, or to be significantly
reduced in value, or when the expenses of maintaining the property
are disproportionate to the value thereof. The proceeds of the
interlocutory sale shall be deposited with the court or as directed
by the court pending determination of the proceeding pursuant to this
section.
(8) The court may make any orders that are necessary to preserve
the continuing viability of any lawful business enterprise that is
affected by the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction issued pursuant to this action.
(9) In making its orders, the court shall seek to prevent any
asset subject to a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction from perishing, spoiling, going to waste, or otherwise
being significantly reduced in value. Where the potential for
diminution in value exists, the court shall appoint a receiver to
dispose of or otherwise protect the value of the property or asset.
(10) A preservation order shall not be issued against any assets
of a business that are not likely to be dissipated and that may be
subject to levy or attachment to meet the purposes of this section.
(h) If the allegation that the defendant is subject to the
aggravated white collar crime enhancement is dismissed or found by
the trier of fact to be untrue, any preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued pursuant to this section shall be
dissolved. If a jury is the trier of fact, and the jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall have the discretion to
continue or dissolve all or a portion of the preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order based upon the interests of justice.
However, if the prosecuting agency elects not to retry the case, any
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued pursuant
to this section shall be dissolved.
(i) (1) (A) If the defendant is convicted of two or more felonies,
as specified in subdivision (a), and the existence of facts that
would make the person subject to the aggravated white collar crime
enhancement have been admitted or found to be true by the trier of
fact, the trial judge shall continue the preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order until the date of the criminal sentencing
and shall make a finding at that time as to what portion, if any, of
the property or assets subject to the preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order shall be levied upon to pay fines and
restitution to victims of the crime. The order imposing fines and
restitution may exceed the total worth of the property or assets
subjected to the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. The court may order the immediate transfer of the property or
assets to satisfy any judgment and sentence made pursuant to this
section. Additionally, upon motion of the prosecution, the court may
enter an order as part of the judgment and sentence making the order
imposing fines and restitution pursuant to this section enforceable
pursuant to Title 9 (commencing with Section 680.010) of Part 2 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
(B) Additionally, the court shall order the defendant to make full
restitution to the victim or to make restitution to the victim based
on his or her ability to pay, as defined in subdivision (b) of
Section 1203.1b. The payment of the restitution ordered by the court
pursuant to this section shall be made a condition of any probation
granted by the court if the existence of facts that would make the
defendant subject to the aggravated white collar crime enhancement
have been admitted or found to be true by the trier of fact.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may order that
the period of probation continue for up to 10 years or until full
restitution is made to the victim, whichever is earlier.
(C) The sentencing court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the
order to pay additional fines and restitution and, in appropriate
cases, may initiate probation violation proceedings or contempt of
court proceedings against a defendant who is found to have willfully
failed to comply with any lawful order of the court.
(D) If the execution of judgment is stayed pending an appeal of an
order of the superior court pursuant to this section, the
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order shall be
maintained in full force and effect during the pendency of the
appellate period.
(2) The order imposing fines and restitution shall not affect the
interest in real property of any third party that was acquired prior
to the recording of the lis pendens, unless the property was obtained
from the defendant other than as a bona fide purchaser for value. If
any assets or property affected by this section are subject to a
valid lien, mortgage, security interest, or interest under a
conditional sales contract and the amount due to the holder of the
lien, mortgage, interest, or contract is less than the appraised
value of the property, that person may pay to the state or the local
government that initiated the proceeding the amount of the difference
between the appraised value of the property and the amount of the
lien, mortgage, security interest, or interest under a conditional
sales contract. Upon that payment, the state or local entity shall
relinquish all claims to the property. If the holder of the interest
elects not to make that payment to the state or local governmental
entity, the interest in the property shall be deemed transferred to
the state or local governmental entity and any indicia of ownership
of the property shall be confirmed in the state or local governmental
entity. The appraised value shall be determined as of the date
judgment is entered either by agreement between the holder of the
lien, mortgage, security interest, or interest under a conditional
sales contract and the governmental entity involved, or if they
cannot agree, then by a court-appointed appraiser for the county in
which the action is brought. A person holding a valid lien, mortgage,
security interest, or interest under a conditional sales contract
shall be paid the appraised value of his or her interest.
(3) In making its final order, the court shall seek to protect the
legitimately acquired interests of any innocent third persons,
including an innocent spouse, who were not involved in the commission
of any criminal activity.
(j) In all cases where property is to be levied upon pursuant to
this section, a receiver appointed by the court shall be empowered to
liquidate all property or assets which shall be distributed in the
following order of priority:
(1) To the receiver, or court-appointed appraiser, for all
reasonable expenditures made or incurred by him or her in connection
with the sale of the property or liquidation of assets, including all
reasonable expenditures for any necessary repairs, storage, or
transportation of any property levied upon under this section.
(2) To any holder of a valid lien, mortgage, or security interest
up to the amount of his or her interest in the property or proceeds.

(3) To any victim as restitution for any fraudulent or unlawful
acts alleged in the accusatory pleading that were proven by the
prosecuting agency as part of the pattern of fraudulent or unlawful
acts.
(4) For payment of any fine imposed pursuant to this section. The
proceeds obtained in payment of a fine shall be paid to the treasurer
of the county in which the judgment was entered, or if the action
was undertaken by the Attorney General, to the Treasurer. If the
payment of any fine imposed pursuant to this section involved losses
resulting from violation of Section 550 of this code or Section
1871.4 of the Insurance Code, one-half of the fine collected shall be
paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was
entered, and one-half of the fine collected shall be paid to the
Department of Insurance for deposit in the appropriate account in the
Insurance Fund. The proceeds from the fine first shall be used by a
county to reimburse local prosecutors and enforcement agencies for
the reasonable costs of investigation and prosecution of cases
brought pursuant to this section.
(5) To the Restitution Fund, or in cases involving convictions
relating to insurance fraud, to the Insurance Fund as restitution for
crimes not specifically pleaded and proven in the accusatory
pleading.
(k) If, after distribution pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subdivision (j), the value of the property to be levied upon pursuant
to this section is insufficient to pay for restitution and fines,
the court shall order an equitable sharing of the proceeds of the
liquidation of the property, and any other recoveries, which shall
specify the percentage of recoveries to be devoted to each purpose.
At least 70 percent of the proceeds remaining after distribution
pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (j) shall be
devoted to restitution.
(l) Unless otherwise expressly provided, the remedies or penalties
provided by this section are cumulative to each other and to the
remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state,
except that two separate actions against the same defendant and
pertaining to the same fraudulent or unlawful acts may not be brought
by a district attorney or the Attorney General pursuant to this
section and Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of Part 2 of
Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code. If a fine is imposed
under this section, it shall be in lieu of all other fines that may
be imposed pursuant to any other provision of law for the crimes for
which the defendant has been convicted in the action.[/align]

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ACT


186.20. This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the
"California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act."



