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الموضوع: Relating To Certain Aspects Of Laws On Use Of Languages In Education In Belgium (Meri

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      1. COLLECTIVE DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES HOLMBÄCK, RODENBOURG, ROSS, WIARDA AND MAST
        1. (Point I of the operative provisions of the judgment)
      2. (Translation)
      3. The legal and administrative measures governing access to the education given in French in the six communes "with special facilities", are not incompatible with the first sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol read in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14+P1-2) of the Convention. This opinion follows from a logical application of the principles formulated by the Court, in particular, in the general part of the judgment (interpretation adopted by the Court), and in the reasons for the decision reached by it concerning the first question. Those holding the present opinion consider that the reply which the Court, by a majority of one, has given to the second limb of the fifth question is difficult to reconcile with a rational interpretation of these principles. The general part of the judgment states the following principles:
        1. "... Article 14 (art. 14) (of the Convention) does not forbid every difference in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised ... One would, in effect, be led to judge as contrary to the Convention every one of the many legal or administrative provisions which do not secure to everyone complete equality of treatment in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised. The competent national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems which, on account of differences inherent therein, call for different legal solutions; however certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities". The judgment holds that the effect of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 (art. 14+P1-2) is not to guarantee to children or their parents the right to education conducted in the language of their choice since, where the Contracting Parties wished to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction, specific rights in the field of the use of a language or of its understanding, they made this clear in the text, as in Articles 5 (2) and 6 (3) (a) (art. 5-2, art. 6-3-a) of the Convention. The judgment then states, in its general part, when the distinction in treatment is contrary to Article 14 (art. 14).
      4. It lays down the following rules:
        1. (1) The distinction must pursue a legitimate aim.
        1. (2) The distinction may not lack an "objective justification".
        1. (3) Article 14 (art. 14) is violated when it "is clearly established" that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.
        1. (4) The existence of this reasonable relationship must be appreciated in the knowledge of the "legal and factual features which characterise the life of the society in the State which is to answer for the measure in dispute".
        1. (5) The Court cannot, in the exercise of this power of appreciation, "assume the role of the competent national authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention". It follows from this that "the national authorities remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention" and that "review by the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the requirements of the Convention".
      5. Those holding the dissenting opinion here stated do not contest the well-foundedness of these five principles, but they consider that there is a discrepancy between the legal premises established by the Court and the reply given to the second limb of the fifth question.
      6. They consider:
      7. I. That the distinction in treatment attacked pursues a legitimate aim;
      8. II. That the measures attacked are based on objective features which justify them;
      9. III. That the absence of a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised is not established and certainly is not clearly established; that with regard to the reply given to the second limb of the fifth question, the judgment has not sufficiently taken account of the rule according to which the national authorities, who are in the first place those who must appreciate the requirements implied by the factual and legal features in issue, remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention.
      10. I. The distinction in treatment attacked pursues a legitimate aim
      11. In excluding from the benefit of education given in French the children whose parents live in the Dutch unilingual region near the communes "with special facilities", the legislator was anxious to ensure the linguistic homogeneity of the two communities which would, in his view, be threatened by an extension of an exceptional system beyond the territory of the six communes. The conception of the Acts of 30th July and 2nd August 1963, which were voted by a very large majority of Fleming, Walloon and Brussels parliamentarians, was that this homogeneity is the very condition of a lasting accord between the communities.
      12. This way of looking at things is open to discussion and was discussed at great length in the Belgian Parliament, but there is no reason to believe that the objective pursued in this case by the laws attacked is contrary to the letter or the spirit of the Convention.
      13. Besides, the Court in its reply to the first question has affirmed that the purpose of the "legal measures which have been attacked ... is to achieve linguistic unity within the two large regions of Belgium in which a large majority of the population speaks only one of the two national languages" and that "in other words (the legislation) tends to prevent, in the Dutch unilingual region, the establishment or maintenance of schools which teach only in French".
      14. The Court holds that "such a measure cannot be considered arbitrary", that "to begin with it is based on the objective element which the region constitutes" and that "it is based on a public interest, namely to ensure that all schools dependent on the State and existing in a unilingual region, conduct their teaching in the language which is essentially that of the region".
      15. II. The distinction in treatment challenged is based on objective
      16. FEATURES
      17. It may be assumed that the French-speaking persons, to whose cost the balance which a non-discriminatory measure implies is said to have been disturbed, live in communes situated in Dutch unilingual territory adjacent to the communes "with special facilities". Their system is that of all the French-speaking persons living in that part of Belgium.
      18. The alleged lack of objectivity constituting a discrimination is based on an ambiguity in the appreciation of the situation in which they are placed because they live in the Dutch unilingual region near to the commune "with special facilities".
      19. One is moved by the fact that they must, if they wish their children to be educated in French, send them to a school in Brussels which is further from their home than the French-language school in the commune "with special facilities" near to where they live.
      20. To deduce from this that the imposition upon them of this difficulty or inconvenience amounts to a discrimination, is to misunderstand the significance of that objective factor which is the frontier which separates the communes with special facilities from the Dutch unilingual communes.
      21. This frontier is an objective and necessary factor, inherent in the nature of the relationship between the system of common law and that which constitutes an exception to it.
      22. Any derogation from a system of common law, whatever it may be, has by its very nature effects which may seem arbitrary but which are only apparently so. The minor has full capacity only on the day on which he attains his majority; he does not have it the day before. It would however be ill-considered to condemn as arbitrary, for this reason, the law which fixes the age of majority at 21 years. The same reasoning holds good in the case referred to the Court by the second limb of the fifth question.
      23. The Belgian legislator was not obliged to accord to the six communes "with special facilities", situated in unilingual territory, an exceptional system establishing certain modifications of a practical nature to the principle of territoriality. This he has done but, in so doing, he expressly affirmed that in the six communes, he did not intend to renounce the principle of territoriality. Section 7 (3) of the Act of 2nd August 1963, which is conclusive on this point, says, in its preliminary provisions, that as regards the question of schools in the six communes the language of instruction shall be Dutch.
      24. In a similar spirit, Section 7 (4) of the Act of 2nd August 1963 (paragraph relating to the administrative system in general of the communes "with special facilities"), provides as follows: "In their relations with the local services set up in the six communes with which this Article is concerned, the central services, the regional services on which the said local services depend, as well as the local and regional services of the Dutch language region shall employ the Dutch language".
      25. The reply given to the second limb of the fifth question does not mention the text of paragraph 4 and does not accord to paragraph 3 its proper scope. This scope is considerable since it concerns, essentially, the linguistic system relating to education. It is true, as the judgment holds, that the legislator has derogated from the principle of territoriality with regard to the six communes; it is also true that the six communes constitute "a distinct administrative district" and that they are allotted a "special status"; likewise it is true, under the terms of Section 7 (2), that the local services set up in these communes draft both in Dutch and in French, the communications and forms to be sent to the public. But paragraphs 3 and 4 cited above imply that as regards education just as much as administration, the linguistic system of the common law of the localities in question, is the Dutch system. Thus the premises, from which the reply given to the second limb of the fifth question follows, are all the more open to question as the scope of paragraphs 3 and 4 is conclusive.
      26. The legislator who, it must be reiterated, may grant derogations from the principle of territoriality but who is not bound to do so, has, regard being had to the Convention, the right to determine the precise limits within which he intends to confine the extent of the derogation granted. In this case, he has decided that these limits should be those, which are eminently objective, of the territory of the six communes.
      27. A system which derogates from the common law is by its very nature limited in its effects. That those who do not fulfil the objective conditions required (because they live outside the territory provided for) are in certain respects treated differently from those who do fulfil them (because they do live in that territory), in no way therefore constitutes a discrimination.
      28. Article 14 (art. 14) is furthermore not violated because the residence condition only applies with respect to one of the two linguistic groups.
      29. It is true that "the Dutch-speaking children resident in the French unilingual region, which incidentally is very near, have access to Dutch-language schools in the six communes, whereas French-speaking children living in the Dutch unilingual region are refused access to French-language schools in those same communes", but this difference in treatment is not arbitrary. It is justified on objective grounds. Firstly, by the legitimate aim which the legislator has pursued, to wit, to ensure the linguistic homogeneity of the communities.
      30. Furthermore, and above all, it is justified because the Dutch-language schools are, in the six communes, the common law schools and because in the two regions, the characteristic of common law schools is that they are open to all.
      31. Lastly, in establishing in Flemish territory French-language schools which depend on an exceptional system, the legislator has left unchanged the common law system of Dutch-language schools in Flemish territory.
      32. Thus, the difference in treatment which is wrongly denounced as a discrimination is the inevitable consequence of the fact that the legislator - as was his right - intended to limit the effects of the exception which he permitted to the principle of territoriality only to the children of families whose head lives in the communes "with special facilities", and the limits to common law were permitted on the basis of this paramount objective factor, which the residence of the head of the family constitutes.
