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الموضوع: R.F. AND A.F. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 3034/67 [1967] ECHR 33 (19 December 1967)

  1. #1

    افتراضي R.F. AND A.F. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 3034/67 [1967] ECHR 33 (19 December 1967)

    [align=left]
    R.F. AND A.F. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 3034/67 [1967] ECHR 33 (19 December 1967)
    THE FACTSWhereas the facts presented by the Applicant may be summarised asfollows:The Applicants are citizens of the United Kingdom. The male Applicantwas born in 1934 and is at present detained in Wormwood Scrubbs prisonin London. The female Applicant is detained at Askham Grange prison inYorkshire.On 27 July 1961, the Applicants and a third person were convicted atBirmingham Assizes of the murder of a child, having set fire to a housein which he was burned to death, knowing it to be occupied. The essenceof the case against the male Applicant was that he had taken part inthe conspiracy to set fire to the house and did not at any time clearlywithdraw from the conspiracy although it was not established that hetook any active part in starting the fire.The Applicants appealed on the ground that they had been convicted, inparticular, on the evidence of 2 witnesses who had committed perjury.However, the Court of Appeal, although it heard further evidence fromthe witnesses in question and came to the opinion that their evidenceat the trial could not be relied upon, decided that the conviction ofthe Applicants was justified by the remaining evidence. Accordingly,it dismissed the appeal on 18 April 1962.The Applicants have requested the Home Secretary to refer their caseto the Court of Appeal for reconsideration under the provisions ofSection 19 of the Court of Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, but this wasrefused on 2 February 1967.The Applicants' case for a retrial before the United Kingdom courts,as well as their Application before the Commission, rests onallegations that a considerable amount of evidence at the trial and,in particular, the police evidence relating to admissions allegedlycontained in statements made by the Applicants, was false.The Applicants claim that in these circumstances their trial anddetention constitute a violation of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention.They also complain of the refusal to grant them a retrial.The male Applicant further complained in a letter of 27 January 1967that he had been told by the prison authorities that he must obtainpermission by petition to the Home Secretary, in order to send hisapplication form to the Commission. He stated that this would probablyhinder his communicating with the Commission within the meaning ofArticle 25, paragraph (1), of the Convention, or, at the least, causeconsiderable delay. However, it appears from his letter of 2 Februarythat he had sent the application form to the female Applicant for hersignature although he states that he was still prevented from sendingit to the Commission.By a letter received on 13 February 1967, the male Applicant succeededin sending his application form to the Commission through a thirdparty, stating that he regretted that he was obliged to do this as hehad not been allowed to send it through the proper channels. He alsosaid it was in no way his wish to infringe the prison rules.In a further letter of 11 April 1967, the male Applicant complainedthat the Home Secretary had denied him facilities to obtain a reviewof his own conviction and that of his wife. However, on 3 May, withthe permission of the Home Secretary, he was permitted to apply on hisown behalf for habeas corpus by an informal letter to the Master of theCrown Office. He alleged that he had been convicted on perjuredevidence and so was not properly detained, and also that the HomeSecretary refused to produce him personally before the Court: heinvoked Articles 5, paragraph (4) and 6, paragraph (1), of theConvention.After proceedings at which the Applicant did not appear and was notrepresented, a Divisional Court of the High Court in London decidedthat as the Applicant was in execution from a court of competentjurisdiction there were no grounds disclosed for moving for a writ ofhabeas corpus and that the Applicant should be left, if so advised, tomake a formal application in accordance with the rules.The Applicant accordingly applied to the local Legal Aid Committee forfree legal assistance which was refused because the Applicant had notshown reasonable grounds for taking proceedings, and the Applicant wasso informed by a letter from the Secretary dated 4 July 1967. TheApplicant does not expressly state whether he is appealing against thisdecision but writes, "As I cannot argue my grounds whether to the lawsociety or the court without legal assistance which I cannot afford,[this refusal] evidences that I am in fact wholly shut out - which Ihave no doubt the Commission will regard as conclusive".The male Applicant also complained that he had not been permitted tosend letters to the Attorney General to request the reopening understatutory powers of an inquest on a person who was a witness at histrial and also letters to other persons, ie the coroner and witnessesat the inquest informing them of this request.The witness in question was examined by the Court of Appeal whichitself went into the question which the Applicant is raising, ieperjury or withdrawal of evidence by this witness. The Court came tothe opinion that the witness was unworthy of belief, both as regardsthe evidence he gave at the trial and the changed evidence given in theCourt of Appeal but maintained the conviction of Fletcher and his wifeas fully justified by other evidence which was before the jury.After the partial decision of 29 May 1967, and the subsequentadjournment of this Application on 31 May 1967, the Applicant, Mr RoyFletcher, made a further complaint.Prior to his trial on 10 July 1961, the Applicant was served with anindictment containing 2 charges, one for murder and a second for arson.At his trial he was only required to plead to the first charge and wasconvicted of murder.[/align]
    مكتب
    هيثم محمود الفقى
    المحامى بالاستئناف العالى ومجلس الدولة
    المستشار القانونى لنقابة التمريض ا مساعد أمين الشباب لدى منظمة الشعوب العربية لحقوق الانسان ودعم الديمقراطية ا مراقب عام دائم بمنظمة الشعوب والبرلمانات العربية ا مراسل ومحرر صحفى ا