186.21. The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is the
right of every person, regardless of race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, gender, age, ***ual orientation, or handicap, to be
secure and protected from fear, intimidation, and physical harm
caused by the activities of violent groups and individuals. It is
not the intent of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of the
constitutionally protected rights of freedom of expression and
association. The Legislature hereby recognizes the constitutional
right of every citizen to harbor and express beliefs on any lawful
subject whatsoever, to lawfully associate with others who share
similar beliefs, to petition lawfully constituted authority for a
redress of perceived grievances, and to participate in the electoral
process.
The Legislature, however, further finds that the State of
California is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent
street gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a
multitude of crimes against the peaceful citizens of their
neighborhoods. These activities, both individually and collectively,
present a clear and present danger to public order and safety and
are not constitutionally protected. The Legislature finds that there
are nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in California, and
that the number of gang-related murders is increasing. The
Legislature also finds that in Los Angeles County alone there were
328 gang-related murders in 1986, and that gang homicides in 1987
have increased 80 percent over 1986. It is the intent of the
Legislature in enacting this chapter to seek the eradication of
criminal activity by street gangs by focusing upon patterns of
criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of street gangs,
which together, are the chief source of terror created by street
gangs. The Legislature further finds that an effective means of
punishing and deterring the criminal activities of street gangs is
through forfeiture of the profits, proceeds, and instrumentalities
acquired, accumulated, or used by street gangs.



186.22. (a) Any person who actively participates in any criminal
street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged
in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes,
furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of
that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a
period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison
for 16 months, or two or three years.
(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), any person
who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with
the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal
conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, in
addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony
or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be
punished as follows:
(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the person
shall be punished by an additional term of two, three, or four years
at the court's discretion.
(B) If the felony is a serious felony, as defined in subdivision
(c) of Section 1192.7, the person shall be punished by an additional
term of five years.
(C) If the felony is a violent felony, as defined in subdivision
(c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be punished by an additional
term of 10 years.
(2) If the underlying felony described in paragraph (1) is
committed on the grounds of, or within 1,000 feet of, a public or
private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high school, during
hours in which the facility is open for classes or school-related
programs or when minors are using the facility, that fact shall be a
circumstance in aggravation of the crime in imposing a term under
paragraph (1).
(3) The court shall order the imposition of the middle term of the
sentence enhancement, unless there are circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation. The court shall state the reasons for its choice of
sentencing enhancements on the record at the time of the sentencing.

(4) Any person who is convicted of a felony enumerated in this
paragraph committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members, shall, upon conviction of that felony, be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of:
(A) The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for
the underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under
Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or
any period prescribed by Section 3046, if the felony is any of the
offenses enumerated in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph.
(B) Imprisonment in the state prison for 15 years, if the felony
is a home invasion robbery, in violation of subparagraph (A) of
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 213; carjacking, as
defined in Section 215; a felony violation of Section 246; or a
violation of Section 12022.55.
(C) Imprisonment in the state prison for seven years, if the
felony is extortion, as defined in Section 519; or threats to victims
and witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1.
(5) Except as provided in paragraph (4), any person who violates
this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for life shall not be paroled until
a minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.
(c) If the court grants probation or suspends the execution of
sentence imposed upon the defendant for a violation of subdivision
(a), or in cases involving a true finding of the enhancement
enumerated in subdivision (b), the court shall require that the
defendant serve a minimum of 180 days in a county jail as a condition
thereof.
(d) Any person who is convicted of a public offense punishable as
a felony or a misdemeanor, which is committed for the benefit of, at
the direction of or in association with, any criminal street gang
with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members, shall be punished by imprisonment
in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the
state prison for one, two, or three years, provided that any person
sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail shall be imprisoned for
a period not to exceed one year, but not less than 180 days, and
shall not be eligible for release upon completion of sentence,
parole, or any other basis, until he or she has served 180 days. If
the court grants probation or suspends the execution of sentence
imposed upon the defendant, it shall require as a condition thereof
that the defendant serve 180 days in a county jail.
(e) As used in this chapter, "pattern of criminal gang activity"
means the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to
commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or
conviction of two or more of the following offenses, provided at
least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of this
chapter and the last of those offenses occurred within three years
after a prior offense, and the offenses were committed on separate
occasions, or by two or more persons:
(1) Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to
produce great bodily injury, as defined in Section 245.
(2) Robbery, as defined in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 211)
of Title 8 of Part 1.
(3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter, as defined in Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1.
(4) The sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture,
offer for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances as
defined in Sections 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, and 11058 of the
Health and Safety Code.
(5) Shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle,
as defined in Section 246.
(6) Discharging or permitting the discharge of a firearm from a
motor vehicle, as defined in subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section
12034.
(7) Arson, as defined in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 450)
of Title 13.
(8) The intimidation of witnesses and victims, as defined in
Section 136.1.
(9) Grand theft, as defined in subdivision (a) or (c) of Section
487.
(10) Grand theft of any firearm, vehicle, trailer, or vessel.
(11) Burglary, as defined in Section 459.
(12) Rape, as defined in Section 261.
(13) Looting, as defined in Section 463.
(14) Money laundering, as defined in Section 186.10.
(15) Kidnapping, as defined in Section 207.
(16) Mayhem, as defined in Section 203.
(17) Aggravated mayhem, as defined in Section 205.
(18) Torture, as defined in Section 206.
(19) Felony extortion, as defined in Sections 518 and 520.
(20) Felony vandalism, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision
(b) of Section 594.
(21) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(22) The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm, as defined in
Section 12072.
(23) Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of
being concealed upon the person in violation of paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 12101.
(24) Threats to commit crimes resulting in death or great bodily
injury, as defined in Section 422.
(25) Theft and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, as defined
in Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code.
(26) Felony theft of an access card or account information, as
defined in Section 484e.
(27) Counterfeiting, designing, using, attempting to use an access
card, as defined in Section 484f.
(28) Felony fraudulent use of an access card or account
information, as defined in Section 484g.
(29) Unlawful use of personal identifying information to obtain
credit, goods, services, or medical information, as defined in
Section 530.5.
(30) Wrongfully obtaining Department of Motor Vehicles
documentation, as defined in Section 529.7.
(31) Prohibited possession of a firearm in violation of Section
12021.
(32) Carrying a concealed firearm in violation of Section 12025.
(33) Carrying a loaded firearm in violation of Section 12031.
(f) As used in this chapter, "criminal street gang" means any
ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities
the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in
paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, or (31) to (33), inclusive, of
subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying sign or
symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or
have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(g) Notwithstanding any other law, the court may strike the
additional punishment for the enhancements provided in this section
or refuse to impose the minimum jail sentence for misdemeanors in an
unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served, if
the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the
circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be
served by that disposition.
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for each person
committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities for a conviction
pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) of this section, the offense shall
be deemed one for which the state shall pay the rate of 100 percent
of the per capita institutional cost of the Division of Juvenile
Facilities, pursuant to Section 912.5 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
(i) In order to secure a conviction or sustain a juvenile
petition, pursuant to subdivision (a) it is not necessary for the
prosecution to prove that the person devotes all, or a substantial
part, of his or her time or efforts to the criminal street gang, nor
is it necessary to prove that the person is a member of the criminal
street gang. Active participation in the criminal street gang is all
that is required.
(j) A pattern of gang activity may be shown by the commission of
one or more of the offenses enumerated in paragraphs (26) to (30),
inclusive, of subdivision (e), and the commission of one or more of
the offenses enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, or (31)
to (33), inclusive of subdivision (e). A pattern of gang activity
cannot be established solely by proof of commission of offenses
enumerated in paragraphs (26) to (30), inclusive, of subdivision (e),
alone.


