[align=left] Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

VADEN v. DISCOVER BANK et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 07–773. Argued October 6, 2008Decided March 9, 2009

Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U. S. C. §4, authorizes a United States district court to entertain a petition to compel arbitration if the court would have jurisdiction, save for [the arbitration] agreement, over a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties.

Discover Bank’s servicing affiliate filed a complaint in Maryland state court to recover past-due charges from one of its credit cardholders, petitioner Vaden. Discover’s pleading presented a claim arising solely under state law. Vaden answered and counterclaimed, alleging that Discover’s finance charges, interest, and late fees violated state law. Invoking an arbitration clause in its cardholder agreement with Vaden, Discover then filed a §4 petition in Federal District Court to compel arbitration of Vaden’s counterclaims. The District Court ordered arbitration.

On Vaden’s initial appeal, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over Discover’s §4 petition pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1331, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law. The Fourth Circuit instructed the District Court to conduct this inquiry by looking through the §4 petition to the substantive controversy between the parties. With Vaden conceding that her state-law counterclaims were completely preempted by §27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), the District Court expressly held that it had federal-question jurisdiction and again ordered arbitration. The Fourth Circuit then affirmed. The Court of Appeals recognized that, in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U. S. 826 , this Court held that federal-question jurisdiction depends on the contents of a well-pleaded complaint, and may not be predicated on counterclaims. It concluded, however, that the complete preemption doctrine is paramount and thus overrides the well-pleaded complaint rule.

Held: A federal court may look through a §4 petition to determine whether it is predicated on a controversy that arises under federal law; in keeping with the well-pleaded complaint rule as amplified in Holmes Group, however, a federal court may not entertain a §4 petition based on the contents of a counterclaim when the whole controversy between the parties does not qualify for federal-court adjudication. Pp. 6–21.

(a) Congress enacted the FAA [t]o overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440 , and to declare ‘a national policy favoring arbitration’ of claims that parties contract to settle in that manner, Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. ___, ___. To that end, §2 makes arbitration agreements in contracts involving commerce valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, while §4 provides for federal district court enforcement of those agreements. The body of federal substantive law generated by elaboration of §2 is equally binding on state and federal courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 . However, the FAA requir[es] [for access to a federal forum] an independent jurisdictional basis over the parties’ dispute. Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, ___. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a suit arises under federal law for 28 U. S. C. §1331 purposes only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law]. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 . Federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or anticipated defense, ibid., or rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim, Holmes Group, 535 U. S. 826 . A complaint purporting to rest on state law can be recharacterized as one arising under federal law if the law governing the complaint is exclusively federal, see Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U. S. 1 , but a state-law-based counterclaim, even if similarly susceptible to recharacterization, remains nonremovable. Pp. 6–11.

(b) FAA §4’s text drives the conclusion that a federal court should determine its jurisdiction by looking through a §4 petition to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy. The phrase save for [the arbitration] agreement indicates that the district court should assume the absence of the agreement and determine whether it would have jurisdiction under title 28 over the controversy between the parties, which is most straightforwardly read to mean the underlying dispute between the parties. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1 . Vaden’s argument that the relevant controversy is simply and only the parties’ discrete dispute over the arbitrability of their claims is difficult to square with §4’s language. If courts are to determine whether they would have jurisdiction save for [the arbitration] agreement, how can a dispute over an arbitration agreement’s existence or applicability be the controversy that counts? The Court is unpersuaded that the save for clause means only that the antiquated and arcane ouster notion no longer holds sway. To the extent that the ancient ouster doctrine continued to impede specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, FAA §2, the Act’s centerpiece provision, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614 , directly attended to the problem by commanding that an arbitration agreement is enforceable just as any other contract. Vaden’s approach also has curious practical consequences. It would permit a federal court to entertain a §4 petition only when a federal-question suit is already before the court, when the parties satisfy the requirements for diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, or when the dispute over arbitrability involves a maritime contract, yet would not accommodate a §4 petitioner who could file a federal-question suit in, or remove such a suit to, federal court, but has not done so. In contrast, the look through approach permits a §4 petitioner to ask a federal court to compel arbitration without first taking the formal step of initiating or removing a federal-question suit. Pp. 11–15.

