Residency restriction laws are a fairly new method some jurisdictions are using in an attempt to curb the actions of *** offenders. Alabama passed the first residency restriction law in 1996. The law was part of the states' Community Notification Act. It prohibited child molesters from living within 1,000 feet of a school. By January 2006, approximately 14 states had enacted residency restrictions. Moreover, some local governments have implemented their own residency restrictions.
Critics and supporters of residency restriction laws have watched Iowa's law with interest since its passage in 2002. The Iowa law applies to a "person who has committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, ***ually violent offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor." According to the law, "A person shall not reside within two thousand feet of the real property comprising a public or nonpublic elementary or secondary school or a child care facility." The law does not apply in certain circumstances, including where the "person has established a residence prior to July 1, 2002, or a school or child care facility is newly located on or after July 1, 2002," or where the person is a minor or a ward under a guardianship. It is an aggravated misdemeanor to reside within 2,000 feet of a school or child care.
The Iowa law took effect on July 1, 2002, but was almost immediately challenged in federal district court. The plaintiffs were three named *** offenders who contended that the law was unconstitutional on its face. The case was certified as a class action, on behalf of other *** offenders to whom the law would apply. At trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence regarding the scope of the law. In many cities, the law would effectively limit *** offenders to small areas of residency. In small towns, a single school or child care center could mean that the entire town was off limits. Expert witnesses on both sides testified to their beliefs in the expected efficacy of the law.
The district court enjoined enforcement of the law, and ruled that it was unconstitutional on several grounds, including:
  • The law was unconstitutional because it was an ex post facto law for anyone convicted before July 1, 2002;
  • It violated plaintiffs' rights to avoid self-incrimination, because registrants would be required to report their addresses, even when the addresses were not in compliance with the law;
  • It violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights;
  • It infringed on fundamental rights to travel and decide how to conduct their family affairs; and
  • It was not tailored narrowly enough to serve a compelling state interest.