  2. #2

    افتراضي

    [align=left]At the end of the proceedings, counsel for the Crown made an
    application to the judge requesting that the second count should remain
    on the file and the judge agreed.

    On 15 June 1967, the Applicant, with the leave of the Home Secretary,
    applied to the Assize Court to be brought to trial on this second count
    citing Article 6 of the Convention and received a reply from the Clerk
    of Assize stating that the Court had no jurisdiction under the European
    Commission of Human Rights. The Applicant complains that this is a
    violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

    By a letter of 22 September 1967, the Applicant, Roy Fletcher, informed
    the Commission that he is to be released on licence on 21 June 1968.

    In the meantime he was selected to be placed on hostel (ie virtual
    release). However, he has now been informed by the prison authorities
    that he will not be placed on hostel until the proceedings on his
    Application before the Commission have been concluded.

    In reply to a request to state in what terms this decision was conveyed
    to him, the Applicant wrote as follows:
    "On Wednesday afternoon, 30 August 1967, I appeared before the hostel
    selection committee for consideration with regard to the hostel scheme.
    Subsequently, I was recalled before the Board to be informed of their
    decision and, on announcing the verdict, the Chairman expressly stated
    - 'You have been accepted for the hostel scheme but in view of the fact
    that your case is before the European Commission your placing on hostel
    will be delayed until the case has been determined'."

    In reply to a letter subsequently addressed to the prison authorities
    on behalf of the Applicant the Governor wrote on 9 October 1967, "...
    Fletcher's selection for the hostel will in no way be prejudiced by his
    application to the European Court of Human Rights".

    However, the Applicant states that on 26 October 1967, he was again
    summoned before the Chairman of the Hostel Selection Committee and
    informed that under no circumstances would he be permitted to enter the
    hostel until after his application to the European Commission had been
    finalised.

    History of the proceedings

    Whereas the proceedings before the Commission may be summarised as
    follows:

    The Application was lodged with the Secretariat of the Commission on
    3 January 1967, and entered in the special register provided for by
    Rule 13 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure on 27 January 1967.

    On 10 March and 8 May 1967, the case was submitted to a group of 3
    members for a preliminary examination in accordance with Rule 34 of the
    Rules of Procedure.

    On 29 May 1967, the Commission examined the Application and declared
    inadmissible the Applicants' complaints relating to the proceedings on
    their trial and on appeal and the refusal by the Home Secretary to
    refer their case to the Court of Criminal Appeal, and adjourned
    consideration of the Applicants' further complaints.

    On 12 July 1967, the Commission again examined the Application and
    declared inadmissible the Applicants' complaints relating to the
    refusal of free legal assistance for the purpose of presenting a formal
    application for habeas corpus and the refusal by the Home Secretary to
    permit the Applicants to write to the Attorney General in order to
    obtain the reopening of an inquest on a person who had been a witness
    at the Applicants' trial.