(c) Having determined that a district court should look through a §4 petition, this Court considers whether the court would have [federal-question] jurisdiction over a suit arising out of the controversy between Discover and Vaden. Because §4 does not enlarge federal-court jurisdiction, a party seeking to compel arbitration may gain such a court’s assistance only if, save for the agreement, the entire, actual controversy between the parties, as they have framed it, could be litigated in federal court. Here, the actual controversy is not amenable to federal-court adjudication. The controversy between the parties arose from Vaden’s alleged debt, a claim that plainly did not arise under federal law; nor did it qualify under any other head of federal-court jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit misapprehended Holmes Group when it concluded that jurisdiction was proper because Vaden’s state-law counterclaims were completely preempted. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a completely preempted counterclaim remains a counterclaim, and thus does not provide a key capable of opening a federal court’s door. Vaden’s responsive counterclaims challenging the legality of Discover’s charges are merely an aspect of the whole controversy Discover and Vaden brought to state court. Whether one might hypothesize a federal-question suit involving that subsidiary disagreement is beside the point. The relevant question is whether the whole controversy is one over which the federal courts would have jurisdiction. Section 4 does not give parties license to recharacterize an existing controversy, or manufacture a new controversy, in order to obtain a federal court’s aid in compelling arbitration. It is hardly fortuitous that the controversy in this case took the shape it did. Seeking to collect a debt, Discover filed an entirely state-law-grounded complaint in state court, and Vaden chose to file responsive counterclaims. Section 4 does not invite federal courts to dream up counterfactuals when actual litigation has defined the parties’ controversy. Allowing parties to commandeer a federal court to slice off responsive pleadings for discrete arbitration while leaving the remainder of the parties’ controversy pending in state court makes scant sense. Furthermore, the presence of a threshold question whether a counterclaim alleged to be based on state law is totally preempted by federal law may complicate the §4 inquiry. Although FAA §4 does not empower a federal court to order arbitration here, Discover is not left without recourse. Because the FAA obliges both state and federal courts to honor and enforce arbitration agreements, Discover may petition Maryland’s courts for appropriate aid in enforcing the arbitration clause of its contracts with Maryland credit cardholders. Pp. 15–20.

489 F. 3d 594, reversed and remanded.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined.

Justice Ginsburg, Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BETTY E. VADEN, PETITIONER v. DISCOVER
BANK et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
[March 9, 2009]

Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §4, authorizes a United States district court to entertain a petition to compel arbitration if the court would have jurisdiction, save for [the arbitration] agreement, over a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties. We consider in this opinion two questions concerning a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a §4 petition: Should a district court, if asked to compel arbitration pursuant to §4, look through the petition and grant the requested relief if the court would have federal-question jurisdiction over the underlying controversy? And if the answer to that question is yes, may a district court exercise jurisdiction over a §4 petition when the petitioner’s complaint rests on state law but an actual or potential counterclaim rests on federal law?

The litigation giving rise to these questions began when Discover Bank’s servicing affiliate filed a complaint in Maryland state court. Presenting a claim arising solely under state law, Discover sought to recover past-due charges from one of its credit cardholders, Betty Vaden. Vaden answered and counterclaimed, alleging that Discover’s finance charges, interest, and late fees violated state law. Invoking an arbitration clause in its cardholder agreement with Vaden, Discover then filed a §4 petition in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to compel arbitration of Vaden’s counterclaims. The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over its petition, Discover maintained, because Vaden’s state-law counterclaims were completely preempted by federal banking law. The District Court agreed and ordered arbitration. Reasoning that a federal court has jurisdiction over a §4 petition if the parties’ underlying dispute presents a federal question, the Fourth Circuit eventually affirmed.

