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07-15-2009, 12:59 AM
X. v. SWEDEN - 2358/64 [1967] ECHR 11 (07 February 1967)
THE FACTSWhereas the facts as presented by the Applicant may be summarised asfollows:The Applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1908, and living atÄlvdalen (Sweden).1. He first wrote to the Commission in September, 1964, complainingthat, as a result of a decision taken by the authorities, the localhospital at Älvdalen could no longer receive as many patients asbefore, and that, in particular, women awaiting their confinement wereobliged to go to the hospital at Mora, which is situated at somedistance from Älvdalen. He considered that this was contrary to Article3 of the Convention. He did not raise this allegation in theApplication form which he later submitted, or in any of his subsequentpleadings, and it is possible, therefore, that he did not intend topursue this particular complaint.2. The Applicant also complains of three decisions given on .. July,1962, by the Ovansiljan District Court for Land Cases (Ovansiljansdomsagas ägodelningsrätt). He has submitted the text of two of thesedecisions, but has failed to explain the contents of the thirddecision. It seems that he appealed against the three decisions andthat - presumably after his appeal had been rejected by the Svea Courtof Appeal (hovrätt) - the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), on .. May,1964, decided not to grant him leave to have his further appealexamined by the Supreme Court.As regards the two decisions submitted by the Applicant, the contentsmay be summarised as follows:(a) During certain proceedings regarding the partition of land whichhad previously been the joint property of the inhabitants of thevillage of Brunnsberg, a dispute arose as to whether a certain forestarea belonged to the inhabitants of this village or whether it was theproperty of the Crown.The Applicant and certain other persons maintained that the forest areahad been in the possession of the village community already in the 15thcentury, and he referred to certain provisions in Swedish law,according to which property to a piece of land may be founded on"possession since time immemorial" (urminnes hävd), even if no legaltitle regarding the acquisition of the land can be shown to exist.On the other hand, the State maintained that the forest area belongedto the Crown since this area was an integral part of a larger piece ofland in regard to which the Crown had been officially registered asbeing the owner.The dispute was referred to the District Court for Land Cases, whichheard the case on .. June, 1962. The Applicant and another personappeared before the Court and asked for an adjournment of the hearinguntil .. October, 1962, so as to give them an opportunity to instructa lawyer in the case. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Courtthat this request was rejected by the Court. Consequently, theApplicant and his colleague pleaded in person before the Court, andthey also submitted a number of documents in support of their opinionthat the forest belonged to the village community. They also asked forlegal aid in the case. The representative of the State contested thestatements of the other party, and maintained that the land in disputebelonged to the Crown.The Court, by its judgment of .. July, 1962, ruled that the forest areawas the property of the Crown and at the same time rejected the requestfor legal aid.The Applicant alleges that, as a result of this judgment as upheld onappeal, he and the other members of the village community had beendeprived of their property, and he has submitted substantialdocumentation in order to show their right of property. He also addsthat the District Court had rejected their claims without giving thema fair hearing; in this respect, he points out that an adjournment wasnot granted by the Court, and that he was not given adequateopportunity to present his case and to call evidence. A fair hearinghad also been refused by the Supreme Court which had not admitted hisappeal.The Applicant invokes Articles 1, 2, 6, paragraphs (1), (3) (a), (b),(c), (d), and (e), 13 and 14 of the Convention.(b) While considering that they were the owners of certain land (aspecial sort of meadows, called "myrslogar"), the Applicant and otherpersons requested that the authorities should determine, by an officialact, the exact boundaries of their land. As the State contested thatthe Applicant and the other persons concerned were owners, the disputeregarding the ownership was referred to the District Court for LandCases.In its judgment of .. July, 1962, the District Court stated that, inregard to the right of property to some of the meadows concerned, theSupreme Court had, already in 1944, made a final ruling and that,therefore, the District Court could not re-examine the question ofownership. As regards the remaining parts of the land in dispute, theDistrict Court arrived at the conclusion that the Crown was the owner.By the same judgment, the District Court also rejected the request forlegal aid submitted by the Applicant and other persons. It seems thatthe Applicant had also asked for an adjournment of the proceedings inthis case, but that his request had been rejected by the DistrictCourt.The Applicant maintains that the Supreme Court's decision of 1944 couldnot be binding on him, since he had not been a party to the proceedingsin 1944. Consequently, the District Court ought not to have based itsjudgment on this previous decision.The Applicant also refers to a number of documents which, in hisopinion, support his assertion that he and the other persons concernedare the real owners of the meadows. He also invokes certain decisionsgiven by the Supreme Court.The Applicant apparently relies on the same provisions of theConvention as mentioned above under (a).3. The Applicant also complains of certain expropriation proceedingsand his complaint, in this respect, may be summarised as follows:In regard to the expropriation of certain land for defence purposes,the State instituted proceedings against the Community of Brunnsbergas being the owner of the land. The case was dealt with by theOvansiljan Expropriation Court (Ovansiljans domsaga***propriationsdomstol). In addition to the representatives of the Crownand the Brunnsberg Village, the present Applicant also appeared beforethe Court, claiming compensation for the expropriation of the groundthat he owned a share of the property concerned.By judgment of .. December, 1965, the Expropriation Court agreed to theproposed measure of expropriation and fixed the compensation to be paidby the State. As regards the Applicant, however, the Court concludedthat it had in no way been shown that the