      33. Consequently it is evident that only the conditions of access to French-language schools allowed in these communes are of importance. That Dutch-speaking children from the Dutch unilingual region are granted access to the Dutch-language classes in the six communes is irrelevant, for the attendance of Dutch-speaking children at schools which provide an education in Dutch does not affect the extent of the exception made to the principle that Dutch is, under common law, the language of instruction in the communes "with special facilities".
      34. Besides, the theoretical character of the factors on which the alleged discrimination is based may be pointed out.
      35. No reason of a linguistic nature can impel Dutch-speaking parents living in the Dutch-language part of the country, or French-speaking parents living in the French part of the country, to send their children to Dutch or French language schools in the six communes since they find the school of the linguistic system of their choice on the spot.
      36. As for the Dutch-speaking parents living in the communes under the French system near to the linguistic frontier, the access which their children have to the Dutch-language schools in the six communes, poses no question of discrimination since they are only claiming to use the common law educational system and not, like the French-speaking parents living in the Dutch part of the country, the advantage of an exceptional system.
      37. It must therefore be concluded that the distinction in treatment attacked is in no way discriminatory.
      38. III. The applications must, as regards the second limb of the fifth question, be rejected by the application of the principles governing the theory of the proportionality, the appreciation of the factual and legal features and the subsidiary character of the Court's mission
      39. In that part of the judgment devoted to the general interpretation adopted by the Court, it is stated as a principle that Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention is violated only when it is clearly established that no relationship of proportionality exists between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. It would not therefore be enough - supposing that such were the position - to be confronted with a marginal case, to conclude that there is a violation of human rights in the case of the Applicants. The differentiation in treatment is not discriminatory and it has not in any way been established that the relationship of proportionality has been disregarded. The common law legislation which governs all the communes in the Dutch-language region applies to French-speaking persons resident in the Dutch unilingual communes adjacent to the six communes, and in its reply to the first question the Court stated why this legislation is contrary neither to Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2), nor to Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, taken in isolation or in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14+P1-2, art. 14+8).
      40. The difficulties invoked by the Applicants concern the distance from the parents' place of residence of French-language schools which, unlike the schools in the six communes, are open to French-speaking children in the Dutch unilingual region.
      41. It is a fact that these difficulties are clearly less for parents who, like the Applicants, live in the localities belonging to the Dutch unilingual system adjacent to the communes "with special facilities" of the Brussels agglomeration, than the difficulties caused to French-speaking parents who, in Dutch unilingual territory, live further or may live much further from the nearest French-language school open to their children.
      42. Now, the Court has found that as regards these last-mentioned parents, "the measures adopted in this matter by the Belgian legislature are not so disproportionate to the requirements of the public interest which is being pursued as to constitute a discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol (art. 14+P1-2) or with Article 8 (art. 14+8) of the Convention".
      43. Even more so, the principle of proportionality has not been violated with respect to the Applicants who live in the localities adjacent to the communes with special facilities.
      44. To consider, for the reasons which have been refuted under II above, that those objective limits imposed by the Belgian legislator on the exception which he has allowed to the principle of territoriality are arbitrary, amounts to contesting his right to decide, regard being had to the factual and legal features characterising the present situation in Belgium, the scope of the derogation which - without being bound so to do - he has considered himself able to make from a more severe common law system, a system which the Court has recognised as not being contrary to the Convention. In so doing the Court has lost "sight of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention".
      45. This is why, for all the reasons stated above, in the opinion of those holding this dissenting opinion, the Applications should have been rejected as regards the second limb of the fifth question.
      46. INDIVIDUAL OPINION, PARTLY DISSENTING (POINT I OF THE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE JUDGMENT), OF JUDGE G. MARIDAKIS
      47. (Translation)<LI value=1>In 1830, when she gained her independence, Belgium consisted of two de facto zones, the Flemish and the Walloon. The Walloons spoke French and the Flemings Dutch.
        The higher civil service spoke French. All judicial business was transacted in French. As far as education was concerned there were no special problems in the Walloon area. In the Flemish region primary education was given in Dutch, secondary education was bilingual and university education was entirely in French.
        In the years 1900-1930 a "Flemish separatist movement" came into being.
        Then came the 1932 legislation. This placed the two languages on an equal footing and adopted the territorialist solution. The 1932 Acts did not fix the language boundary immutably: the boundary could change as a result of the decennial language censuses. The last such census was held in 1947, and the results, which were published in 1954, showed that the Flemish were advancing demographically and the Walloons geographically.
        <LI value=2>Under the 1963 Acts the national territory is divided into four linguistic regions, the Flemish, French and German regions and that of the Brussels conurbation.
        In the first three regions the Acts require the exclusive use of Flemish, French and German respectively.
        Under the 1963 Acts, unlike those of 1932, each linguistic region has stable boundaries drawn in such a way as to give preponderance in the region to one language.
        The immutability of the language boundary and territorial unilingualism are the foundations on which the 1963 Acts are based. It is clearly with the intention of strengthening these foundations that under the Acts:
        (1) Transmutation classes are abolished.
        (2) The Belgian State refuses in the unilingual regions to establish State schools or subsidise private schools in which instruction is given in a language other than that of the region.
        (3) The State refuses to subsidise schools which give instruction in non-subsidised classes in a language other than that of the region.
        (4) The State refuses to homologate leaving certificates issued by schools that do not conform to the language legislation.
        (5) The State makes special arrangements for the bilingual communes on the outskirts of Brussels.
        <LI value=3>The Applicants are French-speaking and live in predominantly Flemish-speaking areas. They complain in effect that the Belgian State:
        - does not provide any French education in the communes where they live or, in the case of Kraainem, provides it only within limits which they consider inadequate,
        - withholds grants from those schools in the communes in question that do not conform with the linguistic clauses of the school legislation,
        - refuses to homologate leaving certificates issued by such schools,
        - denies the Applicants' children entry to the French classes existing in certain places,
        - thereby obliges the Applicants either to enrol their children in a local school - which they consider contrary to their aspirations – or to send them to school either in Greater Brussels, where instruction is given in Dutch or French depending on the child's mother tongue or usual language, or in the "French-speaking region" (Wallonia). Such "scholastic emigration" is said to entail serious dangers and hardships.
        The Applicants allege violations of Articles 8 and 14 (art. 8, art. 14) of the Convention and Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2).
        <LI value=4>Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2) reads:
        "No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions."
        The Applicants maintain that the term "religious and philosophical convictions" covers language. Philosophical convictions are said necessarily to include, inter alia, parents' cultural and linguistic preferences, and it is considered inconceivable that a State that observes Article 2 (P1-2) should allow fathers to bring their children up in a particular religion or philosophy while denying them the choice of education in one of the national languages rather than the other.
        <LI value=5>In the sentence "No person shall be denied the right to education" the Contracting States intended to express a conviction common to all the peoples of Europe, namely that man, as a being gifted with reason (logos), has an innate desire for knowledge. ("All men naturally desire knowledge", Aristotle, The Metaphysics I.) Since knowledge is acquired by instruction, it necessarily follows that instruction, as a concomitant to reason, is coexistent with it and is an inalienable and intangible right of every man. ("No person shall be denied the right to education" is a directive (a legal standard or Richtliniennorm) which the State must follow "in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching".
        As man's innate desire for knowledge, and consequently for the instruction that leads to it, cannot be obstructed in any way, the Contracting States simply add that "in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions".
        By "religious and philosophical convictions" are meant those ideas on the world in general and human society in particular that each man considers the most true in the light of the religion he professes and the philosophical theories he adopts.
        Those ideas make up each man's interior life. As that life develops, it has to resort to a specific language in order to express itself, but it nevertheless exists in its own right irrespective of the idiom by which it tries to externalise itself.
        On this understanding of Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2), the 1963 Acts are in no way concerned with the content of education whatever be the language in which instruction is given – whether French or Dutch; it follows that the Acts in no way prevent parents from bringing their children up in accordance with their religious and philosophical convictions.
        <LI value=6>Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention reads:
        "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
      48. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
        The Applicants complain that they are obliged to send their children either to a French school in Greater Brussels or to a school in the French-speaking region and that such "scholastic emigration" entails serious dangers and hardships.
        Seen from this angle the question whether or not the 1963 Acts are in accordance with Article 8 (art. 8) is a question of fact: in each particular case it will be necessary to establish the effect on private and family life of whether the French-language school is near to or far from the parents' place of residence and of the dangers of daily "scholastic emigration".
        However, the question is general in nature and may be thus formulated: is the content of the Belgian Acts of 1963 contrary to Article 8 (art. 8)?
        In the immutability of the language boundaries and the territorial unilingualism laid down, the Acts have more general aims designed to benefit the entire Belgian nation; they in no way affect private and family life based on ties of blood and on family traditions. Private and family life would be violated if the authorities intervened to force a person to shape that life in a way that departed from his traditions and thus from the spirit that, by virtue of blood ties, predominated in relations between parents and their children and between members of the same family in general.
