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11. Whereas the Commission in its Report and its Principal Delegate
at the oral hearing rebutted the construction placed by the Irish
Government on Article 5 (art. 5) and based in part on the preparatory
work; whereas the Commission contends in the first place that, in
accordance with a well-established rule concerning the interpretation
of international treaties, it is not permissible to resort to
preparatory work when the meaning of the clauses to be construed is
clear and unequivocal; and that even reference to the preparatory work
can reveal no ground for questioning the Commission's interpretation
of Article 5 (art. 5); whereas, in support of its interpretation it
has put forward submissions which may be summarised as follows: that
it is true that, in the Council of Europe, Article 5 (art. 5) is
derived from a proposal made to the Committee of Experts by the United
Kingdom delegation in March 1950, but that that proposal was based on
a text introduced in the United Nations by a group of States which
included not only the United Kingdom but also France; that the United
Nations text was prepared in a number of languages, including English
and French; that the British delegation, when introducing their
proposal in the Committee of Experts of the Council of Europe, put in
both the French and the English versions of the text in question; that
the English version cannot therefore be regarded as the dominant text;
that on the contrary, all the evidence goes to show that the changes
made in the English version, particularly in that of Article 5,
paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c), during the preparatory work at the
Council of Europe were intended to bring it into line with the French
text, which, apart from a few drafting alterations of no importance to
the present case, was essentially the same as that finally adopted for
Article 5 (art. 5) of the Convention; that this is true even of the
comma after the words "autorité judiciaire compétente", which strictly
bears out the construction placed by the Commission on Article 5,
paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c); that the preparatory work on Article 5,
paragraph 3 (art. 5-3), leaves no room for doubt about the intention
of the authors of the Convention to require that everyone arrested or
detained in one or other of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 (c) of the same Article (art. 5-1-c) should be brought
promptly before a judge; that this text, too, had its origin in the
United Nations draft Covenant in both languages; that the words "on the
charge of having committed a crime" were in fact deleted on
7th August 1950 by the Committee of Ministers themselves, but only in
order to bring the English text into line with the French, which had
already been given the following wording by the Conference of Senior
Officials: "Toute personne arrêtée ou détenue, dans les conditions
prévues au paragraphe 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c) etc. ..."; and that the
submissions of the Irish Government therefore receive no support from
the preparatory work;

12. Whereas in the first place, the Court must point out that the
rules set forth in Article 5, paragraph 1 (b), and Article 6
(art. 5-1-b, art. 6) respectively are irrelevant to the present
proceedings, the former because G.R. Lawless was not detained "for
non-compliance with the ... order of a court" and the latter because
there was no criminal charge against him; whereas, on this point, the
Court is required to consider whether or not the detention of
G.R. Lawless from 13th July to 11th December 1957 under the 1940
Amendment Act conflicted with the provisions of Article 5,
paragraphs 1 (c) and 3 (art. 5-1-c, art. 5-3);

13. Whereas, in this connection, the question referred to the
judgment of the Court is whether or not the provisions of Article 5,
paragraphs 1 (c) and 3 (art. 5-1-c, art. 5-3), prescribe that a person
arrested or detained "when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence" shall be brought before a judge, in
other words whether, in Article 5, paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c), the
expression "effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent judicial authority" qualifies only the words "on reasonable
suspicion of having committed an offence" or also the words "when it
is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an
offence";

14. Whereas the wording of Article 5, paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c),
is sufficiently clear to give an answer to this question; whereas it is
evident that the expression "effected for purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority" qualifies every category of cases of
arrest or detention referred to in that sub-paragraph (art. 5-1-c);
whereas it follows that the said clause permits deprivation of liberty
only when such deprivation is effected for the purpose of bringing the
person arrested or detained before the competent judicial authority,
irrespective of whether such person is a person who is reasonably
suspected of having committed an offence, or a person whom it is
reasonably considered necessary to restrain from committing an
offence, or a person whom it reasonably considered necessary to
restrain from absconding after having committed an offence;

Whereas, further, paragraph 1 (c) of Article 5 (art. 5-1-c) can be
construed only if read in conjunction with paragraph 3 of the same
Article (art. 5-3), with which it forms a whole; whereas paragraph 3
(art. 5-3) stipulates categorically that "everyone arrested or
detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this
Article (art. 5-1-c) shall be brought promptly before a judge ..." and
"shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time"; whereas it
plainly entails the obligation to bring everyone arrested or detained
in any of the circumstances comtemplated by the provisions of
paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c) before a judge for the purpose of
examining the question of deprivation of liberty or for the purpose of
deciding on the merits; whereas such is the plain and natural meaning
of the wording of both paragraph 1 (c) and paragraph 3 of Article 5
(art. 5-1-c, art. 5-3);

Whereas the meaning thus arrived at by grammatical analysis is fully
in harmony with the purpose of the Convention which is to protect the
freedom and security of the individual against arbitrary detention or
arrest; whereas it must be pointed out in this connexion that, if the
construction placed by the Court on the aforementioned provisions were
not correct, anyone suspected of harbouring an intent to commit an
offence could be arrested and detained for an unlimited period on the
strength merely of an executive decision without its being possible to
regard his arrest or detention as a breach of the Convention; whereas
such an assumption, with all its implications of arbitrary power,
would lead to conclusions repugnant to the fundamental principles of
the Convention; whereas therefore, the Court cannot deny Article 5,
paragraphs 1 (c) and 3 (art. 5-1-c, art. 5-3), the plain and natural
meaning which follows both from the precise words used and from the
impression created by their context; whereas, therefore, there is no
reason to concur with the Irish Government in their analysis of
paragraph 3 (art. 5-3) seeking to show that that clause is applicable
only to the first category of cases referred to in Article 5,
paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c), to the exclusion of cases of arrest or
detention of a person "when it is reasonably considered necessary to
prevent his committing an offence";

Whereas, having ascertained that the text of Article 5,
paragraphs 1 (c) and 3, (art. 5-1-c, art. 5-3) is sufficiently clear
in itself and means, on the one hand, that every person whom "it is
reasonably considered necessary to prevent ... committing an offence"
may be arrested or detained only "for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority" and, on the other hand, that
once a person is arrested or detained he shall be brought before a
judge and "shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time", and
that, having also found that the meaning of this text is in keeping
with the purpose of the Convention, the Court cannot, having regard to
a generally recognised principle regarding th interpretation of
international treaties, resort to the preparatory work;

15. Whereas it has been shown that the detention of G.R. Lawless
from 13th July to 11th December 1957 was not "effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority" and that during his
detention he was not in fact brought before a judge for trial "within a
reasonable time"; whereas it follows that his detention under Section 4
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