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- Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), did not require that the
decision of first instance was given by a court; it was sufficient
that this decision, where taken by an administrative authority, was
subject to review by a court;

- It was not contrary to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), that the
Constitutional Court was competent only to confirm or to quash (nur
kassatorisch entscheiden) the administrative decision under review;
for, where the decision was quashed, the administrative authorities
were obliged to follow the Court's interpretation of the law;

- the Constitutional Court was not bound by the findings of the
administrative authorities as to the facts.

Whereas it emerges from that decision that the Constitutional Court
considered itself as being the proper tribunal having competence to
review decisions taken by administrative authorities; whereas, under
Austrian law, there is no possibility of appeal against decisions in
the present case, even if the applicant had invoked Article 6,
paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), by alleging that he had been denied access
to a tribunal, he would not have been heard on this submission;
whereas, therefore, he did not have an effective remedy with regard to
his aforesaid complaint;

Whereas the applicant further complained in this connection that the
Constitutional Court had failed to deal with his allegations of bias
of certain members of the Regional Real Property Sales Commission;

Whereas, here again, the respondent Government apparently contends that
the applicant should have invoked before the Constitutional Court
Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission observes that the applicant
has, in fact, invoked before the Constitutional Court Article 83,
paragraph (2), of the Federal Constitutional Act which provides that
nobody shall be deprived of a hearing by the judge established by law
("Niemand darf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden");

Whereas, therefore, the applicant had in substance brought before the
Constitutional Court the issues under Article 6, paragraph (1), of the
Convention relating to the composition of the Regional Real Property
Sales Commission; whereas the Constitutional Court has refused, on
formal legal grounds, to deal with this question; whereas,
consequently, the applicant has exhausted all remedies available to him
under Austrian law according to the generally recognised principles of
international law;

Whereas the respondent Government further maintained that the applicant
failed to comply with the provisions of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention in that the remedies in regard to his complaints under
Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention to the
composition of the Regional Real Property Sales Commission had not yet
been exhausted at the time when he lodged his application with the
Commission; whereas the respondent Government pointed out that the
decision of the Constitutional Court was not given until 27th
September, 1965, while the present application was introduced on 3rd
July, 1965;

Whereas the Commission has already stated that it is sufficient for the
purposes of the rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies
under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention that the Commission should
have been seized of the applicant's complaint within a reasonable time
after the proceedings before the domestic courts have been terminated
with a final decision by the competent court, but before the
Commission, in fact, deals with, that is to say decides upon, the
application;

Whereas the same reasoning applies both to complaints relating to a
continuing situation and those concerning single isolated events;

Whereas the Commission finds that a question under Article 26 (Art. 26)
of the Convention might arise where the period between the date on
which the application was lodged with the Commission, and the date on
which the final decision was taken by the domestic judicial or other
authorities was extremely long; whereas, however, in the present case,
less than three months have elapsed between the introduction of the
application and the decision of the Constitutional Court; whereas,
consequently, the Commission finds that the applicant has exhausted the
domestic remedies in accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention;

Whereas, therefore, the Commission rejects the general objections to
the admissibility of the application made by the respondent Government
on the basis of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention;

B. As regards the alleged violations of Article 5, paragraph (3) and
Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 5-3, 6-1), of the Convention relating
to the length of the applicant's detention on remand and the length of
the criminal proceedings against him;

Whereas Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3), of the Convention provides
as follows: "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (1) (c) of this Article (Art. 5-1-c) .. shall
be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial";
and whereas Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention
provides: "In the determination of .... any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a ..... hearing within a reasonable time
by (a) .... tribunal ...;"

Whereas, first, the applicant alleged that his detention pending trial
for a period of over two years violated Article 5, paragraph (3)
(Art. 5-3), of the Convention; whereas the respondent Government has
submitted in particular that, by reason of his numerous and to some
extent hopeless applications and petitions the applicant himself had
caused the delays concerned, and that therefore the application was in
this respect manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27,
paragraph 2 (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, secondly, the applicant alleged that the failure to bring him
to trial on the charge of fraudulent bankruptcy and the length of the
proceedings against him for fraud deprived him of a hearing in these
cases within a reasonable time in accordance with Article 6, paragraph
(1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas the respondent Government
has submitted that in view of the complexity of the cases concerned,
of the dependence of the proceedings for fraud on the outcome of the
proceedings for fraudulent bankruptcy, and of the fact that the
applicant's case was carried out with the greatest possible expedition,
the periods concerned were not excessive and unreasonable and that this
part of the application was also manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, when deciding upon the admissibility of the present
application, the Commission had regard in particular to the judgments
of 27th June, 1967, of the European Court of Human Rights in the
"Neumeister" and "Wemhoff" cases; whereas, in regard to the allegations
under Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3), the Court pointed out that
it was essential on the basis of the reasons given by the national
authorities in the decisions on the applications for release pending
trial, and of the true facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals,
that the Court should decide whether or not there had been a violation
of the provisions concerned;

Whereas, in relation to the allegations under Article 6, paragraph (1)
(Art. 6-1), of the Convention, the Court had regard to the exceptional
circumstances of the particular case concerned in determining the
question of a violation of this provision;

Whereas, similarly, in a series of previous decisions concerning the
question of the length of detention on remand and of the proceedings
themselves, the Commission has held that the reasonableness of the
periods involved must be assessed not in abstracto but in the light of
the particular circumstances of the case concerned (see, for example,
the decisions on the application of the cases of Matznetter,
Stögmüller, Neumeister, Wemhoff and Gericke);

Whereas Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention in
requiring the Commission to declare inadmissible any application from
an individual which it considers to be "manifestly ill-founded", does
not permit the Commission, at the stage of considering the
admissibility, to reject a complaint whose lack of foundation cannot
be so described (see, for example, Applications Nos. 1474/62 and
1769/63, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 11, pages 50 and 59);

Whereas, in the present case, the Commission has carried out a
preliminary examination of the information and arguments submitted by
the parties with regard to the applicant's complaints under Article 5,
paragraph (3) and Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 5-3, 6-1), of the
Convention concerning the length of his detention on remand and of the
proceedings on the charges preferred against him; whereas the
Commission finds that these complaints are of such complexity that
their determination should depend upon an examination of their merits;
whereas it follows that they cannot be regarded as manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

C. As regards the alleged violation of Article 6, paragraph (1)
(Art. 6-1), of the Convention in relation to the proceedings before the
Constitutional Court

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