        But neither family traditions nor ties of blood are disturbed by the fact that, because of the immutability of the language boundary and territorial unilingualism, both of which principles were introduced in the general interest of the Belgian nation, the Applicants, as French-speaking persons resident in a region where education is given solely in Dutch, are obliged to send their children to French-language schools far from their homes.
        The 1963 Acts withhold from persons attending schools where education is not in the regional language that which is granted to those who attend schools where the education is given in that language; in particular homologation and grants are denied (see No. 3 above).
        But the reasons for this denial is to give effect to the principles of immutability of the language boundary and territorial unilingualism, on which Belgian legislation has placed its language policy in consideration of the general interests of the Belgians. Thus if, for reasons of the public interest of the whole of the Belgian nation, French-speaking parents are obliged to send their children to French-language schools far from their homes, this entails no dangers other than those to which schoolchildren are exposed daily in their journeys between school and home, and which can be eliminated by a little more vigilance on the part of parents.
        Thus the fact that French-speaking parents feel obliged to send their children to schools in which education is given in French, i.e. in the language of the French-speaking region, is a mere inconvenience; it is not interference by the authorities with private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention. Such inconvenience may be described as the price paid for a legislative measure inspired by national and social considerations (see Section 5 (2) of the Act of 30th July 1963 on the use of languages in education: "... while respecting the right of parents to send their children to a school of their choice at a reasonable distance").
      49. The true meaning of Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention becomes clear if it is added to Article 1 (art. 1), which then reads:
        "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention and the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ***, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status".
        The Belgian legislative power thought a just settlement of the violent linguistic dispute between Flemings and Walloons could be achieved if the language boundary were drawn immutably once and for all, territorial unilingualism being introduced at the same time.
        They also thought that such immutability and unilingualism could never be enforced unless the restrictions mentioned under paragraph 3 were introduced.
        Discrimination (distinction in the French text) contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) must be understood to mean any open or disguised discrimination introduced with the manifest intention and sole aim of escaping the State's obligations under the Convention.
        In the present case the restrictions mentioned under paragraph 3 above apply in both the Flemish-speaking and the French-speaking regions. Their justification is their specific object, that of giving effect to, instead of leaving as mere words, territorial unilingualism and the immutability of the language frontier, in order to put an end to the violent dispute between Walloons and Flemings and to restore normal and calm living conditions for the entire Belgian nation.
        These restrictions, especially the denial of homologation and grants, are similar in nature to the "sanctions" listed in Chapter VII, Section 50, of the (parallel) Act of 2nd August 1963 "on the use of languages in administration".
        These restrictions ("sanctions"), taken collectively and individually, have the same object, which is not to leave in the air but to give reality and effect to the regional immutability and territorial unilingualism on which Belgium's linguistic policy in administration and education is based.
        But if all these restrictions are of the same kind and all have the same object, i.e. the interest of the Belgian nation as a whole, and the same value, it follows that it is inconsistent to describe some as "favours" and others as "hardships" towards Walloons or Flemings. They are rather a way of adapting the law to a pre-existing de facto difference resulting from deeply rooted historical realities.
        The restrictions might be described, by analogy with the provisions of Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 18 (art. 8, art. 9, art. 10, art. 11, art. 18) of the Convention, as "necessary measures" to ensure a normal and prosperous life in the Belgian State for the benefit of the entire Belgian nation.
        Moreover, according to the general principles of interpretative technique, the various provisions of an Act form a whole. Their unity derives from the fact that they all express a single intention. Thus a single provision must not be interpreted in a way that is not in accordance with the intention behind the whole text. This is expressed in the celebrated Roman adage: "Incivile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliqua particula ejus judicare vel respondere".
        Thus any specific provision of the Belgian legislation in question conflicts with the Convention only if, following interpretation in the light of the intention behind that legislation as a whole, it conflicts with a specific provision of the Convention interpreted according to the intention behind the Convention as a whole.
        According to the intention behind the Convention, in particular as manifested in Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 18 (art. 8, art. 9, art. 10, art. 11, art. 18) each Contracting State may, for reasons of the public interest, take the measures "necessary in a democratic society" to protect that interest as it appears from the circumstances of the case; but it may do so only to the extent that, while protecting the public interest, the State does not repudiate or appreciably limit its obligations, as laid down in the Convention, to respect the human rights safeguarded by the Convention.
        In the present case the Belgian legislation, considered as a whole and in the light of its intention, has the specific object of restoring to the Belgian nation the calm and order so deeply disturbed by the language question.
        Thus if, in order to achieve this object of the public interest, the Belgian legislative power thought that the measures necessary in a democratic society meant the denial of homologation, the abolition of grants, etc., those measures, being in accordance with the intention behind the legislation taken as a whole, do not conflict with the intention behind the Convention taken as a whole and thus involve no "discrimination" contrary to the Convention.
        It follows from the foregoing considerations that the restrictions mentioned under No. 3 above involve no "discrimination" between French-speaking and Dutch-speaking persons as understood and prohibited by Article 14 (art. 14).
        INDIVIDUAL OPINION, PARTLY DISSENTING (POINT I OF THE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE JUDGMENT), OF JUDGE TERJE WOLDThe majority of the Court has found it expedient to embark upon a discussion of "problems of a more general character" concerning the meaning and scope of Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2) and of Articles 8 and 14 (art. 8, art. 14) of the Convention. As I disagree with the majority interpretation on important points, I find it necessary to give an individual opinion.
        Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2)
        In its report the Commission (majority) basing itself both on the text of the Article (P1-2) and the preparatory works came to the conclusion that Article 2 (P1-2) "does not oblige States themselves to provide any education whatsoever" (Report, para. 375) and further "if the object of the Protocol had been to oblige States either to provide education themselves or to subsidise private education, such an obligation should have been embodied in rules, even if only approximate" (Report, para. 375). I accept this interpretation of the Commission.
        The majority of the Court, who, I take it, agree with this interpretation, are, however, of the opinion that Article 2 (P1-2) has also an additional element of a positive character. Referring to the fact that Article 2 (P1-2) applies the term "right to education" and to the fact that all member States possess a general and official education system, the majority lays down that Article 2 (P1-2) guarantees "to persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties the right to avail themselves in principle of the means of instruction existing at a given time" (pages 34-35 of the Judgment). Thus the majority, contrary to the wording of the article, by way of interpretation insert into Article 2, first sentence (P1-2), a positive obligation. The majority goes even further in stating that the individual has also the right to recognition of the studies which he has completed.
        In my opinion this is not a valid interpretation of Article 2 (P1-2).
        First of all, we should remember that we are dealing with an international convention, and we must clearly distinguish between the rights guaranteed in the Convention and the rights granted the nationals of a country in accordance with its internal, national legislation. We all know that all the European countries have elaborated systems of education, which are at the disposal of their citizens in accordance with the provisions of the laws of each country. But, this access to the educational institutions is not based upon the Convention. In my opinion there is no foundation for this presumption either in the words of the Convention or in the Preparatory Works. On the contrary both the wording of the Convention and the Preparatory Works clearly show quite the opposite.
        Several of the articles of the Convention apply the word "right"
        - Article 9 (art. 9): Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Article 10 (art. 10): Right to freedom of expression, etc. These rights obviously do not impose upon the member States any positive obligation in regard to guaranteeing the individual citizen "the right" to use for instance the existing churches which the State may own, or to use the means of expression, for instance printing works, newspapers or broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises, which the State possesses. The "right to education" has the same scope and meaning. It does not imply any positive obligation of the State.
        A logical interpretation of Article 2 (P1-2) leads to the same result. First, the subject of the right to education is everyone, cf. Article 1 (art. 1). This means that every person within the jurisdiction of any of the member States which has ratified the Convention, has the same individual human right to education. This is not a right of a group or a minority. It is a subjective right of every individual regardless of nationality, race, ***, language. In consequence, it is misleading to formulate the question, which the Court in this case has to decide as a question "if the French in Flanders or the Flemish population in Wallonia have the right to claim education in their national language". All languages hold the same position in regard to the freedom to education. That is expressly said in Article 14 (art. 14). The question before the Court is therefore in fact the following: has every individual person in Belgium the right to claim education in his own national language – a Chinese, a Japanese, an American, a Portuguese? Or, if we accept the majority interpretation of the concept "right to education" as a "right to access": has every person on Belgian territory the same individual human right to access to all Belgian schools and educational institutions in the country, has a Chinese, a Japanese, an American, a Portuguese the same rights of access as the Belgian nationals themselves? Of course not. The fact that the beneficiaries of the right to education granted by the Convention are, so to say, every person on the earth, and the fact that the right is bestowed on all without distinction on any ground, must be taken seriously into consideration when deciding what the content of the "right to education" in the meaning of Article 2 (P1-2) really is. It goes almost without saying that this right cannot go further than to a freedom for the individual to choose the education he wants without interference by the State. That right belongs to everyone, and it is the same for everyone, regardless of country. This is a fundamental principle in the field of Human Rights.