186.22a. (a) Every building or place used by members of a criminal
street gang for the purpose of the commission of the offenses listed
in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22 or any offense involving
dangerous or deadly weapons, burglary, or rape, and every building or
place wherein or upon which that criminal conduct by gang members
takes place, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and
prevented, and for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a
public or private nuisance.
(b) Any action for injunction or abatement filed pursuant to
subdivision (a), including an action filed by the Attorney General,
shall proceed according to the provisions of Article 3 (commencing
with Section 11570) of Chapter 10 of Division 10 of the Health and
Safety Code, except that all of the following shall apply:
(1) The court shall not assess a civil penalty against any person
unless that person knew or should have known of the unlawful acts.
(2) No order of eviction or closure may be entered.
(3) All injunctions issued shall be limited to those necessary to
protect the health and safety of the residents or the public or those
necessary to prevent further criminal activity.
(4) Suit may not be filed until 30-day notice of the unlawful use
or criminal conduct has been provided to the owner by mail, return
receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the last known address.
(c) Whenever an injunction is issued pursuant to subdivision (a),
or Section 3479 of the Civil Code, to abate gang activity
constituting a nuisance, the Attorney General or any district
attorney or any prosecuting city attorney may maintain an action for
money damages on behalf of the community or neighborhood injured by
that nuisance. Any money damages awarded shall be paid by or
collected from assets of the criminal street gang or its members.
Only members of the criminal street gang who created, maintained, or
contributed to the creation or maintenance of the nuisance shall be
personally liable for the payment of the damages awarded. In a civil
action for damages brought pursuant to this subdivision, the Attorney
General, district attorney, or city attorney may use, but is not
limited to the use of, the testimony of experts to establish damages
suffered by the community or neighborhood injured by the nuisance.
The damages recovered pursuant to this subdivision shall be deposited
into a separate segregated fund for payment to the governing body of
the city or county in whose political subdivision the community or
neighborhood is located, and that governing body shall use those
assets solely for the benefit of the community or neighborhood that
has been injured by the nuisance.
(d) No nonprofit or charitable organization which is conducting
its affairs with ordinary care or skill, and no governmental entity,
shall be abated pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b).
(e) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any aggrieved person
from seeking any other remedy provided by law.
(f) (1) Any firearm, ammunition which may be used with the
firearm, or any deadly or dangerous weapon which is owned or
possessed by a member of a criminal street gang for the purpose of
the commission of any of the offenses listed in subdivision (e) of
Section 186.22, or the commission of any burglary or rape, may be
confiscated by any law enforcement agency or peace officer.
(2) In those cases where a law enforcement agency believes that
the return of the firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon confiscated
pursuant to this subdivision, is or will be used in criminal street
gang activity or that the return of the item would be likely to
result in endangering the safety of others, the law enforcement
agency shall initiate a petition in the superior court to determine
if the item confiscated should be returned or declared a nuisance.
(3) No firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon shall be sold or
destroyed unless reasonable notice is given to its lawful owner if
his or her identity and address can be reasonably ascertained. The
law enforcement agency shall inform the lawful owner, at that person'
s last known address by registered mail, that he or she has 30 days
from the date of receipt of the notice to respond to the court clerk
to confirm his or her desire for a hearing and that the failure to
respond shall result in a default order forfeiting the confiscated
firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon as a nuisance.
(4) If the person requests a hearing, the court clerk shall set a
hearing no later than 30 days from receipt of that request. The court
clerk shall notify the person, the law enforcement agency involved,
and the district attorney of the date, time, and place of the
hearing.
(5) At the hearing, the burden of proof is upon the law
enforcement agency or peace officer to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the seized item is or will be used in criminal street
gang activity or that return of the item would be likely to result in
endangering the safety of others. All returns of firearms shall be
subject to Section 12021.3.
(6) If the person does not request a hearing within 30 days of the
notice or the lawful owner cannot be ascertained, the law
enforcement agency may file a petition that the confiscated firearm,
ammunition, or deadly weapon be declared a nuisance. If the items are
declared to be a nuisance, the law enforcement agency shall dispose
of the items as provided in Section 12028.



186.23. This chapter does not apply to employees engaged in
concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, or the
activities of labor organizations or their members or agents.



186.24. If any part or provision of this chapter, or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
the remainder of the chapter, including the application of that part
or provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected
thereby and shall continue in full force and effect. To this end,
the provisions of this chapter are severable.



186.25. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent a local governing
body from adopting and enforcing laws consistent with this chapter
relating to gangs and gang violence. Where local laws duplicate or
supplement this chapter, this chapter shall be construed as providing
alternative remedies and not as preempting the field.




186.26. (a) Any person who solicits or recruits another to actively
participate in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f)
of Section 186.22, with the intent that the person solicited or
recruited participate in a pattern of criminal street gang activity,
as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, or with the intent
that the person solicited or recruited promote, further, or assist in
any felonious conduct by members of the criminal street gang, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two
or three years.
(b) Any person who threatens another person with physical violence
on two or more separate occasions within any 30-day period with the
intent to coerce, induce, or solicit any person to actively
participate in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f)
of Section 186.22, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for two, three, or four years.
(c) Any person who uses physical violence to coerce, induce, or
solicit another person to actively participate in any criminal street
gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, or to prevent
the person from leaving a criminal street gang, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years.
(d) If the person solicited, recruited, coerced, or threatened
pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), or (c) is a minor, an additional
term of three years shall be imposed in addition and consecutive to
the penalty prescribed for a violation of any of these subdivisions.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
prosecution under any other provision of law.



186.28. (a) Any person, corporation, or firm who shall knowingly
supply, sell, or give possession or control of any firearm to another
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a
county jail for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and
imprisonment if all of the following apply:
(1) The person, corporation, or firm has actual knowledge that the
person will use the firearm to commit a felony described in
subdivision (e) of Section 186.22, while actively participating in
any criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section
186.22, the members of which engage in a pattern of criminal
activity, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 186.22.
(2) The firearm is used to commit the felony.
(3) A conviction for the felony violation under subdivision (e) of
Section 186.22 has first been obtained of the person to whom the
firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or control pursuant
to this section.
(b) This section shall only be applicable where the person is not
convicted as a principal to the felony offense committed by the
person to whom the firearm was supplied, sold, or given possession or
control pursuant to this section.



186.30. (a) Any person described in subdivision (b) shall register
with the chief of police of the city in which he or she resides, or
the sheriff of the county if he or she resides in an unincorporated
area, within 10 days of release from custody or within 10 days of his
or her arrival in any city, county, or city and county to reside
there, whichever occurs first.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall apply to any person convicted in a
criminal court or who has had a petition sustained in a juvenile
court in this state for any of the following offenses:
(1) Subdivision (a) of Section 186.22.
(2) Any crime where the enhancement specified in subdivision (b)
of Section 186.22 is found to be true.
(3) Any crime that the court finds is gang related at the time of
sentencing or disposition.



186.31. At the time of sentencing in adult court, or at the time of
the dispositional hearing in the juvenile court, the court shall
inform any person subject to Section 186.30 of his or her duty to
register pursuant to that section. This advisement shall be noted in
the court minute order. The court clerk shall send a copy of the
minute order to the law enforcement agency with jurisdiction for the
last known address of the person subject to registration under
Section 186.30. The parole officer or the probation officer assigned
to that person shall verify that he or she has complied with the
registration requirements of Section 186.30.