We agree with the Fourth Circuit in part. A federal court may look through a §4 petition and order arbitration if, save for [the arbitration] agreement, the court would have jurisdiction over the [substantive] controversy between the parties. We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals misidentified the dimensions of the controversy between the parties. Focusing on only a slice of the parties’ entire controversy, the court seized on Vaden’s counterclaims, held them completely preempted, and on that basis affirmed the District Court’s order compelling arbitration. Lost from sight was the triggering pleaDiscover’s claim for the balance due on Vaden’s account. Given that entirely state-based plea and the established rule that federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a defense or counterclaim, the whole controversy between the parties does not qualify for federal-court adjudication. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

I

This case originated as a garden-variety, state-law-based contract action: Discover sued its cardholder, Vaden, in a Maryland state court to recover arrearages amounting to $10,610.74, plus interest and counsel fees.1 Vaden’s answer asserted usury as an affirmative defense. Vaden also filed several counterclaims, styled as class actions. Like Discover’s complaint, Vaden’s pleadings invoked only state law: Vaden asserted that Discover’s demands for finance charges, interest, and late fees violated Maryland’s credit laws. See Md. Com. Law Code Ann. §§12–506, 12–506.2 (Lexis 2005). Neither party invokedby notice to the other or petition to the state courtthe clause in the credit card agreement providing for arbitration of any claim or dispute between [Discover and Vaden], App. 44 (capitalization and bold typeface omitted).2

Faced with Vaden’s counterclaims, Discover sought federal-court aid. It petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for an order, pursuant to §4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act), 9 U. S. C. §4, compelling arbitration of Vaden’s counterclaims.3 Although those counterclaims were framed under state law, Discover urged that they were governed entirely by federal law, specifically, §27(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U. S. C. §1831d(a). Section 27(a) prescribes the interest rates state-chartered, federally insured banks like Discover can charge, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted. This provision, Discover maintained, was completely preemptive, i.e., it superseded otherwise applicable Maryland law, and placed Vaden’s counterclaims under the exclusive governance of the FDIA. On that basis, Discover asserted, the District Court had authority to entertain the §4 petition pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1331, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law.

The District Court granted Discover’s petition, ordered arbitration, and stayed Vaden’s prosecution of her counterclaims in state court pending the outcome of arbitration. App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a–90a. On Vaden’s initial appeal, the Fourth Circuit inquired whether the District Court had federal-question jurisdiction over Discover’s §4 petition. To make that determination, the Court of Appeals instructed, the District Court should look through the §4 petition to the substantive controversy between the parties. 396 F. 3d 366, 369, 373 (2005). The appellate court then remanded the case for an express determination whether that controversy presented a properly invoked federal question. Id., at 373.

On remand, Vaden concede[d] that the FDIA completely preempts any state claims against a federally insured bank. 409 F. Supp. 2d 632, 636 (Md. 2006). Accepting this concession, the District Court expressly held that it had federal-question jurisdiction over Discover’s §4 petition and again ordered arbitration. Id., at 634–636, 639. In this second round, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, dividing 2 to 1. 489 F. 3d 594 (2007).

Recognizing that a party may not create jurisdiction by concession, id., at 604, n. 10, the Fourth Circuit majority conducted its own analysis of FDIA §27(a), ultimately concluding that the provision completely preempted state law and therefore governed Vaden’s counterclaims.4 This Court’s decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U. S. 826 (2002) , the majority recognized, held that federal-question jurisdiction depends on the contents of a well-pleaded complaint, and may not be predicated on counterclaims. 489 F. 3d, at 600, n. 4. Nevertheless, the majority concluded, the complete preemption doctrine is paramount, overrid[ing] such fundamental cornerstones of federal subject-matter jurisdiction as the well-pleaded complaint rule. Ibid. (quoting 14B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3722.1, p. 511 (3d ed. 1998) (hereinafter Wright & Miller)).5

The dissenting judge considered Holmes Group dispositive. As §27(a) of the FDIA formed no part of Discover’s complaint, but came into the case only as a result of Vaden’s responsive pleadings, the dissent reasoned, [t]here was no ‘properly invoked federal question’ in the underlying state case. 489 F. 3d, at 610.

