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The Applicant's Counsel, in his observations of 1st March 1963, agreed
that the time-limit expired on 16th June 1962. The Application was
dated 8th June 1962, however, and was acknowledged by letter dated 12th
June 1962 from the Secretary to the Commission. The application form,
which was itself not a necessary document since it might be replaced
by equivalent documents, was dated 16th June. This was acknowledged by
a letter of 20th June stating that it had been registered on 18th June.
The time-limit was pointed out to the Secretary to the Commission who
wrote confirming that the effective date of the filing of the
Application was 8th June 1962.

7. As regards the contention that the Application is incompatible with
the provisions of the Convention

The Respondent Government stated in its observations of 7th January
1963, its Reply of 1st June 1963 and during the oral hearing, that the
Application contained three submissions namely:

1. that the Commission was requested to declare the Provisional Act of
June 1956 invalid;

2. that the Commission was requested to declare invalid the order of
the Ministry of Social Affairs directing the Applicant to take over the
position of district dentist in Moskenes;

3. that the Commission was requested to declare that the judgment of
the national court could not be enforced.

It submitted that all three claims were incompatible with the provision
of the Convention for the following reasons:

As to 1. The Commission had no competence, either under the Convention
or under any general principle of international law, to declare invalid
an Act duly passed by the Norwegian Legislative authority. The Supreme
Court of Norway decided on 16th December 1961 that the Act was valid
and the Commission could in no sense act as a further Court of Appeal.

As to 2. The Commission had no competence to declare on the validity
of orders or decisions given by the proper Norwegian administrative
authorities. The validity of such orders was also in this case
confirmed by decisions of the Sandefjord Town Court and of the Supreme
Court and the Commission had no appellate jurisdiction in regard to
such orders.

As to 3. The Commission had no competence to decide on the question of
the enforcement of a valid decision by the Supreme Court of Norway.

The Government submitted that the Applicant had amended his claims in
his counter-observations of 1st March 1963 and that the Convention does
not provide for such "re-writing" of an application, particularly when
it is to the benefit of the Applicant and prejudicial to the
Government. The Commission, in view of Article 27, paragraph (2), of
the Convention, may only consider the petition ("requête") itself. It
was further submitted that the Applicant's two new claims were
irreconcilable with the provisions of the Convention. These new claims
were moreover inadmissible as having been introduced more than six
months after the final decision (Article 26 of the Convention). The
Commission was not competent to pronounce itself on any "general
issues" and the proceedings should be confined to this particular
Application which should be considered on the basis of the original
petition and not on the claims as later amended. The Commission was not
competent to examine the Provisional Act of 1956 in abstracto but only
to deal with the circumstances of this particular case (compare
Commission's decision in Application Number 290/57).

The Applicant's Counsel, in his counter-observations of 1st March 1963,
his rejoinder of 15th July 1963 and during the oral hearing, submitted
that the Norwegian Government had accepted the authority of the
Commission in accordance with Article 31 of the Convention to state its
opinion upon Norwegian law, administrative practices and judicial
decisions. It followed that the organs constituted under that
international agreement would be entitled to deliver opinions on
national enactments and administrative or judicial practices, even if
not expressly invested with such powers.

The Applicant's Counsel contested the Government's suggestion that he
had rewritten his petition. The issue raised was still the same,
namely, whether or not Article 4 of the Convention had been infringed.
The objections made by the Government were purely formalistic. There
was no material difference between the wording in the Application and
in the counter-observations.

In order to decide whether or not a violation of Article 4 had been
committed in regard to the Applicant, the Commission had necessarily
to look at the Provisional Act and to determine whether or not its
provisions complied with the requirements of the Convention. The
logical way of approaching the issue raised was first to decide on the
compatibility of the Act which was thus the "general issue" and then
to look at the individual aspects of the Applicant's case. This method
could not be considered an examination in abstracto of the Application
as alleged by the Government.

8. As regards the contention that the Application was an abuse of the
right of petition

The Respondent Government, in its observations of 7th January 1963, in
its Reply of 1st June 1963 and during the oral hearing, submitted that
the Application was abusive as, although it was absolutely clear that
the Applicant had to bear the full burden of proof, he had relied upon
loose and unsubstantiated accusations, leaving it to the Government of
Norway to produce all the basic documents in the dispute.

It was further abusive in the sense that the Commission should not be
used as a forum for domestic politics. Since Norway was a democracy,
in the enactment of almost all laws some divergence of opinion would
be manifest in Parliament as well as in the Press. The present
enactments were passed in a democratic manner and were purely a matter
of domestic politics. The Applicant clearly broke his agreement of 14th
December 1959 with the Ministry for Social Affairs for purposes of
domestic politics and in this respect the Government referred to the
Applicant's letter of 21st March 1960 to the Ministry for Social
Affairs in which he alleged that the Act of 1956 was an attempt to
"socialise" the profession of dentistry. This allegation was entirely
incorrect, as was his statement that the Bill of the 1956 Act was
fought by a united Opposition on the basis of its being contrary to the
Convention.