186.32. (a) The registration required by Section 186.30 shall
consist of the following:
(1) Juvenile registration shall include the following:
(A) The juvenile shall appear at the law enforcement agency with a
parent or guardian.
(B) The law enforcement agency shall serve the juvenile and the
parent with a California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
Act notification which shall include, where applicable, that the
juvenile belongs to a gang whose members engage in or have engaged in
a pattern of criminal gang activity as described in subdivision (e)
of Section 186.22.
(C) A written statement signed by the juvenile, giving any
information that may be required by the law enforcement agency, shall
be submitted to the law enforcement agency.
(D) The fingerprints and current photograph of the juvenile shall
be submitted to the law enforcement agency.
(2) Adult registration shall include the following:
(A) The adult shall appear at the law enforcement agency.
(B) The law enforcement agency shall serve the adult with a
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act
notification which shall include, where applicable, that the adult
belongs to a gang whose members engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity as described in subdivision (e) of
Section 186.22.
(C) A written statement, signed by the adult, giving any
information that may be required by the law enforcement agency, shall
be submitted to the law enforcement agency.
(D) The fingerprints and current photograph of the adult shall be
submitted to the law enforcement agency.
(b) Within 10 days of changing his or her residence address, any
person subject to Section 186.30 shall inform, in writing, the law
enforcement agency with whom he or she last registered of his or her
new address. If his or her new residence address is located within
the jurisdiction of a law enforcement agency other than the agency
where he or she last registered, he or she shall register with the
new law enforcement agency, in writing, within 10 days of the change
of residence.
(c) All registration requirements set forth in this article shall
terminate five years after the last imposition of a registration
requirement pursuant to Section 186.30.
(d) The statements, photographs and fingerprints required under
this section shall not be open to inspection by any person other than
a regularly employed peace or other law enforcement officer.
(e) Nothing in this section or Section 186.30 or 186.31 shall
preclude a court in its discretion from imposing the registration
requirements as set forth in those sections in a gang-related crime.



186.33. (a) Any person required to register pursuant to Section
186.30 who knowingly violates any of its provisions is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
(b) (1) Any person who knowingly fails to register pursuant to
Section 186.30 and is subsequently convicted of, or any person for
whom a petition is subsequently sustained for a violation of, any of
the offenses specified in Section 186.30, shall be punished by an
additional term of imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or
2, or 3 years. The court shall order imposition of the middle term
unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation. The
court shall state its reasons for the enhancement choice on the
record at the time of sentencing.
(2) The existence of any fact bringing a person under this
subdivision shall be alleged in the information, indictment, or
petition, and be either admitted by the defendant or minor in open
court, or found to be true or not true by the trier of fact.
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HOMICIDE


187. (a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought.
(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an act
that results in the death of a fetus if any of the following apply:
(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, Article 2
(commencing with Section 123400) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division
106 of the Health and Safety Code.
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's and surgeon'
s certificate, as defined in the Business and Professions Code, in a
case where, to a medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be
death of the mother of the fetus or where her death from childbirth,
although not medically certain, would be substantially certain or
more likely than not.
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the
mother of the fetus.
(c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the
prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.



188. Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away
the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional
doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no
other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of
malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act
within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite
such awareness is included within the definition of malice.



189. All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive
device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of
ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison,
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery,
burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable
under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, or any murder which is
perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the
intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree. All other
kinds of murders are of the second degree.
As used in this section, "destructive device" means any
destructive device as defined in Section 12301, and "explosive" means
any explosive as defined in Section 12000 of the Health and Safety
Code.
As used in this section, "weapon of mass destruction" means any
item defined in Section 11417.
To prove the killing was "deliberate and premeditated," it shall
not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully
reflected upon the gravity of his or her act.



189.5. (a) Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide
by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of
mitigation, or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon the
defendant, unless the proof on the part of the prosecution tends to
show that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that
the defendant was justifiable or excusable.
(b) Nothing in this section shall apply to or affect any
proceeding under Section 190.3 or 190.4.




190. (a) Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be
punished by death, imprisonment in the state prison for life without
the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison for a
term of 25 years to life. The penalty to be applied shall be
determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and
190.5.
Except as provided in subdivision (b), (c), or (d), every person
guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person guilty of
murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for a term of 25 years to life if the victim was a peace
officer, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 830.1, subdivision
(a), (b), or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of Section
830.33, or Section 830.5, who was killed while engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer
engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(c) Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of life
without the possibility of parole if the victim was a peace officer,
as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 830.1, subdivision (a), (b),
or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of Section 830.33, or
Section 830.5, who was killed while engaged in the performance of his
or her duties, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance
of his or her duties, and any of the following facts has been
charged and found true:
(1) The defendant specifically intended to kill the peace officer.

(2) The defendant specifically intended to inflict great bodily
injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, on a peace officer.
(3) The defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in
the commission of the offense, in violation of subdivision (b) of
Section 12022.
(4) The defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of
the offense, in violation of Section 12022.5.
(d) Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 20 years
to life if the killing was perpetrated by means of shooting a firearm
from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the
vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury.
(e) Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of
Title 1 of Part 3 shall not apply to reduce any minimum term of a
sentence imposed pursuant to this section. A person sentenced
pursuant to this section shall not be released on parole prior to
serving the minimum term of confinement prescribed by this section.



190.03. (a) A person who commits first-degree murder that is a hate
crime shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole.
(b) The term authorized by subdivision (a) shall not apply unless
the allegation is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted by
the defendant or found true by the trier of fact. The court shall
not strike the allegation, except in the interest of justice, in
which case the court shall state its reasons in writing for striking
the allegation.
(c) For the purpose of this section, "hate crime" has the same
meaning as in Section 422.55.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
punishment instead pursuant to any other provision of law that
imposes a greater or more severe punishment.


190.05. (a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in
the second degree, who has served a prior prison term for murder in
the first or second degree, shall be confinement in the state prison
for a term of life without the possibility of parole or confinement
in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life. For purposes of
this section, a prior prison term for murder of the first or second
degree is that time period in which a defendant has spent actually
incarcerated for his or her offense prior to release on parole.
(b) A prior prison term for murder for purposes of this section
includes either of the following:
(1) A prison term served in any state prison or federal penal
institution, including confinement in a hospital or other institution
or facility credited as service of prison time in the jurisdiction
of confinement, as punishment for the commission of an offense which
includes all of the elements of murder in the first or second degree
as defined under California law.
(2) Incarceration at a facility operated by the Youth Authority
for murder of the first or second degree when the person was subject
to the custody, control, and discipline of the Director of
Corrections.
(c) The fact of a prior prison term for murder in the first or
second degree shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading, and either
admitted by the defendant in open court, or found to be true by the
jury trying the issue of guilt or by the court where guilt is
established by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or by trial by the
court sitting without a jury.
(d) In case of a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant
served a prior prison term for murder in the first or second degree,
the defendant is entitled to a finding that the allegation is not
true.
(e) If the trier of fact finds that the defendant has served a
prior prison term for murder in the first or second degree, there
shall be a separate penalty hearing before the same trier of fact,
except as provided in subdivision (f).
(f) If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a
jury, the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless
a jury is waived by the defendant and the people, in which case the
trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the trier of fact shall be a
jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and the people.
If the trier of fact is a jury and has been unable to reach a
unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall
dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the
issue as to what the penalty shall be. If the new jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court
in its discretion shall either order a new jury or impose a
punishment of confinement in the state prison for a term of 15 years
to life.
(g) Evidence presented at any prior phase of the trial, including
any proceeding under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
pursuant to Section 1026, shall be considered at any subsequent phase
of the trial, if the trier of fact of the prior phase is the same
trier of fact at the subsequent phase.
(h) In the proceeding on the question of penalty, evidence may be
presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter
relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including, but not
limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense, any
prior felony conviction or convictions whether or not such
conviction or convictions involved a crime of violence, the presence
or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved
the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the
express or implied threat to use force or violence, and the defendant'
s character, background, history, mental condition, and physical
condition.
However, no evidence shall be admitted regarding other criminal
activity by the defendant which did not involve the use or attempted
use of force or violence or which did not involve the express or
implied threat to use force or violence. As used in this section,
criminal activity does not require a conviction.
However, in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be
admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and
acquitted. The restriction on the use of this evidence is intended
to apply only to proceedings pursuant to this section and is not
intended to affect statutory or decisional law allowing such evidence
to be used in any other proceedings.
Except for evidence in proof of the offense or the prior prison
term for murder of the first or second degree which subjects a
defendant to the punishment of life without the possibility of
parole, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in
aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been
given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as
determined by the court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced
without such notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the
defendant in mitigation.
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into
account any of the following factors if relevant:
(1) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of the prior
prison term for murder.
(2) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the
express or implied threat to use force or violence.
(3) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(4) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(5) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(6) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances
which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification
or extenuation for his or her conduct.
(7) Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or
under the substantial domination of another person.
(8) Whether or not at the time of the offense the ability of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as
a result of mental disease or defect, or the effects of
intoxication.
(9) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(10) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense
and his or her participation in the commission of the offense was
relatively minor.
(11) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the
crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of
fact shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section,
and shall impose a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of
fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, the trier of fact shall impose a sentence
of confinement in the state prison for 15 years to life.
(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the
charging of finding of any special circumstance pursuant to Sections
190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.