We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), in view of the conflict among lower federal courts on whether district courts, petitioned to order arbitration pursuant to §4 of the FAA, may look through the petition and examine the parties’ underlying dispute to determine whether federal-question jurisdiction exists over the §4 petition. Compare Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 463 F. 3d 655, 659 (CA7 2006) (in determining jurisdiction over a §4 petition, the court may not look through the petition and focus on the underlying dispute); Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F. 3d 92, 94 (CA6 1997) (same); Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 F. 3d 263, 267–269 (CA2 1996) (same); and Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F. 2d 981, 986–989 (CA5 1992) (same), with Community State Bank v. Strong, 485 F. 3d 597, 605–606 (court may look through the petition and train on the underlying dispute), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 508 F. 3d 576 (CA11 2007);6 and 396 F. 3d, at 369–370 (case below) (same).

As this case shows, if the underlying dispute is the proper focus of a §4 petition, a further question may arise. The dispute brought to state court by Discover concerned Vaden’s failure to pay over $10,000 in past-due credit card charges. In support of that complaint, Discover invoked no federal law. When Vaden answered and counterclaimed, however, Discover asserted that federal law, specifically §27(a) of the FDIA, displaced the state laws on which Vaden relied. What counts as the underlying dispute in a case so postured? May Discover invoke §4, not on the basis of its own complaint, which had no federal element, but on the basis of counterclaims asserted by Vaden? To answer these questions, we first review relevant provisions of the FAA, 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., and controlling tenets of federal jurisdiction.

II

In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA [t]o overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 443 (2006) , and to declare ‘a national policy favoring arbitration’ of claims that parties contract to settle in that manner, Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10 (1984) ). To that end, §2 provides that arbitration agreements in contracts involving commerce are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. 9 U. S. C. §2.7 Section 4the section at issue hereprovides for United States district court enforcement of arbitration agreements. Petitions to compel arbitration, §4 states, may be brought before any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28 … of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties. See supra, at 3, n. 3.8

The body of federal substantive law generated by elaboration of FAA §2 is equally binding on state and federal courts. Southland, 465 U. S., at 12 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 25, n. 32 (1983) ); accord Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 271–272 (1995) . As for jurisdiction over controversies touching arbitration, however, the Act is something of an anomaly in the realm of federal legislation: It bestow[s] no federal jurisdiction but rather requir[es] [for access to a federal forum] an independent jurisdictional basis over the parties’ dispute. Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 4) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 25, n. 32).9 Given the substantive supremacy of the FAA, but the Act’s nonjurisdictional cast, state courts have a prominent role to play as enforcers of agreements to arbitrate. See Southland, 465 U. S., at 15; Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 25, and n. 32.

The independent jurisdictional basis Discover relies upon in this case is 28 U. S. C. §1331, which vests in federal district courts jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Under the longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, however, a suit arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law]. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 152 (1908) . Federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or anticipated defense: It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of [federal law]. Ibid.

Nor can federal jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim. We so ruled, emphatically, in Holmes Group, 535 U. S. 826 . Without dissent, the Court held in Holmes Group that a federal counterclaim, even when compulsory, does not establish arising under jurisdiction.10 Adhering assiduously to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the Court observed, inter alia, that it would undermine the clarity and simplicity of that rule if federal courts were obliged to consider the contents not only of the complaint but also of responsive pleadings in determining whether a case arises under federal law. Id., at 832. See also id., at 830 ([T]he well-pleaded complaint rule, properly understood, [does not] allo[w] a counterclaim to serve as the basis for a district court’s ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1 , and n. 9 (1983) (The well-pleaded complaint rule applies to the original jurisdiction of the district courts as well as to their removal jurisdiction.).11

A complaint purporting to rest on state law, we have recognized, can be recharacterized as one arising under federal law if the law governing the complaint is exclusively federal. See Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U. S. 1, 8 (2003) . Under this so-called complete preemption doctrine, a plaintiff’s state cause of action [may be recast] as a federal claim for relief, making [its] removal [by the defendant] proper on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 14B Wright & Miller §3722.1, p. 511.12 A state-law-based counterclaim, however, even if similarly susceptible to recharacterization, would remain nonremovable. Under our precedent construing §1331, as just explained, counterclaims, even if they rely exclusively on federal substantive law, do not qualify a case for federal-court cognizance.

