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Opinion of THOMAS, J.

JUSTICE THOMAS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA joined.

In this case, we must determine whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly applied our decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), in concluding that the evidence against respondent Frank West was insufficient, as a matter of due process, to support his state-court conviction for grand larceny.

I

Between December 13 and December 26, 1978, someone broke into the Westmoreland County, Virginia, home of Angelo Card ova and stole items valued at approximately $3,500. On January 10, 1979, police conducted a lawful search of the Gloucester County, Virginia, home of West and his wife. They discovered several of the items stolen from the Cardova home, including various electronic equipment (two television sets and a record player); articles of clothing (an imitation mink coat with the name "Esther" embroidered in it, a silk jacket emblazoned "Korea 1970," and a pair of shoes); decorations (several wood carvings and a mounted lobster); and miscellaneous household objects (a mirror framed with seashells, a coffee table, a bar, a sleeping bag, and some silverware). These items were valued at approximately $800, and the police recovered other, unspecified items of Cardova's property with an approximate value of $300.

West was charged with grand larceny. Testifying at trial on his own behalf, he admitted to a prior felony conviction, but denied having taken anything from Cardova's house.

General of Ohio, Jerry Boone, Solicitor General of New York, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and Martin A. Hotvet, Assistant Attorney General; for Senator Biden et al. by William F. Sheehan and Christopher E. Palmer; for the American Bar Association by Talbot D'Alemberte and Seth P. Waxman; for Benjamin R. Civiletti et al. by Douglas G. Robinson and James S. Liebman; and for Gerald Gunther et al. by Larry W Yackle.




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He explained that he had bought and sold "a lot of ... merchandise" from "several guys" at "flea bargain places" where, according to West, "a lot of times you buy things ... that are stolen" although "you never know it." App. 21. On cros***amination, West said that he had bought many of the stolen items from a Ronnie Elkins, whom West claimed to have known for years. West testified that he purchased one of the wood carvings, the jacket, mounted lobster, mirror, and bar from Elkins for about $500. West initially guessed, and then twice positively asserted, that this sale occurred before January 1, 1979. In addition, West claimed to have purchased the coat from Elkins for $5 around January 1, 1979. His testimony did not make clear whether he was describing one transaction or two, whether there were any other transactions between himself and Elkins, where the transactions occurred, and whether the transactions occurred at flea markets.1 West testified further that he had purchased one of

1 The quality of West's testimony on these matters can best be appreci-

ated by example:

"Q Are those items that you bought at a flea market?

"A Well, I didn't buy these items at a flea market, no sir. "Q Whose items are they?

"A They are some items that I got from a Ronnie Elkins. "Q All of the items you bought from him?

"A I can't say all.

"Q Which ones did you buy from him?

"A I can't say, because I don't have an inventory.

"Q Can you tell me the ones you bought from Ronnie Elkins? "A Yes, I am sure I can.

"Q Which ones?

"A I would say the platter.

"Q How about the sea shell mirror? "A Yes, sir, I think so.

"Q Where did you buy that?

"A In Newport News at a flea market." App.21-22.

"Q I want to know about your business transactions with Ronnie Elkins.

[Footnote 1 is continued on p. 282J




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Opinion of THOMAS, J.

the television sets in an entirely separate transaction in Goochland County, from an individual whose name he had forgotten. Finally, West testified that he did not remember how he had acquired the second television, the coffee table, and the silverware.

Under then-applicable Virginia law, grand larceny was defined as the wrongful and nonconsensual taking of property worth at least $100, with the intent to deprive the owner of it permanently. See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-95 (1975); Skeeter v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 722, 725, 232 S. E. 2d 756, 758 (1977). Virginia law permits an inference that a person who fails to explain, or falsely explains, his exclusive possession of recently stolen property is the thief. See, e. g., Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 568, 290 S. E. 2d 891, 893 (1982); Best v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 387, 389, 282 S. E. 2d 16, 17 (1981). The trial court instructed the jurors about this permissive inference, but warned that the inference did not compromise their constitutional obligation to acquit unless they found that the State had established every element

"A I buy and sell different items from different individuals at flea

markets.

"Q Tell us where that market is.

"A In Richmond. You have them in Gloucester. "Q Where is Ronnie Elkins' flea market?

"A He does not have one.

"Q Didn't you say you bought some items from Ronnie Elkins? "A At a flea market.

"Q Tell the jury where that is at [sic]. "A In Gloucester.

"Q Tell the jury about this flea market and Ronnie Elkins, some time around January 1, and these items, not the other items.

"A Ronnie Elkins does not own a flea market.

"Q Tell the jury, if you will, where Ronnie Elkins was on the day that

you bought the items?

"A I don't remember. It was before January 1. "Q Where was it?

"A I bought stuff from him in Richmond, Gloucester, and Newport News." Id., at 26-27.




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of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970).2

The jury returned a guilty verdict, and West received a 10-year prison sentence. West petitioned for an appeal, contending (among other things) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In May 1980, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused the petition-a disposition indicating that the court found the petition without merit, see Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 700,204 S. E. 2d 421, 424 (1974). Seven years later, West filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the same court, supported by an affidavit executed by Ronnie Elkins in April 1987. West renewed his claim that the original trial record contained insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and he argued in the alternative that Elkins' affidavit, which tended to corroborate West's trial testimony in certain respects, constituted new evidence entitling him to a new trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia again denied relief. West then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected both claims and denied relief.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 931 F. 2d 262 (1991). As the court correctly recognized, a

2 The instruction on the permissive inference read:

"If you belie[ve] from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that property of a value of $100.00 or more was stolen from Angelo F. C[a]rdova, and that it was recently thereafter found in the exclusive and personal possession of the defendant, and that such possession has been unexplained or falsely denied by the defendant, then such possession is sufficient to raise an inference that the defendant was the thief; and if such inference, taking into consideration the whole evidence, leads you to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the theft, then you shall find the defendant guilty." App. 34.

Several other instructions emphasized that despite the permissive inference, "[t]he burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt every material and necessary element of the offense charged against the defendant." Ibid.




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claim that evidence is insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of due process depends on "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S., at 319 (emphasis in original). Five considerations led the court to conclude that this standard was not met: first, the items were recovered no sooner than two weeks after they had been stolen; second, only about a third of the items stolen from Cardova (measured by value) were recovered from West; third, the items were found in West's house in plain view, and not hidden away as contraband; fourth, West's explanation of his possession was not so "inherently implausible," even if it were disbelieved, that it could "fairly be treated as positive evidence of guilt"; and fifth, there was no corroborating evidence (such as fingerprints or eyewitness testimony) beyond the fact of mere possession. See 931 F. 2d, at 268-270. The court viewed West's testimony as "at most, a neutral factor," id., at 270, despite noting his "confusion" about the details of his alleged purchases, id., at 269, and despite conceding that his testimony "at first blush ... may itself seem incredible," id., at 270, n. 7. In holding that the Jackson standard was not met, the court did not take into consideration the fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia had twice previously concluded otherwise.

After the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by an equally divided court, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 34-35, the warden and the State Attorney General sought review in this Court on, among other questions, whether the Court of Appeals had applied Jackson correctly in this case. We granted certiorari, 502 U. S. 1012 (1991), and requested additional briefing on the question whether a federal habeas court should afford deference to state-court determinations applying law to the specific facts of a case, 502 U. S. 1021 (1991). We now reverse.



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