190.1. A case in which the death penalty may be imposed pursuant to
this chapter shall be tried in separate phases as follows:
(a) The question of the defendant's guilt shall be first
determined. If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first
degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of all
special circumstances charged as enumerated in Section 190.2 except
for a special circumstance charged pursuant to paragraph (2) of
subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 where it is alleged that the
defendant had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of
murder in the first or second degree.
(b) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and
one of the special circumstances is charged pursuant to paragraph (2)
of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 which charges that the defendant
had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder of
the first or second degree, there shall thereupon be further
proceedings on the question of the truth of such special
circumstance.
(c) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and
one or more special circumstances as enumerated in Section 190.2 has
been charged and found to be true, his sanity on any plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity under Section 1026 shall be determined
as provided in Section 190.4. If he is found to be sane, there shall
thereupon be further proceedings on the question of the penalty to
be imposed. Such proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of Section 190.3 and 190.4.



190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of
murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state
prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section
190.4 to be true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.

(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first
or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense
committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California
would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed
murder in the first or second degree.
(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more
than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area,
dwelling, building, or structure, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would
create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect,
an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted
to mail or deliver, or caused to be mailed or delivered, and the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act
or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human
beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1,
830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37,
830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged
in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was
intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer,
as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace
officer under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who,
while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties,
was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or
the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was
intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her
official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1,
who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her
duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the victim was a firefighter
engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally
killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any
criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed
during the commission or attempted commission, of the crime to which
he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and
was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in
any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section
602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a
former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state
prosecutor's office in this or any other state, or of a federal
prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's
official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record
in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state,
and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or
to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former
official of the federal government, or of any local or state
government of this or any other state, and the killing was
intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the
phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity" means a conscienceless or pitiless crime that
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of
lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her
race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in,
or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of,
or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit,
the following felonies:
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of
a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section
460.
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.
(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(M) To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in
subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific
intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the
elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special
circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is
committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the
murder.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of
torture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the
administration of poison.
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder
was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another
person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor vehicle" means any
vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while the
defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as
defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was
carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under
subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an
actual killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to
be true under Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at
the time of the commission of the offense which is the basis of the
special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to
kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests,
or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree
shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true
under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual
killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in
paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some
person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special
circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been
found to be true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and
Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.




190.25. (a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in
the first degree shall be confinement in state prison for a term of
life without the possibility of parole in any case in which any of
the following special circumstances has been charged and specially
found under Section 190.4, to be true: the victim was the operator
or driver of a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless trolley,
or other motor vehicle operated on land, including a vehicle
operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in the
air, used for the transportation of persons for hire, or the victim
was a station agent or ticket agent for the entity providing such
transportation, who, while engaged in the course of the performance
of his or her duties was intentionally killed, and such defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was the
operator or driver of a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless
trolley, or other motor vehicle operated on land, including a
vehicle operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended
in the air, used for the transportation of persons for hire, or was a
station agent or ticket agent for the entity providing such
transportation, engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(b) Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of
intentionally aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing,
soliciting, requesting, or assisting any actor in the commission of
murder in the first degree shall suffer confinement in state prison
for a term of life without the possibility of parole, in any case in
which one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in
subdivision (a) of this section has been charged and specially found
under Section 190.4 to be true.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the
charging or finding of any special circumstance pursuant to Sections
190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.



190.3. If the defendant has been found guilty of murder in the
first degree, and a special circumstance has been charged and found
to be true, or if the defendant may be subject to the death penalty
after having been found guilty of violating subdivision (a) of
Section 1672 of the Military and Veterans Code or Sections 37, 128,
219, or 4500 of this code, the trier of fact shall determine whether
the penalty shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term
of life without the possibility of parole. In the proceedings on the
question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people
and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation,
mitigation, and sentence including, but not limited to, the nature
and circumstances of the present offense, any prior felony conviction
or convictions whether or not such conviction or convictions
involved a crime of violence, the presence or absence of other
criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or
attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or
implied threat to use force or violence, and the defendant's
character, background, history, mental condition and physical
condition.
However, no evidence shall be admitted regarding other criminal
activity by the defendant which did not involve the use or attempted
use of force or violence or which did not involve the express or
implied threat to use force or violence. As used in this section,
criminal activity does not require a conviction.
However, in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be
admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and
acquitted. The restriction on the use of this evidence is intended
to apply only to proceedings pursuant to this section and is not
intended to affect statutory or decisional law allowing such evidence
to be used in any other proceedings.
Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special
circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no
evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless
notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the
defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the
court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced without such
notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in
mitigation.
The trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of
confinement to state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole may in future after sentence is imposed, be
commuted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of
parole by the Governor of the State of California.
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into
account any of the following factors if relevant:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special
circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the
express or implied threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances
which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification
or extenuation for his conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under
the substantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of
mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense
and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively
minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the
crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of
fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section,
and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of
fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a
term of life without the possibility of parole.



