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from the team, the state attorney has the option of filing a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is a ***ually violent predator. § 394.9135(3), Fla.


Stat. (2004). "If a petition is not filed within 48 hours after receipt of the written assessment and recommendation by the state attorney, the person shall be immediately released." Id. If a petition is timely filed pursuant to this section and the judge determines that there is probable cause, then "the judge shall order the person to be maintained in custody and held in an appropriate secure facility for further proceedings in accordance with this part." § 394.9135(3), Fla. Stat. (2004).


These provisions of the Act all demonstrate legislative intent that the individual be in lawful custody when civil commitment proceedings are initiated.


Therefore, as to the question of custody, we conclude that it is clear from a reading of all of the related provisions that the legislative intent of the Jimmy Ryce Act is that the person is in lawful custody at the time any initial steps are taken in the commitment process under either section 394.913 or 394.9135. There are no provisions in the Act that expressly provide or even imply that the State may initiate a civil commitment proceeding after a person has been released from custody and is living in society. We will next consider whether any sections of the Act constitute a statutory waiver of this custody requirement to allow the state to initiate Jimmy Ryce proceedings against an individual who is not in lawful custody.





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Jurisdiction Under the Act


Because the First District based its conclusion that custody is not required under the Act on sections 394.913(4) and 394.9135(4), Florida Statutes (2003), a close examination of the text of those and the other provisions of sections 394.913 and 394.9135 is required to determine the legislative intent and legal effect of subsection (4) of each statute in the context of the entire statute. We must endeavor to ascertain the intent of the entirety of both statutes because all parts of a statute must be read together to discern the intent apparent in the whole. See GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 787 (Fla. 2007). This is in accord with the requirement that we "give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another." Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 199 (quoting Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 898). These principles are especially applicable here where the disclaimer subsections expressly refer to the provisions or time limitations contained in the specific statute of which each subsection is a part.


We will first set forth the actual text of each of the subsections relied upon by the district court because "[w]e endeavor to construe statutes to effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006). We have said many times that "legislative intent is the polestar" that guides the Courts inquiry and "is determined primarily from the language of the





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statute." Maggio v. Fla. Dept of Labor & Employment Sec., 899 So. 2d 1074, 1076-77 (Fla. 2005). Accordingly, "we begin with the,,actual language used in the statute." Continental Cas. Co. v. Ryan Inc. Eastern, 974 So. 2d 368, 374 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Borden, 921 So. 2d at 595).


The text of section 394.913(4), Florida Statutes (2004), provides as follows:




(4) The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with them in no way prevents the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the provisions of this part.


Section 394.9135(4), Florida Statutes (2004), also relied on by the First District Court of Appeal, states:




(4) The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with the time limitations, which results in the release of a person who has been convicted of a ***ually violent offense, is not dispositive of the case and does not prevent the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the provisions of this part.


These provisions remain unchanged in the 2008 statutes.


We first turn to section 394.913(4). The language of the "jurisdictional disclaimer" provision in that section does not make any reference to the inmate being out of custody. The subsection refers only to the fact that the "failure to comply" with the "provisions of this part" will not prevent the state attorney from proceeding against a person otherwise subject to the statute. The provisions of the section to which the subsection refers involve notice to the multidisciplinary team,





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with a copy to the state attorney, of certain details regarding an individual who has been convicted of a ***ually violent offense, including deadlines for the notice, specification of information to be contained in the notice, establishment of the multidisciplinary team, deadlines for its written assessment, and other time frames to be met by the state attorney.


The entire statute is predicated on the inmate being in custody, as is evidenced by its very title, which includes the words "Notice to state attorney and multidisciplinary team of release." This is also an appropriate consideration because the title of an act is properly considered in determining legislative intent.


See Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. Pship, 959 So. 2d 176, 182 (Fla. 2007). Based on the text of section 394.913(4) and the provisions contained in the larger part to which it refers, we conclude that the provisions of this section for which compliance is waived by subsection (4) deal only with time frames for notice of the inmates release, the composition, duties and deadlines for the multidisciplinary team, and other specific matters relating to the assessment of the person--not the fact of the release or status of custody.


