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The Court of Appeals also concluded that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would not be overly burdensome because the Navy had shut down MFA sonar 27 times during its eight prior training exercises in SOCAL; in several of these cases, the Navy turned off its sonar when marine mammals were spotted well beyond the Navy’s self-imposed 200-yard shutdown zone. 518 F. 3d, at 700, n. 65. Admiral Locklear—the Commander of the Navy’s Third Fleet—stated that any shutdowns beyond the 200-yard zone were voluntary avoidance measures that likely took place at tactically insignificant times; the Ninth Circuit discounted this explanation as not supported by the re-cord. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals ignored key portions of Admiral Locklear’s declaration, in which he stated unequivocally that commanding officers “would not shut down sonar until legally required to do so if in contact with a submarine.” Pet. App. 354a–355a. Similarly, if a commanding officer is in contact with a target submarine, “the CO will be expected to continue to use active sonar unless another ship or helicopter can gain contact or if regulatory reasons dictate otherwise.” Id., at 355a. The record supports the Navy’s contention that its shutdowns of MFA sonar during prior training exercises only occurred during tactically insignificant times; those voluntary shutdowns do not justify the District Court’s imposition of a mandatory 2,200-yard shut-down zone.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit stated that a 2,200-yard shut-down zone was feasible because the Navy had previously adopted a 2,000-meter zone for low-frequency active (LFA) sonar. The Court of Appeals failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that LFA sonar is used for long-range detection of enemy submarines, and thus its use and shutdown involve tactical considerations quite different from those associated with MFA sonar. See App. 508(noting that equating MFA sonar with LFA sonar “is completely misleading and is like comparing 20 degrees Fahrenheit to 20 degrees Celsius”).
3. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Navy’ straining exercises would not be significantly affected by the requirement that it power down MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface ducting conditions. Again, we think the Ninth Circuit understated the burden this requirement would impose on the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training exercises.
Surface ducting is a phenomenon in which relatively little sound energy penetrates beyond a narrow layer near the surface of the water. When surface ducting occurs, active sonar becomes more useful near the surface but less useful at greater depths. Pet. App. 299a–300a. Diesel-electric submariners are trained to take advantage of these distortions to avoid being detected by sonar. Id., at 333a.
The Ninth Circuit determined that the power down requirement during surface ducting conditions was unlikely to affect certification of the Navy’s strike groups because surface ducting occurs relatively rarely, and the Navy has previously certified strike groups that did not train under such conditions. 518 F. 3d, at 701–702. This reasoning is backwards. Given that surface ducting is both rare and unpredictable, it is especially important for the Navy to be able to train under these conditions when they occur. Admiral Bird explained that the 6 dB power-down requirement makes the training less valuable be-cause it “exposes [sonar operators] to unrealistically lower levels of mutual interference caused by multiple sonar systems operating together by the ships within the Strike Group.” Pet. App. 281a (footnote omitted). Although a 6dB reduction may not seem terribly significant, decibels are measured on a logarithmic scale, so a 6 dB decrease in power equates to a 75% reduction. Id., at 284a–285a.
4. The District Court acknowledged that “‘the imposition of these mitigation measures will require the Navy to alter and adapt the way it conducts antisubmarine war-fare training—a substantial challenge. Nevertheless, evidence presented to the Court reflects that the Navy has employed mitigation measures in the past, without sacrificing training objectives.’” 527 F. Supp. 2d, at 1238.Apparently no good deed goes unpunished. The fact that the Navy has taken measures in the past to address concerns about marine mammals—or, for that matter, has elected not to challenge four additional restrictions imposed by the District Court in this case, see supra, at 7– 8—hardly means that other, more intrusive restrictions pose no threat to preparedness for war.
The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by stating that “the Navy may return to the district court to request relief on an emergency basis” if the preliminary injunction “actually result[s] in an inability to train and certify sufficient naval forces to provide for the national defense.” 518
F. 3d, at 703. This is cold comfort to the Navy. The Navy contends that the injunction will hinder efforts to train sonar operators under realistic conditions, ultimately leaving strike groups more vulnerable to enemy submarines. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, we do not think the Navy is required to wait until the injunction “actually result[s] in an inability to train . . . sufficient naval forces for the national defense” before seeking its dissolution. By then it may be too late.
IV
As noted above, we do not address the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims. While we have authority to proceed to such a decision at this point, see Munaf, 553 U. S., at __(slip op., at 13–14), doing so is not necessary here. In addition, reaching the merits is complicated by the fact that the lower courts addressed only one of several issues raised, and plaintiffs have largely chosen not to defend the decision below on that ground.5
At the same time, what we have said makes clear that it would be an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction, after final decision on the merits, along the same lines as the preliminary injunction. An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 313 (“a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law”).
The factors examined above—the balance of equities and consideration of the public interest—are pertinent in assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, preliminary or permanent. See Amoco Production Co., 480 U. S., at 546, n. 12 (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success”). Given that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must pre-pare an EIS, not that it must cease sonar training, there is no basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly alleged to pose a serious threat to national security. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the training has been going on for 40 years with no documented episode of harm to a marine mammal.
A court concluding that the Navy is required to prepare an EIS has many remedial tools at its disposal, including declaratory relief or an injunction tailored to the preparation of an EIS rather than the Navy’s training in the interim. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 466 (1974) (“Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the injunction”). In the mean-time, we see no basis for jeopardizing national security, as the present injunction does. Plaintiffs confirmed at oral argument that the preliminary injunction was “the whole ball game,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, and our analysis of the propriety of preliminary relief is applicable to any permanent injunction as well.
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President Theodore Roosevelt explained that “the only way in which a navy can ever be made efficient is by practice at sea, under all the conditions which would have to be met if war existed.” President’s Annual Message, 42 Cong. Rec. 67, 81 (1907). We do not discount the importance of plaintiffs’ ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals. Those interests, however, are plainly outweighed by the Navy’s need to conduct realistic training exercises to ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines. The District Court abused its discretion by imposing a 2,200-yard shutdown zone and by requiring the Navy to power down its MFA sonar during significant surface ducting conditions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-versed, and the preliminary injunction is vacated to the extent it has been challenged by the Navy.
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