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do in this analysis, in order to achieve a consistent whole. GTC, Inc., 967 So. 2d at




787. This is in accord with the principle that "[e]very statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts." Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Fleischman




v. Dept of Profl Reg., 441 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)). This requires us, as we have done here, to "look not only to the words themselves but also to,,the context in which the language lies." Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 182 (quoting Miele




v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 1995)).


To construe sections 394.913(4) and 394.9135(4) to allow proceedings to be initiated after a person has been released from custody and is living in society, where no part of the process was begun while the person was in lawful custody, would require us to look only at those discrete subsections in isolation; and under the construction placed on the provisions by the First District, would also render without effect the other, detailed requirements of sections 394.913 and 394.9135.


This would violate the "basic rule of statutory construction . . . that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless." Goode, 830 So. 2d at 824. We cannot read a statutory subsection in isolation, "but must read it within the context of the entire section in order to ascertain legislative intent for the provision."





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ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d at 1265. We conclude that when each statutory section is read in context, as a whole, to give effect to every clause, it is apparent that the jurisdictional disclaimers contained in the two subsections are not intended to and do not waive or dispense with the underlying requirement, otherwise clearly present in the Act, that the individual against whom commitment proceedings are brought must be in lawful custody when steps are taken to commence those proceedings in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction.


Tanguay v. State


The First District also relied on the decision of Tanguay v. State, 880 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2004), in reaching its decision in this case and the State relies on Tanguay here. Therefore, we must conduct a careful examination of that precedent to determine if it controls our decision in this case. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that Tanguay does not determine the question before the Court.


In Tanguay, the individual was actually in custody, although the custody was found to be unlawful. In holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition under the statute in effect at that time, a plurality of this Court in Tanguay stated that there was no "in custody" requirement in the applicable statute, specifically section 916.35(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998). 880 So. 2d at 537. That section provided: "If the judge





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determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a ***ually violent predator, the judge shall direct that the person be taken into custody and held in an appropriate secure facility." § 916.35(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). In its holding in Tanguay, the plurality Court specifically pointed out that it was dealing with a version of the Jimmy Ryce Act that existed prior to its amendment in 1999. Tanguay, 880 So. 2d at 535. Significantly, the statute in effect in Tanguay spoke in terms of the individual being "taken into custody," a provision that does not appear in the text of the current section 394.915 or 394.9135.


In 1999, the Jimmy Ryce Act was moved to chapter 394 and former section




916.35 was renumbered to section 394.915. See ch. 99-222, § 9, Laws of Fla.


Although the title of section 394.915 remained the same, and includes the reference to "respondent taken into custody" as did the title to section 916.35, the text of section 394.915 was amended and no longer refers to the person being "taken into custody." Instead, section 394.915 states:





(1) When the state attorney files a petition seeking to have a person declared a ***ually violent predator, the judge shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in the petition is a ***ually violent predator. If the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a ***ually violent predator, the judge shall order that the person remain in custody and be immediately transferred to an appropriate secure facility if the persons incarcerative sentence expires.




(2) Upon the expiration of the incarcerative sentence and before the release from custody of a person . . . .





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§ 394.915, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added). Moreover, former section 916.35 made no reference to the expiration of the persons incarcerative sentence, as does the amended version of the statute.7


Section 394.9135 was also added in 1999, providing procedures to be followed where the anticipated release of an inmate from total confinement becomes immediate for any reason--statutory procedures which were not applicable to the Courts decision in Tanguay. See ch. 99-222, § 7, Laws of Fla.


Since the Legislature added a section providing for special procedures where immediate release is anticipated, and amended section 394.915 to state that the person "remain in custody" rather than be "taken into custody," there is no longer any statutory basis on which to hold that there is no "in custody" requirement in







7. In discussing the effect of a jurisdictional disclaimer contained in section




916.33, the predecessor statute to section 394.913(4), the Tanguay Court explained the provision in terms relating only to the failure to meet certain specified time deadlines:


The Legislature expressly provided that the requirements of section



916.33 are not jurisdictional and that failure to comply with these requirements would not prevent the State from proceeding under the Act. Id. § 916.33(1). Therefore, if the State fails to strictly adhere to the provisions of this section (i.e., if the State does not provide the multidisciplinary team with notice precisely within 180 or ninety days, or if the multidisciplinary team fails to provide its recommendation within forty-five days), the State may still proceed against the person.


Tanguay, 880 So. 2d at 536 (emphasis added).






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the Jimmy Ryce Act. Accordingly, Tanguay does not control our construction of the 2004 statutes or the jurisdictional disclaimers, first, because section 394.9135 now clearly spells out what is to occur when an inmate is to be immediately released and is expressly premised on the inmate being in custody; second, because section 394.915 has been amended to state that the person for whom probable cause has been found will "remain" in custody; and finally, because Tanguay was a plurality opinion and construed a statute that has now been amended to expressly refer to the person being in custody.


Moreover, it is important to remember that nothing in the Jimmy Ryce Act expressly grants a circuit court jurisdiction over a commitment petition filed against a person not in lawful custody when the proceedings were initiated. We have previously interpreted the term "custody" as used in the Jimmy Ryce Act to mean "lawful custody." See Atkinson, 831 So. 2d at 174 (holding that the Jimmy Ryce Act is limited to persons who were in lawful custody on its effective date).