    On 18 July 1967, after further deliberation, the Commission decided to
    give notice to the United Kingdom Government in accordance with Rule
    45, paragraph (3) (b) of the Rules of Procedure of that part of the
    Application which related to the refusal by the Assize Court to proceed
    with the trial on the count of arson which was left on the file at the
    termination of the Applicants' trial in July 1961, and to invite the
    respondent Government to submit its observations on the admissibility
    of this part of the Application.

    The Government of the United Kingdom submitted its observations
    (Document D.20.733) on 25 September 1967 and the Applicants submitted
    their observations in reply (Document D.20.999) on 12 October 1967
    while further observations were submitted on their behalf on 19 October
    1967.

    Submissions of the Parties

    Whereas the submissions of the parties may be summarised as follows:

    1. On the question whether a charge remaining on the file after a
    conviction for murder is a charge to which the provisions of Article
    6, paragraph (1) of the Convention applies

    The Respondent Government states that, at the time of the Applicants'
    trial, it was a rule of practice established in the case of The King
    v. Jones [1918] 1. KB 416) that counts charging other offenses were not
    included in an indictment for murder or manslaughter. Accordingly,
    where an indictment for a less serious offence was preferred at the
    same time as an indictment for murder, it was the practice to arraign
    the accused person only on the indictment for murder and, if a
    conviction on that charge resulted, not to proceed with the second
    indictment for the less serious offence unless the indictment for
    murder was quashed on appeal. Upon a conviction for murder it was,
    therefore, the practice for the Court to order that the second
    indictment should remain in the file. It was then, and continues to be,
    the invariable rule that, where the second indictment has been so
    ordered to remain on the file, it shall not be proceeded with without
    the leave of the Court or the Court of Criminal Appeal.

    The Respondent Government states that it is not aware of any case in
    which a second indictment thus ordered to remain on the file has
    subsequently been proceeded with while the conviction on the charge of
    murder remained undisturbed, whether before or after a sentence of
    imprisonment resulting from that conviction has been served. Where on
    the facts of the case the conviction of murder would necessarily have
    involved the finding that the convicted person was guilty of a less
    serious offence, which was the subject-matter of a second indictment,
    to allow the second indictment to be tried would indeed be an abuse of
    the process of the Court. On the latter point the Respondent Government
    refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, on
    28 July 1967, in Regina v. Thatcher. The Respondent Government points
    out that the Applicants, after their conviction on the indictment for
    murder, made no objection to the order that the second indictment
    should remain on the file. Nor was any application made by them or on
    their behalf in respect of that second indictment at the time of the
    hearing of their appeal.

    The Respondent Government submits that, where a charge remains on the
    file in such circumstances, that charge is not one to which the
    provisions of Article 6, paragraph (1) can be said to apply. That
    charge cannot be proceeded with without the leave of the Court and, for
    the reasons mentioned above, such leave would not be granted. In these
    circumstances the Applicants are not in peril in respect of the charge
    in question and the refusal to bring them to trial does not infringe
    the provisions of Article 6.

    The Applicants state that, in its interpretation of the rule of
    practice laid down in The King v. Jones, the Respondent Government
    defines that rule as an authority allowing the Crown "to have 2 bites
    at the cherry" by instituting a second prosecution on the less serious
    offence, should the charge of murder fail. The rule enunciated was laid
    down solely to protect a defendant from a jury who may be confused by
    additional counts on the indictment. That rule was not intended to, and
    does not grant the Crown any additional powers which it did not already
    possess before that rule was laid down.

