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II

The habeas corpus statute permits a federal court to entertain a petition from a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2254(a). The court must "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." § 2243. For much of our history, we interpreted these bare guidelines and their predecessors to reflect the common-law principle that a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus could challenge only the jurisdiction of the court that had rendered the judgment under which he was in custody. See, e. g., In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278, 285-287 (1891) (Harlan, J.); Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.). Gradually, we began to expand the category of claims deemed to be jurisdictional for habeas purposes. See, e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 377 (1880) (court without jurisdiction to impose sentence under unconstitutional statute); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176 (1874) (court without jurisdiction to impose sentence not authorized by statute). Next, we began to recognize federal claims by state prisoners if no state court had provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims. See, e. g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 91-92 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 335336 (1915). Before 1953, however, the inverse of this rule also remained true: Absent an alleged jurisdictional defect, "habeas corpus would not lie for a [state] prisoner ... if he had been given an adequate opportunity to obtain full and fair consideration of his federal claim in the state courts." Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 459-460 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 478-499 (1963). In other words, the state-court judgment was entitled to "absolute respect," Kuhlmann v. Wil-




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son, 477 U. S. 436, 446 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added), and a federal habeas court could not review it even for reasonableness.3

3 JUSTICE O'CONNOR offers three criticisms of our summary of the history of habeas corpus before 1953, none of which we find convincing. First, she contends that the full-and-fair litigation standard in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), served no purpose other than to define the scope of the underlying alleged constitutional violation. See post, at 297-299. Frank and Moore involved claims, rejected by the state appellate courts, that a trial had been so dominated by a mob as to violate due process. In Frank, we denied relief not because the state appellate court had decided the federal claim correctly (the relevant question on direct review), and not even because the state appellate court had decided the federal claim reasonably, but only "because Frank's federal claims had been considered by a competent and unbiased state tribunal," Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 , 476 (1976). In Moore, which reaffirmed Frank expressly, see 261 U. S., at 90-91, we ordered the District Court to consider the mob domination claim on the merits because the state appellate court's "perfunctory treatment" of it "was not in fact acceptable corrective process." Noia, 372 U. S., at 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Bator, 76 Harv. L. Rev., at 488-489. In both cases, a claim that the habeas petitioner had been denied due process at trial was not cognizable on habeas unless the petitioner also had been denied a full and fair opportunity to raise that claim on appeal.

Second, JUSTICE O'CONNOR states that we mischaracterize the views of Justice Powell about the history of habeas law between 1915 and 1953. See post, at 299. In fact, however, Justice Powell has often recounted exactly the same familiar history that we summarize above. In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), for example, he described Frank as having "modestly expanded" the "scope of the writ" in order to "encompass those cases where the defendant's federal constitutional claims had not been considered in the state-court proceeding." 443 U. S., at 580 (opinion concurring in judgment). Similarly, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), he described Frank as having extended "[t]he scope of federal habeas corpus" to permit consideration of "whether the applicant had been given an adequate opportunity in state court to raise his constitutional claims." 412 U. S., at 255-256 (concurring opinion). In neither case, nor in Kuhlmann, did Justice Powell even suggest that federal habeas was available before 1953 to a prisoner who had received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his federal claim in state court.

Third, JUSTICE O'CONNOR criticizes our failure to acknowledge Salinger




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We rejected the principle of absolute deference in our landmark decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953). There, we held that a state-court judgment of conviction "is not res judicata" on federal habeas with respect to federal constitutional claims, id., at 458, even if the state court has rejected all such claims after a full and fair hearing. Instead, we held, a district court must determine whether the state-court adjudication "has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion." Id., at 463. We had no occasion to explore in detail the question whether a "satisfactory" conclusion was one that the habeas court considered correct, as opposed to merely reasonable, because we concluded that the constitutional claims advanced in Brown itself would fail even if the state courts' rejection of them were reconsidered de novo. See id., at 465-476. Nonetheless, we indicated that the federal courts enjoy at least the discretion to take into consideration the fact that a state court has previously rejected the federal claims asserted on habeas. See id., at 465 ("As the state and federal courts have the same responsibilities to protect persons from violation of their constitutional rights, we conclude that a federal district court may decline, without a rehearing of the facts, to award a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner where the legality of such detention has been

plicitly to hold that "res judicata is not strictly followed on federal habeas." Post, at 299. Salinger, however, involved the degree of preclusive effect of a habeas judgment upon subsequent habeas petitions filed by a federal prisoner. This case, of course, involves the degree of preclusive effect of a criminal conviction upon an initial habeas petition filed by a state prisoner. We cannot fault ourselves for limiting our focus to the latter context. But even assuming its relevance, Salinger hardly advances the position advocated by JUSTICE O'CONNOR that a habeas court must exercise de novo review with respect to mixed questions of law and fact. Despite acknowledging that a prior habeas judgment is not entitled to absolute preclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata, Salinger also indicated that the prior habeas judgment "may be considered, and even given controlling weight." 265 U. S., at 231 (emphasis added).




