[align=left](2) As to the rejection of his request to have all the woollen blankets
examined by an expert, the Applicant points out that there were several
possibilities that some of these blankets had been scorched, e.g. by
cigarettes, and that this need not be visible for a layman, but could
be ascertained only by an expert.

(3) As to the refusal of the trial court to hear in court the
neighbours who allegedly travelled with him on the bus on the morning
after the crime, the Applicant argues that the interrogation of these
witnesses by the police was no adequate substitute. He submits that
many witnesses when giving evidence before the police without being
cross-examined or under oath, would try to keep out of the trial,
particularly if contradictions between other witnesses coming from the
same village were involved. According to the Applicant, some of the
witnesses did, in fact, confirm his statements, to a certain extent and
indicated certain further witnesses who also could have testified,
whether the conversation alleged by V and U. had taken place or not.
If it was necessary for the defence, as stated by the Supreme Court,
to repeat the request to hear the witnesses after the police report on
their interrogations had been read out, the trial court was obliged to
draw this to the attention of the defence counsel. Its failure to do
so could not be held against the accused.

(4) As to this request to hear his doctor on the question whether he
was physically capable of carrying the body of the victim 118 metres,
and lifting it 1.5 to 2 metres, as assumed by the prosecution, the
Applicant submits that this was a question which could have been
answered by his doctor, and not by the expert. According to the
Applicant, the expert who had not been committed before the trial to
give an opinion on this point, never sought information from the doctor
who had treated the Applicant at the time of the crime continuously for
24 days, including 12 days of sick leave. Without having even seen the
case sheet, the expert only made a few superficial remarks at the trial
which did in no way answer the question in point.

(5) As to the request to hear the policeman responsible for the report
on his reputation read out in court, the Applicant does not give any
details other than those contained in his plea of nullity.

(6) As to his request to hear the wife of the neighbour whom he told
on the day after the crime that he had taken a woman along in his car,
the Applicant objects to the statement of the Court that this was a
detail of no importance. He submits that he had requested to hear both
the husband and his wife, that both were present, that the husband was
heard, but did not remember this point, and that thus his own
credibility might have appeared questionable in the eyes of the jury,
and that in these circumstances, it was quite essential to hear also
the wife. He argues that there was, in fact, no reason to hear the
husband but not the wife on the point in question.

(7) The Applicant sets out in great detail certain contradictions in
the opinion of the experts heard by the Court, and submits that under
these circumstances his request to have a new examination made by a
different expert, should have been granted. Even the Supreme Court had
admitted that as to the swearing in of the experts, the rules of law
had not always been observed.

Articles 8 (1) and 10 (1)
The Applicant further complains of the stopping of the letter he wrote
to his wife on .. March, 1962. According to him, this letter did in no
way suggest to his wife any particular way of testifying, but only
requested her to tell the truth without fear or concern. If his wife
had received the letter she would have given immediately a clear and
true account of his coming home in the night of .. to .. July, 1961.
When the letter was stopped and the investigating judge approached her,
she was even more confused and intimidated, and therefore refused at
that time to give any evidence at all. Thus, he was deprived of an
important means of defence by the stopping of his letter.

Article 13
The Applicant complains that he did not enjoy "equality of arms". The
prosecution's plea of nullity lodged against the acquittal pronounced
by the first jury was set aside, although the police officers not heard
at the first trial could, in fact, not give any substantial evidence.
His own plea of nullity, although based on the trial court's refusal
to hear several important witnesses at the second trial, was rejected
by the Supreme Court. After the acquittal had been quashed, he did no
longer have a real chance before the second jury which must have been
under the impression that the Supreme Court considered him as guilty.
The same impression was also created by numerous press reports
unfavourable to him. Being in detention and without sufficient means,
he had no possibility of convincing the public opinion of his
innocence.

Articles 14 and 17
The Applicant submits that the Austrian authorities consider themselves
as not being bound internally by the Convention, but take the view that
they can act as they think fit, and leave it to the accused to complain
to the Commission. He complains of a bias of the prosecution and of the
courts against him and his relatives. As an example, he quotes the case
of his mother-in-law, who was first convicted, but when the prosecution
was afraid of a defect after the conviction had been set aside, they
simply discontinued the proceedings.

"Interferences with the right of petition" (Article 25)
When lodging his Application, the Applicant demanded access to his
file; however, he was given only a little more than six hours' time to
study the file. He was told that the file was further needed at
Korneuburg. Upon a second request, some time later, he received the
same reply.
In July, 1965, he lodged a petition to grant him free legal aid to
obtain, free of charge, the certification of copies of parts of his
case-file in order to submit them to the Commission. On .. July, 1965,
the Court rejected this petition on the ground that for this purpose
no free legal aid was provided for by the law. The Applicant offers to
submit, upon request of the Commission, uncertified copies of further
documents, particularly of the court record of his trial. Whereas the
Applicant demands that the conviction should be set aside and that a
new trial, observing both the provisions of the Austrian Code of
Criminal Procedure and of the Convention, should be held before the
Jury Courts in Vienna.