    The Applicants then quote the Respondent Government as stating that
    "... where the second indictment has been ordered to remain on the
    file, it shall not be proceeded with without the leave of the Court or
    the Court of Appeal." As to this, they observe: "The error of that
    assertion is shown on page 2, paragraph E, of the transcripts of Regina
    v. Thatcher in which, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Parker,
    expressly ruled that, "... the jurisdiction of the Court (the Court of
    Appeal (Criminal Division) only arises in the case of applications and
    appeals by persons convicted on indictment." Thus, the Court of Appeal
    (Criminal Division) hold no jurisdiction to order an indictment, which
    has been ordered to remain in the file, to be resurrected. It is a
    matter of law and common sense that the court of trial which has
    ordered the second indictment to remain on the file cannot reconsider
    its own order unless on the application of some interested party. Thus
    the court of trial does not hold power, by itself, to resurrect a
    second indictment which it had previously ordered to remain on the
    file. In Regina v. Connelly Mr Justice Stephenson expressly stated that
    "... he still held the view that Connelly ought not to be tried on this
    second indictment but he had no power to stop a trial in view of the
    Attorney General's refusal to enter a nolle prosequi and the Director
    of Public Prosecutions' refusal to offer no evidence. Should the
    Applicants be arraigned on the second indictment a nolle prosequi could
    not properly be entered because its effect would be against the
    interests of justice as it would prevent the Applicants from presenting
    the new evidence of their innocence to a jury and would conceal from
    the court the evidence of guilt of those who had conspired fraudulently
    to obtain the conviction of the Applicants on a charge of murder. Thus
    it remains entirely a matter for the Director of Public Prosecutions
    whether, in such instances, a second indictment ordered to remain on
    the file should be resurrected and determined by a jury.[/align]
    مكتب
    هيثم محمود الفقى
    المحامى بالاستئناف العالى ومجلس الدولة
    المستشار القانونى لنقابة التمريض ا مساعد أمين الشباب لدى منظمة الشعوب العربية لحقوق الانسان ودعم الديمقراطية ا مراقب عام دائم بمنظمة الشعوب والبرلمانات العربية ا مراسل ومحرر صحفى ا

  3. #3

    افتراضي

    [align=left]Under the constitution a British Government cannot bind a future
    government. Thus the Respondent Government can speak only for itself
    and the present Director of Public Prosecutions when it states that the
    Applicants are not in peril as a consequence of the second indictment
    being ordered to remain on the file .... A future executive may decide
    to allow all undetermined indictments which have been ordered to remain
    on the file, to be determined by a jury's verdict ... . It is a further
    fact that in the United Kingdom there is no statute of limitations in
    respect of criminal offenses and, once an indictment has been drawn,
    the mere passage of time will not impair the validity of the indictment
    within the lifetime of the accused named on that indictment.

    In Regina v. Connelly Mr Justice Stephenson said "... generally
    speaking the prosecutor has as much right as a defendant to demand the
    verdict of a jury". It must follow that, if the prosecutor and
    defendant hold equal rights to demand the verdict of a jury in respect
    of an indictment drawn, then the Applicants must possess the right to
    demand that the second indictment on the charge of arson be put to a
    jury because, as has been shown, the Director of Public Prosecutions
    is the only Department under the Crown which holds the right to
    resurrect the indictment of the charge of arson.

    As the defendant and the prosecutor have equal rights to demand the
    verdict of a jury once an indictment has been drawn, and it must be
    remembered that Mr Justice Stephenson was never corrected on that
    ruling by the Court of Criminal Appeal when the case went before that
    Court, it cannot be an abuse of a jury in respect of the second
    indictment when he has been convicted on the first indictment of
    murder. To submit otherwise would be to submit that a prosecutor has
    greater rights to a jury's verdict than a defendant, which is plainly
    immoral. In any event, there is no parallel between the Applicant's
    application and that of Regina v. Thatcher.

    Since the conviction of the Applicants on the charge of murder. They
    have obtained new evidence which absolutely establishes their innocence
    and, after many efforts, they have been unable to produce that evidence
    in a court of justice because of the actions of the Respondent
    Government. Mr Thatcher had never revealed any evidence of his
    innocence which was not produced during his trial or even asserted that
    such evidence existed. The mere fact that the Respondent Government is
    unaware of any case in which a second indictment, thus ordered to
    remain on the file, has been subsequently proceeded with while the
    conviction of murder remained undisturbed is, on the Government's own
    showing, uncertain and, in any event, irrelevant.