        That the right to education was meant as freedom of choice is also strongly upheld in the Preparatory Works. The right to education was from the very beginning listed as one of the three family rights (Preparatory work on Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2), p. 5, document CDH (67) 2) and defined as "prior rights of parents to choose the kind of education to be given to their children". And through the whole of the Preparatory Works, in numerous places, the right to education - by all who took part - is mentioned as a right of choice for the parents, which should be secured as a basic fundamental freedom.
        The Preparatory Works also clearly show that it was not in the mind of anyone that Article 2 (P1-2) should establish a positive claim against the State. On the contrary, the basic intention was to protect the individual against interference by the State. It is this which in my view is the reality to take into consideration when interpreting Article 2 (P1-2). We must not forget that Europe, at the time when the Convention was adopted, had just gone through years of suppression of the freedom of the peoples, where governments used all sorts of means and pressure to nazify the youth, especially through the schools and youth organisations. It was an important aim of the Convention that this should not be repeated and that the freedom of education should be protected. Frequently, throughout the Preparatory Works this point is stressed.
        A "right of access" to the existing educational institutions of the member States is not dealt with by the Convention and is, within the meaning of the European Convention, not a human right at all. Nobody denies that everyone may have a right of access to the schools and teaching institutions in Belgium and the European countries in accordance with the laws of each country, but this is not a right laid down in the Convention. There is in fact no foundation for the majority's view that the right to education laid down in Article 2 (P1-2) would be meaningless if it did not imply the right to be educated in the national language. Imposing a negative obligation upon the State, Article 2 (P1-2) is important and has a full meaning.
        Every human right granted by the Convention must be the same in all the contracting member States. The right to education must have exactly the same content in Belgium as in Norway or in Turkey and all the other States which have ratified the Convention. Within its limited field it is just the aim of the Convention to adopt the same European system. The majority opinion contravenes this basic aim of the Convention, when it is stated that the human right to education "by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals". This shows that the majority view goes outside the scope of the Convention. The human rights granted are absolute rights, which cannot be the object of regulation by the separate States except where this is expressly stated in the Convention and under the conditions the Convention itself has laid down. In regard to the right to education the Convention has no such provision. It would also be a very dangerous road to embark upon if the articles of the Convention were to be interpreted in such a way as to allow the member States to regulate the human rights "according to the needs and resources of the community". Such an interpretation cannot be accepted. And even worse is the interpretation by the majority that the Convention "implies a just balance between the protection of the general interest of the community and the respect due to fundamental human rights". I strongly disagree with this interpretation. In my opinion it carries the Court into the very middle of the internal political questions of each Member State, which it has never been the intention that the Court should deal with.
        Finally, I would like to indicate briefly some of the practical difficulties the majority interpretation leads to.
        Shall everyone be secured the "right" of access to all the institutions of instruction in the member States, primary and secondary schools, universities, etc? What will happen to this individual right of access when there is not room for all? In many countries there are not even sufficient facilities for their own nationals. This shows that if it really had been the meaning to introduce a positive obligation on the Contracting Parties, there necessarily must have been adopted some rules of regulation and limitation. Further, these rules must have been the same for all Parties to the Convention. But such rules were not even discussed. The reason is simple. The scholastic system of the member States is the internal, national concern of each of them: it is entirely outside the scope of the Convention. It was also during the Preparatory Works expressly pointed out that the Convention should not affect the internal scholastic organisation of States. This case also shows how meaningless it would be if the European Court, referring only to Article 2 (P1-2) in its present form, should have competence to interfere with the organisation of the scholastic system of Belgium, which was adopted by the Belgian Parliament by a large majority of all groups of the country. The only question which can be reasonably discussed with regard to the Belgian laws is if they are so strict or so rigorous that they imply a denial of the free choice of education. But this has not even been claimed.
        All this makes it, in my opinion, evidently clear that the positive interpretation adopted by the majority is not well grounded. The negative interpretation adopted by the Commission is both logical and consistent with the wording of Article 2 (P1-2).
        Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention
        Article 14 (art. 14) cannot be applied in our case. That follows already from the fact that, in my opinion, there has been no denial of the right to education by the Belgian State. I have no objection to considering Article 14 (art. 14) as a part of each of the foregoing Articles of the Convention and the Articles of the Protocol. But that brings no new element into the discussion, it only makes it evidently clear that the human right dealt with in each Article shall be secured without discrimination for instance on the ground of language.
        I also agree that the object of Article 2 and Article 14 (art. 14+P1-2) read in conjunction is to ensure that the right to education shall be secured by each Member State without discrimination on the ground of language. But still the question remains - what is the content of the right to education? In that respect I refer to what I have said in regard to the interpretation of Article 2 (P1-2).
        The majority of the Court maintains that it is possible to visualise a measure which, while in itself in conformity with the requirements of a certain article of the Convention, nevertheless infringes the same article because it is of a discriminatory nature. In my opinion, this method of interpretation is both illogical and confusing. If a measure infringes a human right because it is of a discriminatory nature, the reason always will be that the measure in question is not in conformity with the Article, and in itself contains a violation. I shall not go into details on this point, I only want to state that I cannot see that the construction introduced by the majority in any way casts any light on the problem before us. The question will always be the same and only one: Is there a violation of a certain article of the Convention? But, in deciding this question the Court may have to decide if a discrimination has taken place. This is the simple solution of the relation between Article 14 (art. 14) and the other articles of the Convention.
        Neither are the examples mentioned by the majority of the Court especially convincing. For instance, if a State takes discriminatory measures in laying down entrance requirements to educational establishments, this constitutes no violation of the Convention if a right of access to the educational establishment in question is not laid down as an individual right in the Convention (cf. Article 1) (art. 1). The same applies to the example regarding the application of Article 6 (art. 6) which the majority has cited.
        The question if a discrimination has taken place must be decided on the concrete facts in every individual case. It is almost impossible to lay down general principles. The majority has, however, tried to do so, and that makes it necessary for me to make some observations.
        In all our countries we speak about the principle of equality, which we maintain shall govern our legislation; and even if this principle is not expressly laid down in words in our Constitutions, we take it as a matter of fact that it exists and can be applied. It is also not infrequently referred to.
        But if the principle of legality before the law is applied within the separate States, in the entire field of the national legislation, it goes without saying that it must be applied and even more strongly or more strictly with regard to Human Rights in the limited field of the European Convention. Human Rights are, and must be, the same for everyone, and if we allow derogation in this field, we very soon run the risk of destroying the guarantees which the Convention secures to the individual.
        It is true that the competent national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems which call for different legal solutions. But this fact has no relevance when we are interpreting the content of the different concepts of Human Rights in the Convention. We cannot have different concepts of Human Rights in the different member States. That applies also to all the other concepts of the Convention. It applies to the concept of "discrimination" and even for instance to the concept of the legal standard "reasonable" in Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3). It follows that the concept of "discrimination" must be interpreted in the same way for all European States. We must find a "European" interpretation. It is for the Court after having interpreted the concept of discrimination in the Convention then to decide if in the concrete case a discrimination has taken place. This decision must be based on an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each separate case. It is of little help in this context to refer to "the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies" or to "reasonable relationship of proportionality" between means and aims. The decisive factor must always be the content of the Human Right in question. This right everyone shall enjoy in full "without discrimination on any ground". For the evaluation of the question if in the concrete case a discrimination has taken place, no general rules can be laid down. In the field of Human Rights laid down in the Convention, in my opinion, it would in any case be wrong if the Court should embark upon a discussion of the needs and the resources of the different member States.
        The only deviation from the Convention allowed is laid down in the Convention itself, and I think we should keep strictly within the field of these exceptions not generally laid down, but attached to each separate Article.
        In regard to the interpretation of the second sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2) and Article 8 (1) (art. 8-1) of the Convention, I agree with the majority opinion.
        It follows from what I have said that I have come to the conclusion that in the case before us there is no violation by the Belgian State of any Human Right secured by the European Convention. The Belgian educational laws do not contravene the provisions of the Convention, and it is for me not necessary to embark upon a discussion of the details of the case, which in my view are of a more or less internal political character and fall within the exclusive sovereignty of the Belgian State.