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determined, on the facts presented, by the highest state court with jurisdiction").4

In an influential separate opinion endorsed by a majority of the Court, Justice Frankfurter also rejected the principle of absolute deference to fairly litigated state-court judgments. He emphasized that a state-court determination of federal constitutional law is not "binding" on federal habeas, id., at 506, regardless of whether the determination involves a pure question of law, ibid., or a "so-called mixed questio[n]" requiring the application of law to fact, id., at 507. Nonetheless, he stated quite explicitly that a "prior State determination may guide [the] discretion [of the district court] in deciding upon the appropriate course to be followed in disposing of the application." Id., at 500. Discussing mixed questions specifically, he noted further that "there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration." Id., at 508.5

4JUSTICE O'CONNOR contends that the inclusion of this passage in a section of our opinion entitled "Right to a Plenary Hearing" makes clear that we were discussing only the resolution of factual questions. See post, at 300-301. In our introduction to that section, however, we indicated that both factual and legal questions were at issue. See 344 U. S., at 460 (noting contentions "that the District Court committed error when it took no evidence and heard no argument on the federal constitutional issues" (emphasis added)). Indeed, if only factual questions were at issue, we would have authorized a denial of the writ not whenever the statecourt proceeding "has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion" (as we did), id., at 463 (emphasis added), but only whenever the state-court proceeding has resulted in satisfactory factjinding.

5 JUSTICE O'CONNOR quotes Justice Frankfurter for the proposition that a district judge on habeas" 'must exercise his own judgment' "with respect to mixed questions. Post, at 300 (quoting 344 U. S., at 507). Although we agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that this passage by itself suggests a de novo standard, it is not easily reconciled with Justice Frankfurter's later statement that "there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration" of the mixed question, id., at 508. These statements can be reconciled, of course, on the assumption that the habeas judge must review the state-court determination for reasonableness. But we need not attempt to defend that conclusion in detail, for




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In subsequent cases, we repeatedly reaffirmed Brown's teaching that mixed constitutional questions are "open to review on collateral attack," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342 (1980), without ever explicitly considering whether that "review" should be de novo or deferential. In some of these cases, we would have denied habeas relief even under de novo review, see, e. g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 698 (1984) (facts make it "clear" that habeas petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 201 (1972) (facts disclose "no substantial likelihood" that habeas petitioner was subjected to unreliable pretrial lineup); in others, we would have awarded habeas relief even under deferential review, see, e. g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 405 (1977) (facts provide "no reasonable basis" for finding valid waiver of right to counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 725 (1961) (facts show "clear and convincing" evidence of biased jury); and in yet others, we remanded for application of a proper legal rule without addressing that standard of review question, see, e. g., Cuyler, supra, at 342, 350. Nonetheless, because these cases never qualified our early citation of Brown for the proposition that a federal habeas court must reexamine mixed constitutional questions "independently," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 318 (1963) (dictum), we have gradually come to treat as settled the rule that mixed constitutional questions are "subject to plenary federal review" on habeas, Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 112 (1985).6

we conclude not that Brown v. Allen establishes deferential review for reasonableness, but only that Brown does not squarely foreclose it.

6 We have no disagreement with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that Brown v. Allen quickly came to be cited for the proposition that a habeas court should review mixed questions "independently"; that several of our cases since Brown have applied a de novo standard with respect to pure and mixed legal questions; and that the de novo standard thus appeared well settled with respect to both categories by the time the Court decided Miller v. Fenton in 1985. See post, at 301-302. Despite her extended discussion of the leading cases from Brown through Miller, however, JUSTICE O'CON-




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Jackson itself contributed to this trend. There, we held that a conviction violates due process if supported only by evidence from which "no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U. S., at 317. We stated explicitly that a state-court judgment applying the Jackson rule in a particular case "is of course entitled to deference" on federal habeas. Id., at 323; see also id., at 336, n. 9 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("State judges are more familiar with the elements of state offenses than are federal judges and should be better able to evaluate sufficiency claims"). Notwithstanding these principles, however, we then indicated that the habeas court itself should apply the Jackson rule, see id., at 324, rather than merely reviewing the state courts' application of it for reasonableness. Ultimately, though, we had no occasion to resolve our conflicting statements on the standard of review question, because we concluded that the habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief even under our own de novo application of Jackson. See id., at 324-326.7

NOR offers nothing to refute those of our limited observations with which she evidently disagrees-that an unadorned citation to Brown should not have been enough, at least as an original matter, to establish de novo review with respect to mixed questions; and that in none of our leading cases was the choice between a de novo and a deferential standard outcome determinative.

7 JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that Jackson "expressly rejected" a "deferential standard of review" that she characterizes as "very much like the one" urged on us by petitioners. Post, at 303 (citing 443 U. S., at 323). What Jackson expressly rejected, however, was a proposal that habeas review "should be foreclosed" if the state courts provide "appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence." Ibid. That rule, of course, would permit no habeas review of a state-court sufficiency determination. As we understand it, however, petitioners' proposal would permit limited review for reasonableness, a standard surely consistent with our own statement that that state-court determination "is of course entitled to deference." Ibid. We agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that Jackson itself applied a de novo standard. See post, at 303. Nonetheless, given our statement




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Despite our apparent adherence to a standard of de novo habeas review with respect to mixed constitutional questions, we have implicitly questioned that standard, at least with respect to pure legal questions, in our recent retroactivity precedents. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313-314 (1989), a majority of this Court endorsed the retroactivity analysis advanced by JUSTICE O'CONNOR for a plurality in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Under Teague, a habeas petitioner generally cannot benefit from a new rule of criminal procedure announced after his conviction has become final on direct appeal. See id., at 305-310 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). Teague defined a "new" rule as one that was "not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id., at 301 (emphasis in original). In Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 415 (1990), we explained that the definition includes all rules "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds." Thus, if a state court has reasonably rejected the legal claim asserted by a habeas petitioner under existing law, then the claim seeks the benefit of a "new" rule under Butler, and is therefore not cognizable on habeas under Teague. In other words, a federal habeas court "must defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless that decision is patently unreasonable." Butler, supra, at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting).8
expressly endorsing a notion of at least limited deference, and given that the Jackson petitioner would have lost under either a de novo standard or a reasonableness standard, we cannot agree that the case "expressly rejected" the latter. Post, at 303.
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