190.4. (a) Whenever special circumstances as enumerated in Section
190.2 are alleged and the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of
first degree murder, the trier of fact shall also make a special
finding on the truth of each alleged special circumstance. The
determination of the truth of any or all of the special circumstances
shall be made by the trier of fact on the evidence presented at the
trial or at the hearing held pursuant to Subdivision (b) of Section
190.1.
In case of a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance
is true, the defendant is entitled to a finding that is not true.
The trier of fact shall make a special finding that each special
circumstance charged is either true or not true. Whenever a special
circumstance requires proof of the commission or attempted commission
of a crime, such crime shall be charged and proved pursuant to the
general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime.
If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a
jury, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by
the defendant and by the people, in which case the trier of fact
shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by a plea of
guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by
the defendant and by the people.
If the trier of fact finds that any one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 as charged is true, there
shall be a separate penalty hearing, and neither the finding that any
of the remaining special circumstances charged is not true, nor if
the trier of fact is a jury, the inability of the jury to agree on
the issue of the truth or untruth of any of the remaining special
circumstances charged, shall prevent the holding of a separate
penalty hearing.
In any case in which the defendant has been found guilty by a
jury, and the jury has been unable to reach an unanimous verdict that
one or more of the special circumstances charged are true, and does
not reach a unanimous verdict that all the special circumstances
charged are not true, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall
order a new jury impaneled to try the issues, but the issue of guilt
shall not be tried by such jury, nor shall such jury retry the issue
of the truth of any of the special circumstances which were found by
an unanimous verdict of the previous jury to be untrue. If such new
jury is unable to reach the unanimous verdict that one or more of the
special circumstances it is trying are true, the court shall dismiss
the jury and in the court's discretion shall either order a new jury
impaneled to try the issues the previous jury was unable to reach
the unanimous verdict on, or impose a punishment of confinement in
state prison for a term of 25 years.
(b) If defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury
the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless a
jury is waived by the defendant and the people, in which case the
trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by
a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is
waived by the defendant and the people.
If the trier of fact is a jury and has been unable to reach a
unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall
dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the
issue as to what the penalty shall be. If such new jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court
in its discretion shall either order a new jury or impose a
punishment of confinement in state prison for a term of life without
the possibility of parole.
(c) If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime
for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same
jury shall consider any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
pursuant to Section 1026, the truth of any special circumstances
which may be alleged, and the penalty to be applied, unless for good
cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury
shall be drawn. The court shall state facts in support of the
finding of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered
into the minutes.
(d) In any case in which the defendant may be subject to the death
penalty, evidence presented at any prior phase of the trial,
including any proceeding under a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity pursuant to Section 1026 shall be considered an any
subsequent phase of the trial, if the trier of fact of the prior
phase is the same trier of fact at the subsequent phase.
(e) In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a
verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be
deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict
or finding pursuant to Subdivision 7 of Section 11. In ruling on the
application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take
into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a
determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are
contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on
the record the reasons for his findings.
The judge shall set forth the reasons for his ruling on the
application and direct that they be entered on the Clerk's minutes.
The denial of the modification of the death penalty verdict pursuant
to subdivision (7) of Section 1181 shall be reviewed on the defendant'
s automatic appeal pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1239. The
granting of the application shall be reviewed on the People's appeal
pursuant to paragraph (6).


190.41. Notwithstanding Section 190.4 or any other provision of
law, the corpus delicti of a felony-based special circumstance
enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 need
not be proved independently of a defendant's extrajudicial
statement.



190.5. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death
penalty shall not be imposed upon any person who is under the age of
18 at the time of the commission of the crime. The burden of proof
as to the age of such person shall be upon the defendant.
(b) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the
first degree, in any case in which one or more special circumstances
enumerated in Section 190.2 or 190.25 has been found to be true under
Section 190.4, who was 16 years of age or older and under the age of
18 years at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be
confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of
parole or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life.
(c) The trier of fact shall determine the existence of any special
circumstance pursuant to the procedure set forth in Section 190.4.



190.6. (a) The Legislature finds that the sentence in all capital
cases should be imposed expeditiously.
(b) Therefore, in all cases in which a sentence of death has been
imposed on or after January 1, 1997, the opening appellate brief in
the appeal to the State Supreme Court shall be filed no later than
seven months after the certification of the record for completeness
under subdivision (d) of Section 190.8 or receipt by the appellant's
counsel of the completed record, whichever is later, except for good
cause. However, in those cases where the trial transcript exceeds
10,000 pages, the briefing shall be completed within the time limits
and pursuant to the procedures set by the rules of court adopted by
the Judicial Council.
(c) In all cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed on
or after January 1, 1997, it is the Legislature's goal that the
appeal be decided and an opinion reaching the merits be filed within
210 days of the completion of the briefing. However, where the
appeal and a petition for writ of habeas corpus is heard at the same
time, the petition should be decided and an opinion reaching the
merits should be filed within 210 days of the completion of the
briefing for the petition.
(d) The failure of the parties or the Supreme Court to meet or
comply with the time limit provided by this section shall not be a
ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence
of death.



190.7. (a) The "entire record" referred to in Section 190.6
includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) The normal and additional record prescribed in the rules
adopted by the Judicial Council pertaining to an appeal taken by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction.
(2) A copy of any other paper or record on file or lodged with the
superior or municipal court and a transcript of any other oral
proceeding reported in the superior or municipal court pertaining to
the trial of the cause.
(b) Notwithstanding this section, the Judicial Council may adopt
rules, not inconsistent with the purpose of Section 190.6,
specifically pertaining to the content, preparation and certification
of the record on appeal when a judgment of death has been
pronounced.


190.8. (a) In any case in which a death sentence has been imposed,
the record on appeal shall be expeditiously certified in two stages,
the first for completeness and the second for accuracy, as provided
by this section. The trial court may use all reasonable means to
ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and rules of court
pertaining to record certification in capital appeals, including, but
not limited to, the imposition of sanctions.
(b) Within 30 days of the imposition of the death sentence, the
clerk of the superior court shall provide to trial counsel copies of
the clerk's transcript and shall deliver the transcript as provided
by the court reporter. Trial counsel shall promptly notify the court
if he or she has not received the transcript within 30 days.
(c) During the course of a trial in which the death penalty is
being sought, trial counsel shall alert the court's attention to any
errors in the transcripts incidentally discovered by counsel while
reviewing them in the ordinary course of trial preparation. The
court shall periodically request that trial counsel provide a list of
errors in the trial transcript during the course of trial and may
hold hearings in connection therewith.
Corrections to the record shall not be required to include
immaterial typographical errors that cannot conceivably cause
confusion.
(d) The trial court shall certify the record for completeness and
for incorporation of all corrections, as provided by subdivision (c),
no later than 90 days after entry of the imposition of the death
sentence unless good cause is shown. However, this time period may
be extended for proceedings in which the trial transcript exceeds
10,000 pages in accordance with the timetable set forth in, or for
good cause pursuant to the procedures set forth in, the rules of
court adopted by the Judicial Council.
(e) Following the imposition of the death sentence and prior to
the deadline set forth in subdivision (d), the trial court shall hold
one or more hearings for trial counsel to address the completeness
of the record and any outstanding errors that have come to their
attention and to certify that they have reviewed all docket sheets to
ensure that the record contains transcripts for any proceedings,
hearings, or discussions that are required to be reported and that
have occurred in the course of the case in any court, as well as all
documents required by this code and the rules adopted by the Judicial
Council.
(f) The clerk of the trial court shall deliver a copy of the
record on appeal to appellate counsel when the clerk receives notice
of counsel's appointment or retention, or when the record is
certified for completeness under subdivision (d), whichever is later.

(g) The trial court shall certify the record for accuracy no later
than 120 days after the record has been delivered to appellate
counsel. However, this time may be extended pursuant to the
timetable and procedures set forth in the rules of court adopted by
the Judicial Council. The trial court may hold one or more status
conferences for purposes of timely certification of the record for
accuracy, as set forth in the rules of court adopted by the Judicial
Council.
(h) The Supreme Court shall identify in writing to the Judicial
Council any case that has not met the time limit for certification of
the record for completeness under subdivision (d) or for accuracy
under subdivision (g), and shall identify those cases, and its
reasons, for which it has granted an extension of time. The Judicial
Council shall include this information in its annual report to the
Legislature.
(i) As used in this section, "trial counsel" means both the
prosecution and the defense counsel in the trial in which the
sentence of death has been imposed.
(j) This section shall be implemented pursuant to rules of court
adopted by the Judicial Council.
(k) This section shall only apply to those proceedings in which a
sentence of death has been imposed following a trial that was
commenced on or after January 1, 1997.