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  2. #22

    افتراضي

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      1. COLLECTIVE DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES HOLMB&Auml;CK, RODENBOURG, ROSS, WIARDA AND MAST
        1. (Point I of the operative provisions of the judgment)
      2. (Translation)
      3. The legal and administrative measures governing access to the education given in French in the six communes "with special facilities", are not incompatible with the first sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol read in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14+P1-2) of the Convention. This opinion follows from a logical application of the principles formulated by the Court, in particular, in the general part of the judgment (interpretation adopted by the Court), and in the reasons for the decision reached by it concerning the first question. Those holding the present opinion consider that the reply which the Court, by a majority of one, has given to the second limb of the fifth question is difficult to reconcile with a rational interpretation of these principles. The general part of the judgment states the following principles:
        1. "... Article 14 (art. 14) (of the Convention) does not forbid every difference in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised ... One would, in effect, be led to judge as contrary to the Convention every one of the many legal or administrative provisions which do not secure to everyone complete equality of treatment in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised. The competent national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems which, on account of differences inherent therein, call for different legal solutions; however certain legal inequalities tend only to correct factual inequalities". The judgment holds that the effect of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 (art. 14+P1-2) is not to guarantee to children or their parents the right to education conducted in the language of their choice since, where the Contracting Parties wished to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction, specific rights in the field of the use of a language or of its understanding, they made this clear in the text, as in Articles 5 (2) and 6 (3) (a) (art. 5-2, art. 6-3-a) of the Convention. The judgment then states, in its general part, when the distinction in treatment is contrary to Article 14 (art. 14).
      4. It lays down the following rules:
        1. (1) The distinction must pursue a legitimate aim.
        1. (2) The distinction may not lack an "objective justification".
        1. (3) Article 14 (art. 14) is violated when it "is clearly established" that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.
        1. (4) The existence of this reasonable relationship must be appreciated in the knowledge of the "legal and factual features which characterise the life of the society in the State which is to answer for the measure in dispute".
        1. (5) The Court cannot, in the exercise of this power of appreciation, "assume the role of the competent national authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention". It follows from this that "the national authorities remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention" and that "review by the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the requirements of the Convention".
      5. Those holding the dissenting opinion here stated do not contest the well-foundedness of these five principles, but they consider that there is a discrepancy between the legal premises established by the Court and the reply given to the second limb of the fifth question.
      6. They consider:
      7. I. That the distinction in treatment attacked pursues a legitimate aim;
      8. II. That the measures attacked are based on objective features which justify them;
      9. III. That the absence of a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised is not established and certainly is not clearly established; that with regard to the reply given to the second limb of the fifth question, the judgment has not sufficiently taken account of the rule according to which the national authorities, who are in the first place those who must appreciate the requirements implied by the factual and legal features in issue, remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention.
      10. I. The distinction in treatment attacked pursues a legitimate aim
      11. In excluding from the benefit of education given in French the children whose parents live in the Dutch unilingual region near the communes "with special facilities", the legislator was anxious to ensure the linguistic homogeneity of the two communities which would, in his view, be threatened by an extension of an exceptional system beyond the territory of the six communes. The conception of the Acts of 30th July and 2nd August 1963, which were voted by a very large majority of Fleming, Walloon and Brussels parliamentarians, was that this homogeneity is the very condition of a lasting accord between the communities.
      12. This way of looking at things is open to discussion and was discussed at great length in the Belgian Parliament, but there is no reason to believe that the objective pursued in this case by the laws attacked is contrary to the letter or the spirit of the Convention.
      13. Besides, the Court in its reply to the first question has affirmed that the purpose of the "legal measures which have been attacked ... is to achieve linguistic unity within the two large regions of Belgium in which a large majority of the population speaks only one of the two national languages" and that "in other words (the legislation) tends to prevent, in the Dutch unilingual region, the establishment or maintenance of schools which teach only in French".
      14. The Court holds that "such a measure cannot be considered arbitrary", that "to begin with it is based on the objective element which the region constitutes" and that "it is based on a public interest, namely to ensure that all schools dependent on the State and existing in a unilingual region, conduct their teaching in the language which is essentially that of the region".
      15. II. The distinction in treatment challenged is based on objective
      16. FEATURES
      17. It may be assumed that the French-speaking persons, to whose cost the balance which a non-discriminatory measure implies is said to have been disturbed, live in communes situated in Dutch unilingual territory adjacent to the communes "with special facilities". Their system is that of all the French-speaking persons living in that part of Belgium.
      18. The alleged lack of objectivity constituting a discrimination is based on an ambiguity in the appreciation of the situation in which they are placed because they live in the Dutch unilingual region near to the commune "with special facilities".
      19. One is moved by the fact that they must, if they wish their children to be educated in French, send them to a school in Brussels which is further from their home than the French-language school in the commune "with special facilities" near to where they live.
      20. To deduce from this that the imposition upon them of this difficulty or inconvenience amounts to a discrimination, is to misunderstand the significance of that objective factor which is the frontier which separates the communes with special facilities from the Dutch unilingual communes.
      21. This frontier is an objective and necessary factor, inherent in the nature of the relationship between the system of common law and that which constitutes an exception to it.
      22. Any derogation from a system of common law, whatever it may be, has by its very nature effects which may seem arbitrary but which are only apparently so. The minor has full capacity only on the day on which he attains his majority; he does not have it the day before. It would however be ill-considered to condemn as arbitrary, for this reason, the law which fixes the age of majority at 21 years. The same reasoning holds good in the case referred to the Court by the second limb of the fifth question.
      23. The Belgian legislator was not obliged to accord to the six communes "with special facilities", situated in unilingual territory, an exceptional system establishing certain modifications of a practical nature to the principle of territoriality. This he has done but, in so doing, he expressly affirmed that in the six communes, he did not intend to renounce the principle of territoriality. Section 7 (3) of the Act of 2nd August 1963, which is conclusive on this point, says, in its preliminary provisions, that as regards the question of schools in the six communes the language of instruction shall be Dutch.
      24. In a similar spirit, Section 7 (4) of the Act of 2nd August 1963 (paragraph relating to the administrative system in general of the communes "with special facilities"), provides as follows: "In their relations with the local services set up in the six communes with which this Article is concerned, the central services, the regional services on which the said local services depend, as well as the local and regional services of the Dutch language region shall employ the Dutch language".
      25. The reply given to the second limb of the fifth question does not mention the text of paragraph 4 and does not accord to paragraph 3 its proper scope. This scope is considerable since it concerns, essentially, the linguistic system relating to education. It is true, as the judgment holds, that the legislator has derogated from the principle of territoriality with regard to the six communes; it is also true that the six communes constitute "a distinct administrative district" and that they are allotted a "special status"; likewise it is true, under the terms of Section 7 (2), that the local services set up in these communes draft both in Dutch and in French, the communications and forms to be sent to the public. But paragraphs 3 and 4 cited above imply that as regards education just as much as administration, the linguistic system of the common law of the localities in question, is the Dutch system. Thus the premises, from which the reply given to the second limb of the fifth question follows, are all the more open to question as the scope of paragraphs 3 and 4 is conclusive.
      26. The legislator who, it must be reiterated, may grant derogations from the principle of territoriality but who is not bound to do so, has, regard being had to the Convention, the right to determine the precise limits within which he intends to confine the extent of the derogation granted. In this case, he has decided that these limits should be those, which are eminently objective, of the territory of the six communes.
      27. A system which derogates from the common law is by its very nature limited in its effects. That those who do not fulfil the objective conditions required (because they live outside the territory provided for) are in certain respects treated differently from those who do fulfil them (because they do live in that territory), in no way therefore constitutes a discrimination.
      28. Article 14 (art. 14) is furthermore not violated because the residence condition only applies with respect to one of the two linguistic groups.
      29. It is true that "the Dutch-speaking children resident in the French unilingual region, which incidentally is very near, have access to Dutch-language schools in the six communes, whereas French-speaking children living in the Dutch unilingual region are refused access to French-language schools in those same communes", but this difference in treatment is not arbitrary. It is justified on objective grounds. Firstly, by the legitimate aim which the legislator has pursued, to wit, to ensure the linguistic homogeneity of the communities.
      30. Furthermore, and above all, it is justified because the Dutch-language schools are, in the six communes, the common law schools and because in the two regions, the characteristic of common law schools is that they are open to all.
      31. Lastly, in establishing in Flemish territory French-language schools which depend on an exceptional system, the legislator has left unchanged the common law system of Dutch-language schools in Flemish territory.
      32. Thus, the difference in treatment which is wrongly denounced as a discrimination is the inevitable consequence of the fact that the legislator - as was his right - intended to limit the effects of the exception which he permitted to the principle of territoriality only to the children of families whose head lives in the communes "with special facilities", and the limits to common law were permitted on the basis of this paramount objective factor, which the residence of the head of the family constitutes.
      33. Consequently it is evident that only the conditions of access to French-language schools allowed in these communes are of importance. That Dutch-speaking children from the Dutch unilingual region are granted access to the Dutch-language classes in the six communes is irrelevant, for the attendance of Dutch-speaking children at schools which provide an education in Dutch does not affect the extent of the exception made to the principle that Dutch is, under common law, the language of instruction in the communes "with special facilities".