As we stated in Atkinson in interpreting the "applicability" provision of the Act, "[a] basic tenet of statutory construction compels a court to interpret a statute so as to avoid a construction that would result in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd consequences" and "[i]t would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due process" to interpret provisions of the Act as requiring only actual custody." Id.


Similarly, interpreting the Jimmy Ryce Act as not requiring lawful custody for





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individuals who had been incarcerated at some point after the effective date of the Act but are not in lawful custody when commitment proceedings are initiated would be contrary not only to the overall intent of the Act but "would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due process." Id. Therefore, we will also consider, as we did in Atkinson, whether our interpretation of the Act is in accord with fairness and due process considerations.



Due Process Considerations


In accordance with our precedent, we must read the provisions of the Act consistent with basic tenets of fairness and due process. See Atkinson, 831 So. 2d 172, 174. We conclude that our reading of the Act is consistent with due process considerations. The Florida Legislature modeled the Jimmy Ryce Act after Kansass similar statutory scheme. Goode, 830 So. 2d at 821. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that Kansass ***ually Violent Predator Act "comports with due process requirements and neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles nor constitutes an exercise in impermissible ex post facto lawmaking." 521 U.S. at 371. A plurality of this Court likewise found the Jimmy Ryce Act to be constitutional in Westerheide. 831 So. 2d at 112 (plurality opinion); id. at 113 (Quince, J., concurring in result only); id. at 114 (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).






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Although we upheld the constitutionality of the Jimmy Ryce Act in Westerheide, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of procedural safeguards and time constraints within the Act to ensure that an individuals constitutional rights are protected. For example, this Courts plurality opinion in Westerheide noted the "range of procedural safeguards" provided by the Act, including the assistance of counsel and mental health professionals, the right to a jury trial, the right to appeal, at least an annual review of the persons condition, the right to petition for release, and the States burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person requires commitment. 831 So. 2d at 105; see also §§ 394.916(3)-(5), 394.917(1), (3), 394.918, 394.920, Fla. Stat. (2004).


As repeatedly recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).


We explained in Goode, "Civil commitment proceedings involve a serious deprivation of liberty and, thus, such proceedings must comply with the due process clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions." 830 So. 2d at 825-




26. We noted in Goode that under the statutory scheme, "the State would have multiple opportunities to initiate and pursue these commitments before the respondents criminal sentence expires" and "when circumstances cause a





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legitimate delay but the inmate is scheduled to be released, the statute provides that a person can still be detained pending trial." Id. at 826 & n.8.


In Mitchell v. State, 911 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2005), we reiterated a concern we expressed in Goode that while "the Legislature intended that,,the review process of potential ***ual predators would be concluded while the person was still in prison. . .,,there is evidence that in practice this is not occurring and that often people are being detained for long periods after their scheduled release date without being taken to trial." Mitchell, 911 So. 2d at 1219 (quoting Goode, 830 So. 2d at 825 &




n.7). We further "emphasize[d] that the State should make every effort to initiate the commitment trial,,well in advance of the [detainees] date of release from prison[, so that] the due process concerns of commitment beyond imprisonment would be substantially alleviated." Mitchell, 911 So. 2d at 1219 (quoting Goode, 830 So. 2d at 826).


Finally, in Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2006), we examined the Jimmy Ryce Acts "numerous safeguards to ensure that a prisoners due process rights are protected." Id. at 1092. We explained, "The confinement of an individual past the expiration of his or her incarcerative sentence requires ,,scrupulous compliance with the Acts requirements." Id. at 1093.


Because the Jimmy Ryce Act, by its express terms, is founded upon the concept that the individual be in lawful custody when any portion of the





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commitment proceedings are initiated, and because of the due process considerations set forth above, we conclude that the Act requires that the individual be in lawful custody when commitment proceedings are initiated.


CONCLUSION


Based on the foregoing analysis conducted in accord with our longstanding principles of statutory construction, we hold that an individual must be in lawful custody when the State takes steps to initiate commitment proceedings pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition. When effect is given to all the provisions of sections




394.913 and 394.9135, we conclude that the Legislature clearly intends that the individual be in lawful custody when steps are taken to initiate civil commitment proceedings under the Act. This is buttressed by the fact that the Legislature amended the Act to provide an expedited procedure where an inmate is to be immediately released. That amendment would not have been necessary if the Legislature did not fully intend for the proceedings to be initiated while the inmate was still in custody. We simply cannot construe each jurisdictional disclaimer subsection in isolation but must consider the entirety of not only each section but of the Act itself. After doing so, we find that the jurisdictional disclaimer provisions do not waive or dispense with the custody requirements of the Act.






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Accordingly, we quash the decision of the First District in Larimore and approve the decision of the Second District in Gordon. Because Larimore was not in legal custody when initial steps were taken to initiate civil commitment proceedings against him in this case, the States commitment petition is hereby dismissed with prejudice and Larimore shall be immediately released from any custody or commitment imposed as a result of the Jimmy Ryce Act proceedings that are the subject of this decision.


It is so ordered.


QUINCE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.


WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.


CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., did not participate.


NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND


IF FILED, DETERMINED.


WELLS, J., dissenting.


I would approve the well-reasoned decision of the First District Court of Appeal in this case, which I conclude correctly applied the statute as intended by the Legislature.


Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions First District - Case No. 1D05-3525 (Duval County)





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Bill White, Public Defender, and Ward L. Metzger, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, Florida, for Petitioner Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief Criminal Appeals, and Charles Richey McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent
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