THE LAW

Whereas the Applicant alleges a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3)
of the Convention in that he was taken through the town of Korneuburg
wearing handcuffs and convict's dress; whereas the Commission considers
that this measure, although undesirable, was clearly not so serious as
to amount to an inhuman or degrading treatment (see Decision on the
admissibility of Application No. 1352/62, H. against Austria);

Whereas he also states that during the trial he was hand-cuffed in
front of the jury, upon the order of the presiding judge when evidence
was examined outside the court-house; whereas he submits that this
measure amounted to a violation of Article 6, paragraph (2) (Art. 6-2),
in that it unfavourably influenced the jury and thereby did not respect
the principle of presumption of innocence; whereas the Commission
considers that this order of the presiding judge was clearly a measure
of security which could not lead to any false conclusions on the part
of the jury;

Whereas the Applicant also complains of the length of his detention on
remand; whereas the Commission has examined the complaint in the light
of Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3);

Whereas, in this respect, the question arises whether the period of
detention between the beginning of the first trial and the final
decision of the Supreme Court is to be taken into account when
determining whether a person detained on remand has been brought to
"trial within a reasonable time";

Whereas, without prejudging this question, the Commission considers
that, even if the period of detention until the final judgment were to
be taken into account, there is in the present case no appearance of
undue delay;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission recalls that, according to its
constant jurisprudence, the question whether a period of detention on
remand is "reasonable" or not cannot be decided in abstracto but must
be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of each case
(see Applications No. 2077/63, Yearbook VII, page 276, and No. 2516/65,
Collection of Decisions, Volume 20, page 35);

Whereas, in the present case, the Commission considers that, in view
of the complexity of the case and of the particularly serious nature
of the offence concerned, the examination of the case does not disclose
any appearance of an unduly prolonged period of detention on remand;

Whereas the Applicant further alleges a violation of his right to a
"hearing within a reasonable time", as guaranteed in Article 6,
paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention; whereas, in particular, he
considers as not being justified the period of 14 months from his
arrest until his indictment and the further period of three months
until the beginning of his first trial on .. December, 1962;

Whereas the Commission has considered the question whether the period
referred to in Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), only extends from
the date of the Applicant's arrest (.. July, 1961) to the opening of
the Applicant's first trial on .. December, 1962, or also up to the
judgment of the Regional Court of .. December, 1962, or even includes
the further proceedings up to the final judgment of the Supreme Court
of .. February, 1964;

Whereas, however, the Commission has not found it necessary in the
present case to express any view on this question; whereas it is of the
opinion that, even if the period concerned was considered to run from
.. July, 1961, until .. February, 1964, there is no appearance of a
violation of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1) in the criminal
proceedings against the Applicant;

Whereas, in so deciding, the Commission has particularly taken into
consideration the complexity of the case resulting from the great
number of witnesses and the detailed expert opinion involved and the
very serious nature of the offence forming the subject of the charge
against the Applicant; whereas it must also be observed that the total
period of the proceedings includes the time necessary for the
preparation and the execution of two trials and two hearings on appeal;

Whereas, in view of all these circumstances, the examination of the
case does not reveal any element tending to show that the criminal
proceedings against the Applicant were unduly prolonged by the
authorities;

Whereas the Applicant further complains that he was not given a "fair
hearing" within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of
the Convention, since the witnesses were under the influence of press
reports on his case and since the judges were prejudiced;

Whereas the Commission observes in this respect that its sole task is
to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken in the
Convention by the High Contracting Parties and that the Austrian
Government cannot be held responsible for the press reports which
allegedly influenced the witnesses;

Whereas also with regard to the Applicant's further allegations that
the judges were prejudiced, the examination of the case as it has been
submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not disclose
any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in
the Convention and in particular in Article 6, paragraph (2)
(Art. 6-2);

Whereas the Applicant furthermore complains that the police and the
investigating judge did not inform him fully of the evidence already
taken by them and even deliberately misinformed him on certain points;
Whereas, however, he does not allege that the authorities failed to
inform him of the facts constituting the crime with which he was
charged;

Whereas Article 6, paragraph (3) (a) (Art. 6-3-a), of the Convention
provides that "everyone charged with a criminal offence has the ...
right ... to be informed promptly, ... in detail, of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him";

Whereas an examination of the Applicant's complaint does not disclose
any violation of this provision;[/align]