    The Applicants further submit that under Article 6, paragraph (2) the
    Commission and the Respondent Government are required to presume the
    Applicants to be innocent to unlawfully and maliciously setting fire
    to the house. That being so, unless the Applicants are brought to trial
    on the second indictment, the impossible situation will continue
    whereby the Commission and the Respondent Government presume the
    Applicants to be innocent of an act resulting in the death of a child
    whom the Applicants have been convicted of murdering; thus the
    non-implementation of Article 6, paragraph (1) will require the
    Respondent Government and the Commission to rule that they are unable
    to comply with Article 6 of the Convention in paragraphs (1) and (2).

    2. On the question as to whether the Applicant's real purpose in
    applying for the charge of arson to be heard is to obtain some form of
    retrial

    The Respondent Government submits that the purpose of the Applicants
    in seeking to have brought to trial the charge of unlawfully and
    maliciously setting fire to the house is not to have that charge
    disposed of in accordance with the principles underlying Article 6 of
    the Convention, but to reopen the facts determined at their trial and
    thus to obtain a second avenue of appeal against their conviction for
    murder. This is made clear by the fifth and sixth paragraphs of their
    letter of 30 June 1967, which is as follows: "The implications for me
    of refusal to bring me to trial on a charge [on] which I have been
    committed will be quite clear to the Commission since I could not now
    be found guilty of arson, the evidence making that impossible. It would
    follow, ipso facto, that I was not guilty on the charge of murder, the
    arson having been the alleged cause of the murder". The Respondent
    Government accordingly submits that the object of the Applicants in
    seeking to have the charge of arson brought to trial is in effect to
    secure a retrial of the issues determined in 1961 and that, for this
    reason also, the complaint is inadmissible.

    In reply, the Applicants submit that there is no question of requesting
    a retrial of the indictment which has already been before a jury. The
    Applicants merely seek to invoke Article 6, paragraph (1) of the
    Convention in respect of the undetermined indictment which, unless it
    is discharged by a jury, will always constitute a threat to their
    future liberty.

    It is the further submission of the Applicants that, if implementing
    Article 6, paragraph (1), leads to a retrial of the issues tried in
    1961, then that natural result does not, by itself, invalidate the
    Application even though the Convention does not expressly provide for
    retrial; if such retrial should ensue, it would clearly be in the
    interests of justice and therefore in sympathy with the terms of the
    Convention. Furthermore, although it is conceded that a retrial is not
    secured by any Article of the Convention, no Article of the Convention
    expressly rules out a retrial which is the natural result of the
    implementation of any of the Articles of the Convention. Finally, it
    is the Applicant's submission that, although perhaps none of the High
    Contracting Parties allows for a retrial by right of its internal law,
    none of the High Contracting Parties expressly forbids a retrial by
    statute. Indeed, in the instance of the United Kingdom Government,
    since the trial of the Applicants in 1961, a law has been introduced
    which, in certain circumstances, permits a retrial of events which have
    received the verdict of a jury.

    THE LAW

    Whereas, with regard to the Applicants' complaints that they were not
    tried within a reasonable time on the count of arson which was left on
    the file at the conclusion of their trial in 1961, it is to be observed
    that, insofar as the complaint relates to the period before 14 January
    1966, under the terms of the United Kingdom's declaration of that date
    recognising the Commission's competence to accept petitions under
    Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention, the United Kingdom only
    recognises the Commission's competence to accept petitions so far as
    they relate to acts or decisions, facts or events occurring or arising
    after 13 January 1966; whereas it follows that an examination of this
    part of the Application is outside the competence of the Commission
    ratione temporis;[/align]
    مكتب
    هيثم محمود الفقى
    المحامى بالاستئناف العالى ومجلس الدولة
    المستشار القانونى لنقابة التمريض ا مساعد أمين الشباب لدى منظمة الشعوب العربية لحقوق الانسان ودعم الديمقراطية ا مراقب عام دائم بمنظمة الشعوب والبرلمانات العربية ا مراسل ومحرر صحفى ا

  4. #4

    افتراضي

    [align=left]Whereas, moreover, in regard to the period after 13 January 1966, an
    examination of this complaint as it has been submitted, including an
    examination made ex officio, does not disclose any appearance of a
    violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and
    in particular in Article 6 (Art. 6); whereas in coming to this
    conclusion, the Commission is satisfied that it is the established
    practice in English law that a second indictment left on the file is
    never proceeded with so long as the conviction on the charge of murder
    remains undisturbed;
    whereas the Commission considers that there is thus in fact no criminal
    charge against the Applicants which requires to be determined and that
    there is thus no violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention;