      34. Besides, the theoretical character of the factors on which the alleged discrimination is based may be pointed out.
      35. No reason of a linguistic nature can impel Dutch-speaking parents living in the Dutch-language part of the country, or French-speaking parents living in the French part of the country, to send their children to Dutch or French language schools in the six communes since they find the school of the linguistic system of their choice on the spot.
      36. As for the Dutch-speaking parents living in the communes under the French system near to the linguistic frontier, the access which their children have to the Dutch-language schools in the six communes, poses no question of discrimination since they are only claiming to use the common law educational system and not, like the French-speaking parents living in the Dutch part of the country, the advantage of an exceptional system.
      37. It must therefore be concluded that the distinction in treatment attacked is in no way discriminatory.
      38. III. The applications must, as regards the second limb of the fifth question, be rejected by the application of the principles governing the theory of the proportionality, the appreciation of the factual and legal features and the subsidiary character of the Court's mission
      39. In that part of the judgment devoted to the general interpretation adopted by the Court, it is stated as a principle that Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention is violated only when it is clearly established that no relationship of proportionality exists between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. It would not therefore be enough - supposing that such were the position - to be confronted with a marginal case, to conclude that there is a violation of human rights in the case of the Applicants. The differentiation in treatment is not discriminatory and it has not in any way been established that the relationship of proportionality has been disregarded. The common law legislation which governs all the communes in the Dutch-language region applies to French-speaking persons resident in the Dutch unilingual communes adjacent to the six communes, and in its reply to the first question the Court stated why this legislation is contrary neither to Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2), nor to Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, taken in isolation or in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14+P1-2, art. 14+8).
      40. The difficulties invoked by the Applicants concern the distance from the parents' place of residence of French-language schools which, unlike the schools in the six communes, are open to French-speaking children in the Dutch unilingual region.
      41. It is a fact that these difficulties are clearly less for parents who, like the Applicants, live in the localities belonging to the Dutch unilingual system adjacent to the communes "with special facilities" of the Brussels agglomeration, than the difficulties caused to French-speaking parents who, in Dutch unilingual territory, live further or may live much further from the nearest French-language school open to their children.
      42. Now, the Court has found that as regards these last-mentioned parents, "the measures adopted in this matter by the Belgian legislature are not so disproportionate to the requirements of the public interest which is being pursued as to constitute a discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol (art. 14+P1-2) or with Article 8 (art. 14+8) of the Convention".
      43. Even more so, the principle of proportionality has not been violated with respect to the Applicants who live in the localities adjacent to the communes with special facilities.
      44. To consider, for the reasons which have been refuted under II above, that those objective limits imposed by the Belgian legislator on the exception which he has allowed to the principle of territoriality are arbitrary, amounts to contesting his right to decide, regard being had to the factual and legal features characterising the present situation in Belgium, the scope of the derogation which - without being bound so to do - he has considered himself able to make from a more severe common law system, a system which the Court has recognised as not being contrary to the Convention. In so doing the Court has lost "sight of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention".
      45. This is why, for all the reasons stated above, in the opinion of those holding this dissenting opinion, the Applications should have been rejected as regards the second limb of the fifth question.
      46. INDIVIDUAL OPINION, PARTLY DISSENTING (POINT I OF THE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE JUDGMENT), OF JUDGE G. MARIDAKIS
      47. (Translation)<LI value=1>In 1830, when she gained her independence, Belgium consisted of two de facto zones, the Flemish and the Walloon. The Walloons spoke French and the Flemings Dutch.
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      1. The higher civil service spoke French. All judicial business was transacted in French. As far as education was concerned there were no special problems in the Walloon area. In the Flemish region primary education was given in Dutch, secondary education was bilingual and university education was entirely in French.
        In the years 1900-1930 a "Flemish separatist movement" came into being.
        Then came the 1932 legislation. This placed the two languages on an equal footing and adopted the territorialist solution. The 1932 Acts did not fix the language boundary immutably: the boundary could change as a result of the decennial language censuses. The last such census was held in 1947, and the results, which were published in 1954, showed that the Flemish were advancing demographically and the Walloons geographically.
        <LI value=2>Under the 1963 Acts the national territory is divided into four linguistic regions, the Flemish, French and German regions and that of the Brussels conurbation.
        In the first three regions the Acts require the exclusive use of Flemish, French and German respectively.
        Under the 1963 Acts, unlike those of 1932, each linguistic region has stable boundaries drawn in such a way as to give preponderance in the region to one language.
        The immutability of the language boundary and territorial unilingualism are the foundations on which the 1963 Acts are based. It is clearly with the intention of strengthening these foundations that under the Acts:
        (1) Transmutation classes are abolished.
        (2) The Belgian State refuses in the unilingual regions to establish State schools or subsidise private schools in which instruction is given in a language other than that of the region.
        (3) The State refuses to subsidise schools which give instruction in non-subsidised classes in a language other than that of the region.
        (4) The State refuses to homologate leaving certificates issued by schools that do not conform to the language legislation.
        (5) The State makes special arrangements for the bilingual communes on the outskirts of Brussels.
        <LI value=3>The Applicants are French-speaking and live in predominantly Flemish-speaking areas. They complain in effect that the Belgian State:
        - does not provide any French education in the communes where they live or, in the case of Kraainem, provides it only within limits which they consider inadequate,
        - withholds grants from those schools in the communes in question that do not conform with the linguistic clauses of the school legislation,
        - refuses to homologate leaving certificates issued by such schools,
        - denies the Applicants' children entry to the French classes existing in certain places,
        - thereby obliges the Applicants either to enrol their children in a local school - which they consider contrary to their aspirations – or to send them to school either in Greater Brussels, where instruction is given in Dutch or French depending on the child's mother tongue or usual language, or in the "French-speaking region" (Wallonia). Such "scholastic emigration" is said to entail serious dangers and hardships.
        The Applicants allege violations of Articles 8 and 14 (art. 8, art. 14) of the Convention and Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2).
        <LI value=4>Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2) reads:
        "No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions."
        The Applicants maintain that the term "religious and philosophical convictions" covers language. Philosophical convictions are said necessarily to include, inter alia, parents' cultural and linguistic preferences, and it is considered inconceivable that a State that observes Article 2 (P1-2) should allow fathers to bring their children up in a particular religion or philosophy while denying them the choice of education in one of the national languages rather than the other.
        <LI value=5>In the sentence "No person shall be denied the right to education" the Contracting States intended to express a conviction common to all the peoples of Europe, namely that man, as a being gifted with reason (logos), has an innate desire for knowledge. ("All men naturally desire knowledge", Aristotle, The Metaphysics I.) Since knowledge is acquired by instruction, it necessarily follows that instruction, as a concomitant to reason, is coexistent with it and is an inalienable and intangible right of every man. ("No person shall be denied the right to education" is a directive (a legal standard or Richtliniennorm) which the State must follow "in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching".
        As man's innate desire for knowledge, and consequently for the instruction that leads to it, cannot be obstructed in any way, the Contracting States simply add that "in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions".
        By "religious and philosophical convictions" are meant those ideas on the world in general and human society in particular that each man considers the most true in the light of the religion he professes and the philosophical theories he adopts.
        Those ideas make up each man's interior life. As that life develops, it has to resort to a specific language in order to express itself, but it nevertheless exists in its own right irrespective of the idiom by which it tries to externalise itself.
        On this understanding of Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2), the 1963 Acts are in no way concerned with the content of education whatever be the language in which instruction is given – whether French or Dutch; it follows that the Acts in no way prevent parents from bringing their children up in accordance with their religious and philosophical convictions.
        <LI value=6>Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention reads:
        "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
      2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
        The Applicants complain that they are obliged to send their children either to a French school in Greater Brussels or to a school in the French-speaking region and that such "scholastic emigration" entails serious dangers and hardships.
        Seen from this angle the question whether or not the 1963 Acts are in accordance with Article 8 (art. 8) is a question of fact: in each particular case it will be necessary to establish the effect on private and family life of whether the French-language school is near to or far from the parents' place of residence and of the dangers of daily "scholastic emigration".
        However, the question is general in nature and may be thus formulated: is the content of the Belgian Acts of 1963 contrary to Article 8 (art. 8)?
        In the immutability of the language boundaries and the territorial unilingualism laid down, the Acts have more general aims designed to benefit the entire Belgian nation; they in no way affect private and family life based on ties of blood and on family traditions. Private and family life would be violated if the authorities intervened to force a person to shape that life in a way that departed from his traditions and thus from the spirit that, by virtue of blood ties, predominated in relations between parents and their children and between members of the same family in general.
        But neither family traditions nor ties of blood are disturbed by the fact that, because of the immutability of the language boundary and territorial unilingualism, both of which principles were introduced in the general interest of the Belgian nation, the Applicants, as French-speaking persons resident in a region where education is given solely in Dutch, are obliged to send their children to French-language schools far from their homes.
        The 1963 Acts withhold from persons attending schools where education is not in the regional language that which is granted to those who attend schools where the education is given in that language; in particular homologation and grants are denied (see No. 3 above).
