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Whereas, in conclusion, immediately after the Proclamation which
brought the power of detention into force, the Government publicly
announced that it would release any person detained who gave an
undertaking to respect the Constitution and the Law and not to engage
in any illegal activity, and that the wording of this undertaking was
later altered to one which merely required that the person detained
would undertake to observe the law and refrain from activities
contrary to the 1940 Act; whereas the persons arrested were informed
immediately after their arrest that they would be released following
the undertaking in question; whereas in a democratic country such as
Ireland the existence of this guarantee of release given publicly by
the Government constituted a legal obligation on the Government to
release all persons who gave the undertaking;

Whereas, therefore, it follows from the foregoing that the detention
without trial provided for by the 1940 Act, subject to the
above-mentioned safeguards, appears to be a measure strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation within the meaning of Article 15
(art. 15) of the Convention;

38. Whereas, in the particular case of G.R. Lawless, there is
nothing to show that the powers of detention conferred upon the Irish
Government by the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act 1940,
were employed against him, either within the meaning of Article 18
(art. 18) of the Convention, for a purpose other than that for which
they were granted, or within the meaning of Article 15 (art. 15)
of the Convention, by virtue of a measure going beyond what was
strictly required by the situation at that time; whereas on the
contrary, the Commission, after finding in its Decision of
30th August 1958 on the admissibility of the Application that the
Applicant had in fact submitted his Application to it after having
exhausted the domestic remedies, observed in its Report that the
general conduct of G.R. Lawless, "his association with persons known
to be active members of the IRA, his conviction for carrying
incriminating documents and other circumstances were such as to draw
upon the Applicant the gravest suspicion that, whether or not he was
any longer a member, he still was concerned with the activities of the
IRA at the time of his arrest in July 1957; whereas the file also
shows that, at the beginning of G.R. Lawless's detention under
Act No. 2 of 1940, the Irish Government informed him that he would be
released if he gave a written undertaking "to respect the Constitution
of Ireland and the Laws" and not to "be a member of or assist any
organisation that is an unlawful organisation under the Offences
against the State Act, 1939"; whereas in December 1957 the Government
renewed its offer in a different form, which was accepted by
G.R. Lawless, who gave a verbal undertaking before the Detention
Commission not to "take part in any activities that are illegal under
the Offences against the State Acts 1939 and 1940" and was accordingly
immediately released;

(c) As to whether the measures derogating from obligations under the
Convention were "inconsistent with ... other obligations under
international law".

39. Whereas Article 15, paragraph 1 (art. 15-1), of the Convention
authorises a High Contracting Party to take measures derogating from the
Convention only provided that they "are not inconsistent with ...
other obligations under international law";

40. Whereas, although neither the Commission nor the Irish Government
have referred to this provision in the proceedings, the function of the
Court, which is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by
the Contracting Parties in the Convention (Article 19 of the Convention)
(art. 19), requires it to determine proprio motu whether this condition
has been fulfilled in the present case;

41. Whereas no facts have come to the knowledge of the Court which
give it cause hold that the measure taken by the Irish Government
derogating from the Convention may have conflicted with the said
Government's other obligations under international law;

As to whether the letter of 20th July 1957 from the Irish Government
to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe was a sufficient
notification for the purposes of Article 15, paragraph 3 (art. 15-3),
of the Convention.

42. Whereas Article 15, paragraph 3 (art. 15-3), of the Convention
provides that a Contracting Party availing itself of the right of
derogation under paragraph 1 of the same Article (art. 15-1) shall
keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of
the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor and shall
also inform him when such measures have ceased to operate;

43. Whereas, in the present case, the Irish Government, on
20th July 1957, sent the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe a letter informing him - as is stated therein: "in compliance
with Article 15 (3) (art. 15-3) of the Convention" - that Part II of
the Offences against the State (Amendment) Act, 1940, had been brought
into force on 8th July 1957; whereas copies of the Irish Government's
Proclamation on the subject and of the 1940 Act itself were attached
to the said letter; whereas the Irish Government explained in the said
letter that the measure in question was "considered necessary to
prevent the commission of offences against public peace and order and
to prevent the maintaining of military or armed forces other than
those authorised by the Constitution";

44. Whereas G.R. Lawless contested before the Commission the Irish
Government's right to rely on the letter of 20th July 1957 as a valid
notice of derogation un Article 15, paragraph 3 (art. 15-3), of the
Convention; whereas, in substance, he contended before the
Commission: that the letter had not the character of a notice of
derogation, as the Government had not sent it for the purpose of
registering a formal notice of derogation; that even if the letter
were to be regarded as constituting such a notice, it did not comply
with the strict requirements of Article 15, paragraph 3 (art. 15-3),
in that it neither adduced, as a ground for detention without trial,
the existence of a time of war or other public emergency threatening
the life of the nation nor properly defined the nature of the measure
taken by the Government; whereas the Principal Delegate of the
Commission, in the proceedings before the Court, made known a third
contention of G.R. Lawless to the effect that the derogation, even if
it had been duly notified to the Secretary-General on 20th July 1957,
could not be enforced against persons within the jurisdiction of the
Republic of Ireland in respect of the period before 23rd October 1957,
when it was first made public in Ireland;

45. Whereas the Commission expressed the opinion that the Irish
Government had not delayed in bringing the enforcement of the special
measures to the attention of the Secretary-General with explicit
reference to Article 15, paragraph 3 (art. 15-3), of the Convention;
whereas the terms of the letter of 20th July 1957, to which were
attached copies of the 1940 Act and of the Proclamation bringing it
into force, were sufficient to indicate to the Secretary-General the
nature of the measures taken and that consequently, while noting that
the letter of 20th July did not contain a detailed account of the
reasons which had led the Irish Government to take the measures of
derogation, it could not say that in the present case there had not
been a sufficient compliance with the provisions of Article 15,
paragraph 3 (art. 15-3); whereas, with regard to G.R. Lawless' third
contention the Delegates of the Commission added, in the proceedings
before the Court, that Article 15, paragraph 3 (art. 15-3), of the
Convention required only that the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe be informed of the measures of derogation taken, without
obliging the State concerned to promulgate the notice of derogation
within the framework of its municipal laws;

46. Whereas the Irish Government, in their final submissions, asked
the Court to state, in accordance with the Commission's opinion, that the
letter of 20th July 1957 constituted a sufficient notification for the
purposes of Article 15, paragraph 3 (art. 15-3), of the Convention or,
alternatively, to declare that there is nothing in the said
paragraph 3 (art. 15-3) which, in the present case, detracts from the
Irish Government's right to rely on paragraph 1 of the said Article 15
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