190.9. (a) (1) In any case in which a death sentence may be
imposed, all proceedings conducted in the superior court, including
all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference
in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record
with a court reporter present. The court reporter shall prepare and
certify a daily transcript of all proceedings commencing with the
preliminary hearing. Proceedings prior to the preliminary hearing
shall be reported but need not be transcribed until the court
receives notice as prescribed in paragraph (2).
(2) Upon receiving notification from the prosecution that the
death penalty is being sought, the clerk shall order the
transcription and preparation of the record of all proceedings prior
to and including the preliminary hearing in the manner prescribed by
the Judicial Council in the rules of court. The record of all
proceedings prior to and including the preliminary hearing shall be
certified by the court no later than 120 days following notification
unless the time is extended pursuant to rules of court adopted by the
Judicial Council. Upon certification, the record of all proceedings
is incorporated into the superior court record.
(b) (1) The court shall assign a court reporter who uses
computer-aided transcription equipment to report all proceedings
under this section.
(2) Failure to comply with the requirements of this section
relating to the assignment of court reporters who use computer-aided
transcription equipment is not a ground for reversal.
(c) Any computer-readable transcript produced by court reporters
pursuant to this section shall conform to the requirements of Section
271 of the Code of Civil Procedure.



191. The rules of the common law, distinguishing the killing of a
master by his servant, and of a husband by his wife, as petit
treason, are abolished, and these offenses are homicides, punishable
in the manner prescribed by this Chapter.




191.5. (a) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the
driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section
23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was
either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate
result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in
an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(b) Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving
of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140,
23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the
proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony, but without gross negligence, or the proximate result of
the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(c) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (d), gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of subdivision (a) is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10 years.

(2) Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of
subdivision (b) is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for
not more than one year or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months or 2 or 4 years.
(d) A person convicted of violating subdivision (a) who has one or
more prior convictions of this section or of paragraph (1) of
subdivision (c) of Section 192, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section
192.5 of this code, or of violating Section 23152 punishable under
Sections 23540, 23542, 23546, 23548, 23550, or 23552 of, or convicted
of Section 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.
Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of
Part 3 shall apply to reduce the term imposed pursuant to this
subdivision.
(e) This section shall not be construed as prohibiting or
precluding a charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting
wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to support a finding
of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice consistent with the
holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal.
3d 290.
(f) This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in
the driving of a vehicle or the operation of a vessel punishable
which is not a proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act,
not amounting to felony, or of the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner.
(g) For the penalties in subdivision (d) to apply, the existence
of any fact required under subdivision (d) shall be alleged in the
information or indictment and either admitted by the defendant in
open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.



192. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of three kinds:
(a) Voluntary--upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
(b) Involuntary--in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and
circumspection. This subdivision shall not apply to acts committed in
the driving of a vehicle.
(c) Vehicular--
(1) Except as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 191.5,
driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, and with gross negligence.
(2) Driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a
vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death,
in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(3) Driving a vehicle in connection with a violation of paragraph
(3) of subdivision (a) of Section 550, where the vehicular collision
or vehicular accident was knowingly caused for financial gain and
proximately resulted in the death of any person. This provision shall
not be construed to prevent prosecution of a defendant for the crime
of murder.
This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in the
driving of a vehicle punishable that is not a proximate result of the
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, or of the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner.
"Gross negligence," as used in this section, shall not be
construed as prohibiting or precluding a charge of murder under
Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious
disregard for life to support a finding of implied malice, or upon
facts showing malice, consistent with the holding of the California
Supreme Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290.



192.5. Vehicular manslaughter pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 191.5 and subdivision (c) of Section 192 is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice aforethought, and includes:
(a) Operating a vessel in violation of subdivision (b), (c), (d),
(e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, and in
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, and with
gross negligence; or operating a vessel in violation of subdivision
(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors and
Navigation Code, and in the commission of a lawful act that might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(b) Operating a vessel in violation of subdivision (b), (c), (d),
(e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, and in
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, but
without gross negligence; or operating a vessel in violation of
subdivision (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors
and Navigation Code, and in the commission of a lawful act that might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.

(c) Operating a vessel in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence; or operating a
vessel in the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in
an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(d) Operating a vessel in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, but without gross negligence; or operating a
vessel in the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in
an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(e) A person who flees the scene of the crime after committing a
violation of subdivision (a), (b), or (c), upon conviction, in
addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed, shall be
punished by an additional term of imprisonment of five years in the
state prison. This additional term shall not be imposed unless the
allegation is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted by the
defendant or found to be true by the trier of fact. The court shall
not strike a finding that brings a person within the provisions of
this subdivision or an allegation made pursuant to this subdivision.




193. (a) Voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for 3, 6, or 11 years.
(b) Involuntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for two, three, or four years.
(c) Vehicular manslaughter is punishable as follows:
(1) A violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192
is punishable either by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four,
or six years.
(2) A violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 192
is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
one year.
(3) A violation of paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of Section 192
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10
years.


193.5. Manslaughter committed during the operation of a vessel is
punishable as follows:
(a) A violation of subdivision (a) of Section 192.5 is punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or ten years.
(b) A violation of subdivision (b) of Section 192.5 is punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by
imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or 2 or 4 years.
(c) A violation of subdivision (c) of Section 192.5 is punishable
either by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year
or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or six years.
(d) A violation of subdivision (d) of Section 192.5 is punishable
by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year.



193.7. A person convicted of a violation of subdivision (b) of
Section 191.5 that occurred within seven years of two or more
separate violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section
23103.5, of, or Section 23152 or 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, or any
combination thereof, that resulted in convictions, shall be
designated as an habitual traffic offender subject to paragraph (3)
of subdivision (e) of Section 14601.3 of the Vehicle Code, for a
period of three years, subsequent to the conviction. The person shall
be advised of this designation pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 13350 of the Vehicle Code.



193.8. (a) An adult, who is the registered owner of a motor vehicle
or in possession of a motor vehicle, shall not relinquish possession
of the vehicle to a minor for the purpose of driving if the
following conditions exist:
(1) The adult owner or person in possession of the vehicle knew or
reasonably should have known that the minor was intoxicated at the
time possession was relinquished.
(2) A petition was sustained or the minor was convicted of a
violation of Section 23103 as specified in Section 23103.5, 23140,
23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code or a violation of Section 191.5
or subdivision (a) of Section 192.5.
(3) The minor does not otherwise have a lawful right to possession
of the vehicle.
(b) The offense described in subdivision (a) shall not apply to
commercial bailments, motor vehicle leases, or parking arrangements,
whether or not for compensation, provided by hotels, motels, or food
facilities for customers, guests, or other invitees thereof. For
purposes of this subdivision, hotel and motel shall have the same
meaning as in subdivision (b) of Section 25503.16 of the Business and
Professions Code and food facility shall have the same meaning as in
Section 113785 of the Health and Safety Code.
(c) If an adult is convicted of the offense described in
subdivision (a), that person shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding six months, or by both the fine and
imprisonment. An adult convicted of the offense described in
subdivision (a) shall not be subject to driver's license suspension
or revocation or attendance at a licensed alcohol or drug education
and counseling program for persons who drive under the influence.