        But the reasons for this denial is to give effect to the principles of immutability of the language boundary and territorial unilingualism, on which Belgian legislation has placed its language policy in consideration of the general interests of the Belgians. Thus if, for reasons of the public interest of the whole of the Belgian nation, French-speaking parents are obliged to send their children to French-language schools far from their homes, this entails no dangers other than those to which schoolchildren are exposed daily in their journeys between school and home, and which can be eliminated by a little more vigilance on the part of parents.
        Thus the fact that French-speaking parents feel obliged to send their children to schools in which education is given in French, i.e. in the language of the French-speaking region, is a mere inconvenience; it is not interference by the authorities with private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention. Such inconvenience may be described as the price paid for a legislative measure inspired by national and social considerations (see Section 5 (2) of the Act of 30th July 1963 on the use of languages in education: "... while respecting the right of parents to send their children to a school of their choice at a reasonable distance").
      3. The true meaning of Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention becomes clear if it is added to Article 1 (art. 1), which then reads:
        "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention and the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ***, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status".
        The Belgian legislative power thought a just settlement of the violent linguistic dispute between Flemings and Walloons could be achieved if the language boundary were drawn immutably once and for all, territorial unilingualism being introduced at the same time.
        They also thought that such immutability and unilingualism could never be enforced unless the restrictions mentioned under paragraph 3 were introduced.
        Discrimination (distinction in the French text) contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) must be understood to mean any open or disguised discrimination introduced with the manifest intention and sole aim of escaping the State's obligations under the Convention.
        In the present case the restrictions mentioned under paragraph 3 above apply in both the Flemish-speaking and the French-speaking regions. Their justification is their specific object, that of giving effect to, instead of leaving as mere words, territorial unilingualism and the immutability of the language frontier, in order to put an end to the violent dispute between Walloons and Flemings and to restore normal and calm living conditions for the entire Belgian nation.
        These restrictions, especially the denial of homologation and grants, are similar in nature to the "sanctions" listed in Chapter VII, Section 50, of the (parallel) Act of 2nd August 1963 "on the use of languages in administration".
        These restrictions ("sanctions"), taken collectively and individually, have the same object, which is not to leave in the air but to give reality and effect to the regional immutability and territorial unilingualism on which Belgium's linguistic policy in administration and education is based.
        But if all these restrictions are of the same kind and all have the same object, i.e. the interest of the Belgian nation as a whole, and the same value, it follows that it is inconsistent to describe some as "favours" and others as "hardships" towards Walloons or Flemings. They are rather a way of adapting the law to a pre-existing de facto difference resulting from deeply rooted historical realities.
        The restrictions might be described, by analogy with the provisions of Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 18 (art. 8, art. 9, art. 10, art. 11, art. 18) of the Convention, as "necessary measures" to ensure a normal and prosperous life in the Belgian State for the benefit of the entire Belgian nation.
        Moreover, according to the general principles of interpretative technique, the various provisions of an Act form a whole. Their unity derives from the fact that they all express a single intention. Thus a single provision must not be interpreted in a way that is not in accordance with the intention behind the whole text. This is expressed in the celebrated Roman adage: "Incivile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliqua particula ejus judicare vel respondere".
        Thus any specific provision of the Belgian legislation in question conflicts with the Convention only if, following interpretation in the light of the intention behind that legislation as a whole, it conflicts with a specific provision of the Convention interpreted according to the intention behind the Convention as a whole.
        According to the intention behind the Convention, in particular as manifested in Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 18 (art. 8, art. 9, art. 10, art. 11, art. 18) each Contracting State may, for reasons of the public interest, take the measures "necessary in a democratic society" to protect that interest as it appears from the circumstances of the case; but it may do so only to the extent that, while protecting the public interest, the State does not repudiate or appreciably limit its obligations, as laid down in the Convention, to respect the human rights safeguarded by the Convention.
        In the present case the Belgian legislation, considered as a whole and in the light of its intention, has the specific object of restoring to the Belgian nation the calm and order so deeply disturbed by the language question.
        Thus if, in order to achieve this object of the public interest, the Belgian legislative power thought that the measures necessary in a democratic society meant the denial of homologation, the abolition of grants, etc., those measures, being in accordance with the intention behind the legislation taken as a whole, do not conflict with the intention behind the Convention taken as a whole and thus involve no "discrimination" contrary to the Convention.
        It follows from the foregoing considerations that the restrictions mentioned under No. 3 above involve no "discrimination" between French-speaking and Dutch-speaking persons as understood and prohibited by Article 14 (art. 14).
        INDIVIDUAL OPINION, PARTLY DISSENTING (POINT I OF THE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE JUDGMENT), OF JUDGE TERJE WOLDThe majority of the Court has found it expedient to embark upon a discussion of "problems of a more general character" concerning the meaning and scope of Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2) and of Articles 8 and 14 (art. 8, art. 14) of the Convention. As I disagree with the majority interpretation on important points, I find it necessary to give an individual opinion.
        Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2)
        In its report the Commission (majority) basing itself both on the text of the Article (P1-2) and the preparatory works came to the conclusion that Article 2 (P1-2) "does not oblige States themselves to provide any education whatsoever" (Report, para. 375) and further "if the object of the Protocol had been to oblige States either to provide education themselves or to subsidise private education, such an obligation should have been embodied in rules, even if only approximate" (Report, para. 375). I accept this interpretation of the Commission.
        The majority of the Court, who, I take it, agree with this interpretation, are, however, of the opinion that Article 2 (P1-2) has also an additional element of a positive character. Referring to the fact that Article 2 (P1-2) applies the term "right to education" and to the fact that all member States possess a general and official education system, the majority lays down that Article 2 (P1-2) guarantees "to persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties the right to avail themselves in principle of the means of instruction existing at a given time" (pages 34-35 of the Judgment). Thus the majority, contrary to the wording of the article, by way of interpretation insert into Article 2, first sentence (P1-2), a positive obligation. The majority goes even further in stating that the individual has also the right to recognition of the studies which he has completed.
        In my opinion this is not a valid interpretation of Article 2 (P1-2).
        First of all, we should remember that we are dealing with an international convention, and we must clearly distinguish between the rights guaranteed in the Convention and the rights granted the nationals of a country in accordance with its internal, national legislation. We all know that all the European countries have elaborated systems of education, which are at the disposal of their citizens in accordance with the provisions of the laws of each country. But, this access to the educational institutions is not based upon the Convention. In my opinion there is no foundation for this presumption either in the words of the Convention or in the Preparatory Works. On the contrary both the wording of the Convention and the Preparatory Works clearly show quite the opposite.
        Several of the articles of the Convention apply the word "right"
        - Article 9 (art. 9): Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Article 10 (art. 10): Right to freedom of expression, etc. These rights obviously do not impose upon the member States any positive obligation in regard to guaranteeing the individual citizen "the right" to use for instance the existing churches which the State may own, or to use the means of expression, for instance printing works, newspapers or broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises, which the State possesses. The "right to education" has the same scope and meaning. It does not imply any positive obligation of the State.
        A logical interpretation of Article 2 (P1-2) leads to the same result. First, the subject of the right to education is everyone, cf. Article 1 (art. 1). This means that every person within the jurisdiction of any of the member States which has ratified the Convention, has the same individual human right to education. This is not a right of a group or a minority. It is a subjective right of every individual regardless of nationality, race, ***, language. In consequence, it is misleading to formulate the question, which the Court in this case has to decide as a question "if the French in Flanders or the Flemish population in Wallonia have the right to claim education in their national language". All languages hold the same position in regard to the freedom to education. That is expressly said in Article 14 (art. 14). The question before the Court is therefore in fact the following: has every individual person in Belgium the right to claim education in his own national language – a Chinese, a Japanese, an American, a Portuguese? Or, if we accept the majority interpretation of the concept "right to education" as a "right to access": has every person on Belgian territory the same individual human right to access to all Belgian schools and educational institutions in the country, has a Chinese, a Japanese, an American, a Portuguese the same rights of access as the Belgian nationals themselves? Of course not. The fact that the beneficiaries of the right to education granted by the Convention are, so to say, every person on the earth, and the fact that the right is bestowed on all without distinction on any ground, must be taken seriously into consideration when deciding what the content of the "right to education" in the meaning of Article 2 (P1-2) really is. It goes almost without saying that this right cannot go further than to a freedom for the individual to choose the education he wants without interference by the State. That right belongs to everyone, and it is the same for everyone, regardless of country. This is a fundamental principle in the field of Human Rights.
        That the right to education was meant as freedom of choice is also strongly upheld in the Preparatory Works. The right to education was from the very beginning listed as one of the three family rights (Preparatory work on Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2), p. 5, document CDH (67) 2) and defined as "prior rights of parents to choose the kind of education to be given to their children". And through the whole of the Preparatory Works, in numerous places, the right to education - by all who took part - is mentioned as a right of choice for the parents, which should be secured as a basic fundamental freedom.