III

Attending to the language of the FAA and the above-described jurisdictional tenets, we approve the look through approach to this extent: A federal court may look through a §4 petition to determine whether it is predicated on an action that arises under federal law; in keeping with the well-pleaded complaint rule as amplified in Holmes Group, however, a federal court may not entertain a §4 petition based on the contents, actual or hypothetical, of a counterclaim.

A

The text of §4 drives our conclusion that a federal court should determine its jurisdiction by looking through a §4 petition to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy. We reiterate §4’s relevant instruction: When one party seeks arbitration pursuant to a written agreement and the other resists, the proponent of arbitration may petition for an order compelling arbitration in

any United States district court which, save for [the arbitration] agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties. 9 U. S. C. §4.

The phrase save for [the arbitration] agreement indicates that the district court should assume the absence of the arbitration agreement and determine whether it would have jurisdiction under title 28 without it. See 396 F. 3d, at 369, 372 (case below). Jurisdiction over what? The text of §4 refers us to the controversy between the parties. That phrase, the Fourth Circuit said, and we agree, is most straightforwardly read to mean the substantive conflict between the parties. Id., at 370. See also Moses H. Cone, 460 U. S., at 25, n. 32 (noting in dicta that, to entertain a §4 petition, a federal court must have jurisdiction over the underlying dispute).13

The majority of Courts of Appeals to address the question, we acknowledge, have rejected the look through approach entirely, as Vaden asks us to do here. See supra, at 5–6. The relevant controversy between the parties, Vaden insists, is simply and only the parties’ discrete dispute over the arbitrability of their claims. She relies, quite reasonably, on the fact that a §4 petition to compel arbitration seeks no adjudication on the merits of the underlying controversy. Indeed, its very purpose is to have an arbitrator, rather than a court, resolve the merits. A §4 petition, Vaden observes, is essentially a plea for specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate, and it thus presents principally contractual questions: Did the parties validly agree to arbitrate? What issues does their agreement encompass? Has one party dishonored the agreement?

Vaden’s argument, though reasonable, is difficult to square with the statutory language. Section 4 directs courts to determine whether they would have jurisdiction save for [the arbitration] agreement. How, then, can a dispute over the existence or applicability of an arbitration agreement be the controversy that counts?

The save for clause, courts espousing the view embraced by Vaden respond, means only that the antiquated and arcane ouster notion no longer holds sway. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock, 696 F. Supp. 957, 961 (SDNY 1988). Adherents to this ouster explanation of §4’s language recall that courts traditionally viewed arbitration clauses as unworthy attempts to oust them of jurisdiction; accordingly, to guard against encroachment on their domain, they refused to order specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. See H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1–2 (1924) (discussed in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213 , and n. 6 (1985)). The save for clause, as comprehended by proponents of the ouster explanation, was designed to ensure that courts would no longer consider themselves ousted of jurisdiction and would therefore specifically enforce arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 100 F. 3d, at 267–268, and n. 6 (adopting the ouster interpretation advanced in Drexel Burnham Lambert, 696 F. Supp., at 961–963); Strong, 485 F. 3d, at 631 (Marcus, J., specially concurring) (reading §4’s save for clause as instructing the court to ‘set aside’ not the arbitration agreement … , but merely the previous judicial hostility to arbitration agreements).
We are not persuaded that the ouster explanation of §4’s save for clause carries the day. To the extent that the ancient ouster doctrine continued to impede specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, §2 of the FAA, the Act’s centerpiece provision, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 625 (1985) , directly attended to the problem. Covered agreements to arbitrate, §2 declares, are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Having commanded that an arbitration agreement is enforceable just as any other contract, Congress had no cause to repeat the point. See 1 I. MacNeil, R. Speidel, & T. Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law §9.2.3.3, p. 9:18 (1995) (hereinafter MacNeil) (Th[e] effort to connect the ‘save for’ language to the ancient problem of ‘ouster of jurisdiction’ is imaginative, but utterly unfounded and historically inaccurate. (footnote omitted)).14
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