    Whereas in this connection the Commission refers to the decision of the
    Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of Regina v. Thatcher cited by the
    Respondent Government; whereas moreover the Commission has noted that
    it appears from the case of Regina v. Thatcher cited by the Respondent
    Government; whereas, however, this is not the Applicants, that
    different considerations may apply where a conviction for murder has
    been set aside; whereas, however, this is not the Applicant's case
    since, following the rejection of their appeal, their conviction
    stands;

    Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is manifestly
    ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)
    (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

    Whereas the Respondent Government has suggested that the Applicants'
    real object in applying for the charge of arson to be heard was to
    obtain some form of retrial; whereas the Applicants have contested this
    suggestion; whereas it is to be observed that the Convention, under the
    terms of Article 1 (Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms
    set forth in Section I of the Convention; and whereas, under Article
    25, paragraph (1) (Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of
    those rights and freedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of
    an application presented by a person, non-governmental organisation or
    group of individuals;

    Whereas otherwise its examination is outside the competence of the
    Commission ratione materiae; whereas no right to retrial is as such
    included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention;

    Whereas in this respect the Commission refers to its previous
    decisions, Nos 864/60 - X v. Austria - Collection of Decisions No 9,
    page 17, and 1237/61 - X v. Austria - Yearbook V, page 96; whereas the
    Commission does not consider it necessary to determine what was the
    real object of the Applicants in this respect as it has already found
    this part of the Application to be inadmissible; whereas, however, if
    the Respondent Government's submission was to be accepted, this part
    of the Application is also incompatible with the provisions of the
    Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2)
    of the Convention;

    Whereas with regard to the Applicant's complaint that his participation
    in the hostel scheme is being postponed pending the determination of
    his Application to the Commission, it does not appear in the actual
    circumstances of the case that the Applicant was hindered in the
    effective exercise of his right of petition under Article 25 (Art. 25)
    of the Convention;

    Now therefore the Commission

    1. Declares this Application inadmissible.

    2. Decides to take no further action in regard to the allegations
    relating to a hindrance of the Applicants' right of petition under
    Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.[/align]
    مكتب
    هيثم محمود الفقى
    المحامى بالاستئناف العالى ومجلس الدولة
    المستشار القانونى لنقابة التمريض ا مساعد أمين الشباب لدى منظمة الشعوب العربية لحقوق الانسان ودعم الديمقراطية ا مراقب عام دائم بمنظمة الشعوب والبرلمانات العربية ا مراسل ومحرر صحفى ا

المواضيع المتشابهه

  1. H.J. v. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - 2604/65 [1967] ECHR 26 (19 December 1967)
    بواسطة هيثم الفقى في المنتدى Decisions of The European Court of Human Rights
    مشاركات: 2
    آخر مشاركة: 07-16-2009, 01:48 PM
  2. X. v. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - 2428/65 [1967] ECHR 19 (05 October 1967)
    بواسطة هيثم الفقى في المنتدى Decisions of The European Court of Human Rights
    مشاركات: 3
    آخر مشاركة: 07-16-2009, 01:46 PM
  3. X. against the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - 2728/66 [1967] ECHR 30 (06 October 1967)
    بواسطة هيثم الفقى في المنتدى Decisions of The European Court of Human Rights
    مشاركات: 0
    آخر مشاركة: 07-16-2009, 01:42 PM
  4. X. v. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - 2457/65 [1967] ECHR 21 (10 July 1967)
    بواسطة هيثم الفقى في المنتدى Decisions of The European Court of Human Rights
    مشاركات: 0
    آخر مشاركة: 07-16-2009, 01:41 PM
  5. A., B., C., and D. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 3039/67 [1967] ECHR 34 (29 May 1967)
    بواسطة هيثم الفقى في المنتدى Decisions of The European Court of Human Rights
    مشاركات: 0
    آخر مشاركة: 07-16-2009, 01:10 PM

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