194. To make the killing either murder or manslaughter, it is not
requisite that the party die within three years and a day after the
stroke received or the cause of death administered. If death occurs
beyond the time of three years and a day, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the killing was not criminal. The prosecution
shall bear the burden of overcoming this presumption. In the
computation of time, the whole of the day on which the act was done
shall be reckoned the first.



195. Homicide is excusable in the following cases:
1. When committed by accident and misfortune, or in doing any
other lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution,
and without any unlawful intent.
2. When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of
passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden
combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon
used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.




196. Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and
those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, either--
1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent Court; or,
2. When necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to
the execution of some legal process, or in the discharge of any other
legal duty; or,
3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been
rescued or have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting
persons charged with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or
resisting such arrest.



197. Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in
any of the following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a
felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person,
against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or
surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends
and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter
the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any
person therein; or,
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a
wife or husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of such
person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to
commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent
danger of such design being accomplished; but such person, or the
person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he was the assailant
or engaged in mutual combat, must really and in good faith have
endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was
committed; or,
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and
means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in
lawfully suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving
the peace.


198. A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned
in subdivisions 2 and 3 of Section 197, to prevent which homicide
may be lawfully committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the
circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable
person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of
such fears alone.



198.5. Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or
great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to
have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great
bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that
force is used against another person, not a member of the family or
household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and
forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or
had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred.

As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant
or substantial physical injury.



199. The homicide appearing to be justifiable or excusable, the
person indicted must, upon his trial, be fully acquitted and
discharged.
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[هيثم الفقى]

[align=left]203. Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human
being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it
useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or
slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.




204. Mayhem is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for
two, four, or eight years.



205. A person is guilty of aggravated mayhem when he or she
unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the physical or psychological well-being of another person,
intentionally causes permanent disability or disfigurement of another
human being or deprives a human being of a limb, organ, or member of
his or her body. For purposes of this section, it is not necessary
to prove an intent to kill. Aggravated mayhem is a felony punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of
parole.


206. Every person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme
pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion,
or for any sadistic purpose, inflicts great bodily injury as defined
in Section 12022.7 upon the person of another, is guilty of torture.

The crime of torture does not require any proof that the victim
suffered pain.



206.1. Torture is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for a term of life.[/align]

[هيثم الفقى]

[align=left]
207. (a) Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of
instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any
person in this state, and carries the person into another country,
state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty
of kidnapping.
(b) Every person, who for the purpose of committing any act
defined in Section 288, hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces
by false promises, misrepresentations, or the like, any child under
the age of 14 years to go out of this country, state, or county, or
into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.
(c) Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling
fear, takes or holds, detains, or arrests any person, with a design
to take the person out of this state, without having established a
claim, according to the laws of the United States, or of this state,
or who hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces by false
promises, misrepresentations, or the like, any person to go out of
this state, or to be taken or removed therefrom, for the purpose and
with the intent to sell that person into slavery or involuntary
servitude, or otherwise to employ that person for his or her own use,
or to the use of another, without the free will and consent of that
persuaded person, is guilty of kidnapping.
(d) Every person who, being out of this state, abducts or takes by
force or fraud any person contrary to the law of the place where
that act is committed, and brings, sends, or conveys that person
within the limits of this state, and is afterwards found within the
limits thereof, is guilty of kidnapping.
(e) For purposes of those types of kidnapping requiring force, the
amount of force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is
the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child
away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal
intent.
(f) Subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, do not apply to any of the
following:
(1) To any person who steals, takes, entices away, detains,
conceals, or harbors any child under the age of 14 years, if that act
is taken to protect the child from danger of imminent harm.
(2) To any person acting under Section 834 or 837.



208. (a) Kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for three, five, or eight years.
(b) If the person kidnapped is under 14 years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime, the kidnapping is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 11 years. This
subdivision is not applicable to the taking, detaining, or
concealing, of a minor child by a biological parent, a natural
father, as specified in Section 7611 of the Family Code, an adoptive
parent, or a person who has been granted access to the minor child by
a court order.
(c) In all cases in which probation is granted, the court shall,
except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be
served by a lesser penalty, require as a condition of the probation
that the person be confined in the county jail for 12 months. If the
court grants probation without requiring the defendant to be
confined in the county jail for 12 months, it shall specify its
reason or reasons for imposing a lesser penalty.



209. (a) Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices,
decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away another person by
any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain, or who holds or
detains, that person for ransom, reward or to commit extortion or to
exact from another person any money or valuable thing, or any person
who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for life without possibility of parole in cases in which any
person subjected to any such act suffers death or bodily harm, or is
intentionally confined in a manner which exposes that person to a
substantial likelihood of death, or shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole in cases
where no such person suffers death or bodily harm.
(b) (1) Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to
commit robbery, rape, spousal rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or any
violation of Section 264.1, 288, or 289, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of
parole.
(2) This subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the
victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and
increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that
necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.
(c) In all cases in which probation is granted, the court shall,
except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be
served by a lesser penalty, require as a condition of the probation
that the person be confined in the county jail for 12 months. If the
court grants probation without requiring the defendant to be confined
in the county jail for 12 months, it shall specify its reason or
reasons for imposing a lesser penalty.
(d) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to supersede or affect
Section 667.61. A person may be charged with a violation of
subdivision (b) and Section 667.61. However, a person may not be
punished under subdivision (b) and Section 667.61 for the same act
that constitutes a violation of both subdivision (b) and Section
667.61.



209.5. (a) Any person who, during the commission of a carjacking
and in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps
another person who is not a principal in the commission of the
carjacking shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
life with the possibility of parole.
(b) This section shall only apply if the movement of the victim is
beyond that merely incidental to the commission of the carjacking,
the victim is moved a substantial distance from the vicinity of the
carjacking, and the movement of the victim increases the risk of harm
to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the crime
of carjacking itself.
(c) In all cases in which probation is granted, the court shall,
except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be
served by a lesser penalty, require as a condition of the probation
that the person be confined in the county jail for 12 months. If the
court grants probation without requiring the defendant to be
confined in the county jail for 12 months, it shall specify its
reason or reasons for imposing a lesser penalty.




210. Every person who for the purpose of obtaining any ransom or
reward, or to extort or exact from any person any money or thing of
value, poses as, or in any manner represents himself to be a person
who has seized, confined, inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted,
concealed, kidnapped or carried away any person, or who poses as, or
in any manner represents himself to be a person who holds or detains
such person, or who poses as, or in any manner represents himself to
be a person who has aided or abetted any such act, or who poses as or
in any manner represents himself to be a person who has the
influence, power, or ability, to obtain the release of such person so
seized, confined, inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted, concealed,
kidnapped or carried away, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for two, three or four
years.
Nothing in this section prohibits any person who, in good faith
believes that he can rescue any person who has been seized, confined,
inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted, concealed, kidnapped or
carried away, and who has had no part in, or connection with, such
confinement, inveigling, decoying, abducting, concealing, kidnapping,
or carrying away, from offering to rescue or obtain the release of
such person for a monetary consideration or other thing of value.[/align]

[هيثم الفقى]

[align=left]
210.5. Every person who commits the offense of false imprisonment,
as defined in Section 236, against a person for purposes of
protection from arrest, which substantially increases the risk of
harm to the victim, or for purposes of using the person as a shield
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, five, or
eight years.

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