        The Preparatory Works also clearly show that it was not in the mind of anyone that Article 2 (P1-2) should establish a positive claim against the State. On the contrary, the basic intention was to protect the individual against interference by the State. It is this which in my view is the reality to take into consideration when interpreting Article 2 (P1-2). We must not forget that Europe, at the time when the Convention was adopted, had just gone through years of suppression of the freedom of the peoples, where governments used all sorts of means and pressure to nazify the youth, especially through the schools and youth organisations. It was an important aim of the Convention that this should not be repeated and that the freedom of education should be protected. Frequently, throughout the Preparatory Works this point is stressed.
        A "right of access" to the existing educational institutions of the member States is not dealt with by the Convention and is, within the meaning of the European Convention, not a human right at all. Nobody denies that everyone may have a right of access to the schools and teaching institutions in Belgium and the European countries in accordance with the laws of each country, but this is not a right laid down in the Convention. There is in fact no foundation for the majority's view that the right to education laid down in Article 2 (P1-2) would be meaningless if it did not imply the right to be educated in the national language. Imposing a negative obligation upon the State, Article 2 (P1-2) is important and has a full meaning.
        Every human right granted by the Convention must be the same in all the contracting member States. The right to education must have exactly the same content in Belgium as in Norway or in Turkey and all the other States which have ratified the Convention. Within its limited field it is just the aim of the Convention to adopt the same European system. The majority opinion contravenes this basic aim of the Convention, when it is stated that the human right to education "by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals". This shows that the majority view goes outside the scope of the Convention. The human rights granted are absolute rights, which cannot be the object of regulation by the separate States except where this is expressly stated in the Convention and under the conditions the Convention itself has laid down. In regard to the right to education the Convention has no such provision. It would also be a very dangerous road to embark upon if the articles of the Convention were to be interpreted in such a way as to allow the member States to regulate the human rights "according to the needs and resources of the community". Such an interpretation cannot be accepted. And even worse is the interpretation by the majority that the Convention "implies a just balance between the protection of the general interest of the community and the respect due to fundamental human rights". I strongly disagree with this interpretation. In my opinion it carries the Court into the very middle of the internal political questions of each Member State, which it has never been the intention that the Court should deal with.
        Finally, I would like to indicate briefly some of the practical difficulties the majority interpretation leads to.
        Shall everyone be secured the "right" of access to all the institutions of instruction in the member States, primary and secondary schools, universities, etc? What will happen to this individual right of access when there is not room for all? In many countries there are not even sufficient facilities for their own nationals. This shows that if it really had been the meaning to introduce a positive obligation on the Contracting Parties, there necessarily must have been adopted some rules of regulation and limitation. Further, these rules must have been the same for all Parties to the Convention. But such rules were not even discussed. The reason is simple. The scholastic system of the member States is the internal, national concern of each of them: it is entirely outside the scope of the Convention. It was also during the Preparatory Works expressly pointed out that the Convention should not affect the internal scholastic organisation of States. This case also shows how meaningless it would be if the European Court, referring only to Article 2 (P1-2) in its present form, should have competence to interfere with the organisation of the scholastic system of Belgium, which was adopted by the Belgian Parliament by a large majority of all groups of the country. The only question which can be reasonably discussed with regard to the Belgian laws is if they are so strict or so rigorous that they imply a denial of the free choice of education. But this has not even been claimed.
        All this makes it, in my opinion, evidently clear that the positive interpretation adopted by the majority is not well grounded. The negative interpretation adopted by the Commission is both logical and consistent with the wording of Article 2 (P1-2).
        Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention
        Article 14 (art. 14) cannot be applied in our case. That follows already from the fact that, in my opinion, there has been no denial of the right to education by the Belgian State. I have no objection to considering Article 14 (art. 14) as a part of each of the foregoing Articles of the Convention and the Articles of the Protocol. But that brings no new element into the discussion, it only makes it evidently clear that the human right dealt with in each Article shall be secured without discrimination for instance on the ground of language.
        I also agree that the object of Article 2 and Article 14 (art. 14+P1-2) read in conjunction is to ensure that the right to education shall be secured by each Member State without discrimination on the ground of language. But still the question remains - what is the content of the right to education? In that respect I refer to what I have said in regard to the interpretation of Article 2 (P1-2).
        The majority of the Court maintains that it is possible to visualise a measure which, while in itself in conformity with the requirements of a certain article of the Convention, nevertheless infringes the same article because it is of a discriminatory nature. In my opinion, this method of interpretation is both illogical and confusing. If a measure infringes a human right because it is of a discriminatory nature, the reason always will be that the measure in question is not in conformity with the Article, and in itself contains a violation. I shall not go into details on this point, I only want to state that I cannot see that the construction introduced by the majority in any way casts any light on the problem before us. The question will always be the same and only one: Is there a violation of a certain article of the Convention? But, in deciding this question the Court may have to decide if a discrimination has taken place. This is the simple solution of the relation between Article 14 (art. 14) and the other articles of the Convention.
        Neither are the examples mentioned by the majority of the Court especially convincing. For instance, if a State takes discriminatory measures in laying down entrance requirements to educational establishments, this constitutes no violation of the Convention if a right of access to the educational establishment in question is not laid down as an individual right in the Convention (cf. Article 1) (art. 1). The same applies to the example regarding the application of Article 6 (art. 6) which the majority has cited.
        The question if a discrimination has taken place must be decided on the concrete facts in every individual case. It is almost impossible to lay down general principles. The majority has, however, tried to do so, and that makes it necessary for me to make some observations.
        In all our countries we speak about the principle of equality, which we maintain shall govern our legislation; and even if this principle is not expressly laid down in words in our Constitutions, we take it as a matter of fact that it exists and can be applied. It is also not infrequently referred to.
        But if the principle of legality before the law is applied within the separate States, in the entire field of the national legislation, it goes without saying that it must be applied and even more strongly or more strictly with regard to Human Rights in the limited field of the European Convention. Human Rights are, and must be, the same for everyone, and if we allow derogation in this field, we very soon run the risk of destroying the guarantees which the Convention secures to the individual.
        It is true that the competent national authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems which call for different legal solutions. But this fact has no relevance when we are interpreting the content of the different concepts of Human Rights in the Convention. We cannot have different concepts of Human Rights in the different member States. That applies also to all the other concepts of the Convention. It applies to the concept of "discrimination" and even for instance to the concept of the legal standard "reasonable" in Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3). It follows that the concept of "discrimination" must be interpreted in the same way for all European States. We must find a "European" interpretation. It is for the Court after having interpreted the concept of discrimination in the Convention then to decide if in the concrete case a discrimination has taken place. This decision must be based on an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each separate case. It is of little help in this context to refer to "the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies" or to "reasonable relationship of proportionality" between means and aims. The decisive factor must always be the content of the Human Right in question. This right everyone shall enjoy in full "without discrimination on any ground". For the evaluation of the question if in the concrete case a discrimination has taken place, no general rules can be laid down. In the field of Human Rights laid down in the Convention, in my opinion, it would in any case be wrong if the Court should embark upon a discussion of the needs and the resources of the different member States.
        The only deviation from the Convention allowed is laid down in the Convention itself, and I think we should keep strictly within the field of these exceptions not generally laid down, but attached to each separate Article.
        In regard to the interpretation of the second sentence of Article 2 of the Protocol (P1-2) and Article 8 (1) (art. 8-1) of the Convention, I agree with the majority opinion.

        It follows from what I have said that I have come to the conclusion that in the case before us there is no violation by the Belgian State of any Human Right secured by the European Convention. The Belgian educational laws do not contravene the provisions of the Convention, and it is for me not necessary to embark upon a discussion of the details of the case, which in my view are of a more or less internal political character and fall within the exclusive sovereignty of the Belgian State.
      [/align]
    مكتب
    هيثم محمود الفقى
    المحامى بالاستئناف العالى ومجلس الدولة
    المستشار القانونى لنقابة التمريض ا مساعد أمين الشباب لدى منظمة الشعوب العربية لحقوق الانسان ودعم الديمقراطية ا مراقب عام دائم بمنظمة الشعوب والبرلمانات العربية ا مراسل ومحرر صحفى ا

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المواضيع المتشابهه

  1. X. v. BELGIUM - 2568/65 [1968] ECHR 6 (06 February 1968)
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    آخر مشاركة: 07-19-2009, 12:27 AM
  2. Relating To Certain Aspects Of Laws On Use Of Languages In Education In Belgium - 147
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    آخر مشاركة: 07-15-2009, 12:55 AM
  3. DE BECKER v. BELGIUM - 214/56 [1962] ECHR 1 (27 March 1962)
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    آخر مشاركة: 07-14-2009, 12:58 AM
  4. Community Notification Laws
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    آخر مشاركة: 04-03-2009, 12:05 AM

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