We now turn to section 394.9135(4). Even though section 394.9135 is replete with references to the individual being in custody, the First District read the provisions of section 394.9135(4) to dispense with all custody requirements in the section. A close reading of the actual text of subsection (4), however, shows that it





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refers only to "failure to comply with the time limitations, which results in the release of a person who has been convicted of a ***ually violent offense." §




394.9135(4), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). The time limitations in section




394.9135 all pertain to actions that occur after the inmate has come into the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services directly from his or her incarcerative sentence, to be held in a secure facility by that department. The subsection (4) jurisdictional disclaimer, when given a plain reading in the context of the entire statute, can refer only to the two sections that provide time limitations--subsection (2) (seventy-two hours for the multidisciplinary team to make an assessment) and subsection (3) (forty-eight hours for the state attorney to file the petition).6 The only time limitation in section 394.9135 that would result in







6. The Senate staff analyses support this reading of the section. The Florida Senate Committee on Children and Families staff analysis explains:


If the state attorney does not file a petition within 48 hours after receipt of the written assessment and recommendation from the team, the person must be immediately released from custody.


However, simply because a person is released from custody because the petition was not filed within 48 hours does not mean that it would be dispositive of the case. Rather, the state attorney may still file a petition in the case and follow the procedures set out in the act to involuntarily commit a ***ually violent predator. It is anticipated that if the person is released because the state attorney did not file a petition within 48 hours, a person could be taken back into custody and be held in an appropriate secure facility until there is a trial verdict if the judge finds probable cause on a late-filed petition.






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release if not met is the requirement that the state attorney file the petition within forty-eight hours pursuant to subsection (3). If the state attorney fails to file the petition within forty-eight hours after receipt of the written assessment, and the individual is released, subsection (4) would allow the state attorney to file a petition after the release. However, this jurisdictional disclaimer does not come into play until after the individual has been kept in secure custody by the Department of Children and Family Services, after a multidisciplinary team has made an assessment, and after the state attorney has failed to comply with a time limitation applicable to the filing of the petition, where that failure has resulted in the offenders release. The Legislative intent of section 394.9135(4) appears to be a "safety valve" solely to prevent persons from bringing challenges to civil commitment proceedings on technical grounds, such as the giving of late notice of the anticipated release that is mandated by section 394.9135(1)(a) or the late filing by the state attorney. The status of an inmate who has been lawfully released and Child. & Fams. Comm. SB 2192 Analysis at 25 (emphases added). Similarly, the Florida Senate Committee on Judiciary staff analysis explains:


If the state attorney does not file a petition within 48 hours after receipt of the written assessment and recommendation from the team, the person must be immediately released from custody.


However, the state attorney retains the discretion to file a petition at any later time against the person subject to the Act.


Judiciary Comm. SB 2192 Analysis at 12 (emphases added).





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is no longer in custody, where no steps have been taken in the commitment process, is no mere technical requirement that the Legislature has indicated is waived under subsection (4).


Therefore, based on the actual text of the jurisdictional disclaimer, the legislative intent of section 394.9135(4) is that the state attorney retains the right to file a petition even if the person is released as a result of the state attorneys failure to comply with the forty-eight hour time limitation after the multidisciplinary team has acted. This is also supported by the title of the section: "Immediate releases from total confinement; transfer of person to department; time limitations on assessment, notification, and filing petition to hold in custody; filing petition after release." § 394.9135, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added); see Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 182. Even under the circumstances described in section 394.9135 where the person is released as a result of the state attorneys failure to comply with the time limitations, steps in the commitment proceedings would have already been taken while that person was still in custody, pursuant to sections 394.9135(1) and (2).


Thus, the jurisdictional disclaimer contained in section 394.9135(4) should not be extended beyond its actual text to dispense with the custody requirement where no steps in the proceedings have been initiated.


Neither section 394.913(4) nor section 394.9135(4) can be read in isolation.

Rather, all parts of each statute should be read together, as we have endeavored to
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