The Commission was not competent to decide upon questions raised on
such grounds. The behaviour of the Applicant could not be looked upon
as acts of good faith deserving protection under the Convention.

The Applicant's Counsel, in his counter-observations of 1st March 1963
and in his preliminary and final rejoinders respectively of 15th July
and 29th August 1963, submitted that the question of burden of proof
was not important in this case. Clearly he had the burden of proof of
his case but the Government had the burden of proof in regard to its
contention that the 1956 Act was within the limits of Article 4 of the
Convention.

Since the Provisional Act had, a long time previously, been promulgated
and prolonged, it was not a question of raising domestic political
issues in the Commission.

The question of burden of proof was at this stage of theoretical
interest only. The Applicant had made out a prima facie case that a
breach of the Convention had occurred. The burden of proof was then
shifted so that the Respondent Government would have to prove that the
measures taken were not contrary to the Convention. In order to decide
this issue, it was obviously necessary for the Commission to evaluate
the general issue as to whether or not the Provisional Act of 1956 was
compatible with Article 4 of the Convention.

In reply to the allegation that the Applicant had launched "loose and
unsubstantiated accusations against a responsible Government" is was
pointed out: that a unanimous opposition had fought the Provisional Act
in the Storing on the ground that it was against the Convention; that
two justices of the Supreme Court had been of the opinion that the
Provisional Act could not be invoked against the Applicant; that the
Dentists' Association and the whole Federation of Academic Professions
had taken steps before the Courts against the compulsory measures; and
that the Applicant had brought a specific case before the Commission.

During the oral hearing, Applicant's counsel further submitted that all
cases before the Commission had domestic or political aspects and the
Commission could not be debarred from looking into issues of domestic
policy if it was properly to accomplish its task of protecting human
rights. The contentions of the Government were, in this respect, very
dangerous for the competence of the Commission in general and, if
successful, would render the Commission impotent.

9. As regards the contention that the Application is manifestly
ill-founded
a. as regards the question whether or not the service required from the
Applicant is "forced or compulsory labour" within the meaning of
Article 4, paragraph (2), of the Convention

The Respondent Government, in its observations of 7th January 1963, its
Reply of 1st June 1963 and during the oral hearing, submitted that the
Applicant had not been subjected to "forced or compulsory labour". It
was pointed out that this term should be given a reasonable and working
interpretation so as not to prevent a democratic government from
enacting measures necessary for extending social benefit to its
citizens.

The Respondent Government submitted that, as regards the general
background of the case, the Commission should take into account the
particular circumstances prevailing in Norway at the time when
Parliament passed the Act of 1956.

When trying to give to its citizens all modern social benefits, the
Government was faced with exceptional geographical problems. The
country was situated in the same latitudes as Greenland, Labrador and
Alaska, one-third of it lying north of the Arctic circle. It was barren
and mountainous, the coast heavily indented with fjords and fringed by
150,000 islands. Only 4 % of the surface was cultivable. The Act of
1956 was aimed at helping, inter alia, the northern provinces which,
though comprising 30 % of the territory, were inhabited by only 10 %
of the population, approximately 4 persons per km².

While the southern parts of the country benefited from adequate social
service, the outlying districts had a deplorable lack of such
facilities which seriously affected the social and health conditions
of these communities. It was pointed out that in 1946 there was in Oslo
one dentist per 650 inhabitants whereas in the provinces of Finmark,
Froms and Nordland the ratio was one dentist per 13,000, 6,000 and
5,500 inhabitants respectively. Moreover, adequate dental care was
rendered even more difficult by the enormous distances, the
difficulties of communication and the arctic weather conditions
prevailing during the winter months.

The Acts of 1949 and 1956 were an attempt to overcome these
difficulties by making dental care available to the populations of
these isolated districts and they should be considered in the light of
their humanitarian and social purpose.

The Respondent Government, by the Act of 1949, made provision for free
dental treatment for children and young people and for treatment at
stipulated fees for others, the dentists employed in the Public Dental
Service being public officials. It was, however, found difficult to
fill vacant posts as district dentists in the northern areas of the
country. To fill the posts created by the 1949 Act, two special
measures were introduced:

1. From 1951 the authorities gave permission for qualified students to
study dentistry at approved foreign Universities.

2. Students studying at home or abroad were required to accept and sign
declarations undertaking to serve for a period of up to two years after
final examinations as dentists in a public dental clinic.

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