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B. As regards Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) which gives to everyone the
right to have his case heard within a reasonable time

18. The Court is of opinion that the precise aim of this provision in
criminal matters is to ensure that accused persons do not have to lie
under a charge for too long and that the charge is determined.

There is therefore no doubt that the period to be taken into
consideration in applying this provision lasts at least until
acquittal or conviction, even if this decision is reached on appeal.
There is furthermore no reason why the protection given to the persons
concerned against the delays of the court should end at the first
hearing in a trial: unwarranted adjournments or excessive delays on
the part of trial courts are also to be feared.

19. As regards the beginning of the period to be taken into
consideration, the Court is of opinion that it must run from
9 November 1961, the date on which the first charges were levelled
against Wemhoff and his arrest was ordered.

It was on that date that his right to a hearing within a reasonable
time came into being so that the criminal charges could be determined.

20. The period to be taken into consideration in order to check
whether Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) has been observed thus coincides in
Wemhoff's case, for the greater part, with the period of his detention
as covered by Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3). The Court therefore, having
found no failure on the part of the judicial authorities in their duty
of particular diligence under that provision, must a fortiori accept
that there has been no contravention of the obligation contained in
Article 6 (1) (art. 6-1) of the Convention. Even if the length of the
review proceedings (Revision) is to be taken into account, it
certainly did not exceed the reasonable limit.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,

Holds, by six votes to one, that there has been no breach of
Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) of the Convention;

Holds, unanimously, that there has been no breach of Article 6 (1)
(art. 6-1) of the Convention;

Decides, accordingly, that the facts of the case do not disclose any
breach by the Federal Republic of Germany of its obligations arising
from the Convention;

Finds, therefore, that the question whether K. H. Wemhoff is entitled
to compensation in respect of such a breach does not arise.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authentic, at the
Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, this twenty-seventh day of June,
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

H. ROLIN
President

G. GOLSONG
Registrar

MM. T. Wold and A. Favre, Judges, while concurring with the operative
provisions of the judgment, attach thereto the statement of their
individual opinions (Article 51 (2) of the Convention and Rule 50 (2)
of the Rules of Court) (art. 51-2).

Mr. S. Bilge, Judge, declares that he agrees with the opinion thus
stated by Mr. A. Favre.

Mr. M. Zekia, Judge, considers that there was a breach of
Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) of the Convention; he attaches to the present
judgment the statement of his dissenting opinion (Article 51 (2) of the
Convention and Rule 50 (2) of the Rules of Court) (art. 51-2).

Initialled: H. R.

Initialled: H. G.

INDIVIDUAL OPINION OF JUDGE TERJE WOLD

I. First I want to raise a procedural question which in my opinion
should be decided by the Court.

In his Application to the Commission of 9 January 1964 Wemhoff alleged
that his right under Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) of the Convention to be
brought to trial "within a reasonable time" or released pending trial,
had been violated. He claimed compensation for the damage suffered.
At that time Wemhoff was detained on remand, cf. Article 5 (1) (c)
(art. 5-1-c) of the Convention. But on 17 December 1965 Wemhoff
received his final conviction. He was sentenced to six years and six
months of penal servitude, and the period of detention on remand was
counted as part of the sentence. Under these circumstances, it is in
my opinion difficult to see that Wemhoff has in fact any actual legal
interest in regard to the question of whether or not he has been held
in detention on remand beyond a reasonable time.

It is in fact also difficult to imagine that he has any claim for
compensation. The whole time he has spent in detention has been
deducted from his sentence except the time of three months during the
period of his appeal to the Federal Court.

The Court should not lose sight of the fact that Wemhoff has been
found guilty of having committed very serious crimes, and his claim to
compensation for detention on remand seems to be manifestly
ill-founded, cf. Article 27 (2) (art. 27-2). His claim that his
rights in accordance with Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) have been violated has,
therefore, a purely theoretical interest and constitutes in my opinion
no case before the European Court. However, as I am alone to hold
this opinion, I find it unnecessary to develop my point of view any
further.

II. In regard to the merits of the claim that Wemhoff has been
violated in the right he is granted in Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3), I
hold the following separate, concurring opinion:

In his Application to the Commission of 9 January 1964 Wemhoff alleged
that the length of his detention on remand violated his right under
Article 5 (3) (art. 5-3) of the Convention to be brought to trial
within a reasonable time or released pending trial. This Application
was declared admissible by the Commission on 2 July 1964. In
consequence the case before the Court is to decide if the detention of
Wemhoff lasted beyond a reasonable time.

The first question the Court has had to examine and resolve is the
exact length of time which in Wemhoff's case is relevant as a basis
for the consideration of the Court. This question has in our case two
aspects. The one concerns the general competence of the Court in a
case of this kind. The Application of Wemhoff is dated 9 January
1964. But his detention lasted in fact until 17 December 1965, when
the judgment became final. Has the Court competence to deal with this
latest period between 1964 and 1965 when in actual fact this latest
period is not formally dealt with in the complaint which was declared
admissible by the Commission? This is a question of the scope of the
case before the Court. We are dealing with a continued manner of
conduct on the part of the German authorities. It goes without saying
that Wemhoff, when claiming that he was detained beyond a reasonable
time, implied the whole period the provisional detention goes on and
until it ends. Any later date than 9 January 1964, the date of the
application, is therefore - once the complaint is raised - part and
parcel of the case. This applied to internal practice: it is the
situation at the time of the decision the national courts in cases of
this kind take into consideration. The same applies to the European
Court. The Commission has also in good sense followed this concept in
regard to the factual limitation of the case. The complaint goes back
to 1963, but the Commission has not hesitated to consider the
detention up till November 1964.
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