expropriation concerned hisright and that, therefore, his claims and submissions could not beexamined by the Court.There is no indication that the Application lodged an appeal from thisdecision.The Applicant alleges that the Court was not impartial, since one ofthe lay judges (nämndemän) had a personal interest in the outcome ofthe proceedings. In this respect, he submits that the lay judgeconcerned owned land in the parish of Älvdalen and that the land-ownersin that parish held a joint interest in the property which was subjectto expropriation. It appears from the procès-verbal of the Court thathe had raised this point before the Court but that the Court had found,after deliberation, that there were no circumstances which couldprevent the judge concerned from participating in the case.On this point, the Applicant invokes Articles, 6, paragraph (1), 13 and14 of the Convention.The Applicant has also submitted a number of documents intended to showthat he had a certain right in the expropriated land and that,consequently, the Court ought to have decided on his claims in thecase.It seems that he also objects to the measure of expropriation as such,which he considers as a violation of the right of property.THE LAWWhereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the hospitalfacilities at Älvdalen (paragraph 1 of the statement of facts), it isto be observed that, according to Article 25 (Art. 25) of theConvention, the Commission may receive petitions from any person"claiming to be the victim" of a violation of a right or freedomguaranteed by the Convention;Whereas, in the present case, the Applicant alleges that Article 3(Art. 3) of the Convention is violated by reason of the inadequatehospital facilities at Älvdalen; whereas, however, he does not claimto be himself a victim of this violation of the Convention;Whereas it follows that, in regard to this complaint, the conditionsunder which the Commission may receive an application from anindividual are not satisfied; and whereas therefore this part of theApplication is incompatible with the provisions of the Conventionwithin the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), thereof;Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains that he was refused legalaid in the different proceedings before the District Court for LandCases (paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), theCommission has had regard both to Article 6, paragraph (1)(Art. 6-1),and to Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), of theConvention;Whereas, in respect of Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), itis to be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article 1(Art. 1), guarantees only the rights and freedoms set forth in SectionI of the Convention; and whereas under Article 25, paragraph (1)(Art. 25-1), only the alleged violation of one of those rights andfreedoms by a Contracting Party can be the subject of an Applicationpresented by a person, non-governmental organisation or group ofindividuals; whereas otherwise its examination is outside thecompetence of the Commission ratione materiae; whereas it is truethat, under Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c),of theConvention, everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right,subject to certain conditions, to be granted free legal assistance;whereas, however, as the Commission has frequently stated, the rightto free legal aid in civil cases is not as such included among therights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention; whereas it followsthat the Application in so far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph(3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), is incompatible with this provision of theConvention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2);Whereas the Commission has also had regard to the general clause ofArticle 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas itresults from this provision that, in the determination of his civilrights, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing; and whereas anexamination of the case as it has been submitted does not show that therefusal to grant the Applicant free legal aid constituted in any waya violation of this right; whereas it follows that the Application, inso far as it relates to Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), ismanifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)(Art. 27-2),of the Convention;Whereas the Applicant further complains of the fact that theproceedings before the District Court were not adjourned and allegesthat in general he was not granted a fair hearing (paragraph 2 (a) and(b) of the statement of facts); whereas he also complains that in onecase the District Court based itself on a previous court decision whichwas not binding on him (paragraph 2 (b) of the statement of facts);Whereas in these respects an examination of the case as it has beensubmitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rightsand freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in Article6 (Art. 6); whereas it follows that these parts of the Application aremanifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaints as to the conclusionreached by the Courts regarding the ownership of certain land(paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the statement of facts), an examination ofthe case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance ofa violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention andthe Protocol;Whereas, in respect of the judicial decisions complained of, theCommission has frequently stated that in accordance with Article 19(Art. 19) of the Convention its only task is to ensure observance ofthe obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention; whereas,in particular, it is not competent to deal with an application allegingthat errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,except where the Commission considers that such errors might haveinvolved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedomslimitatively listed in the Convention; whereas, in this respect, theCommission refers to its decisions Nos. 458/59 (X. v. Belgium -Yearbook III, page 233) and 1140/61 (X v. Austria - Collection ofDecisions, Volume 8, page 57); and whereas there is no appearance ofa violation in the proceedings complained of; whereas it follows thatthis part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within themeaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains of the decision of theExpropriation Court and the proceedings before that Court (paragraph3 of the statement of facts), it is to be observed that, under Article26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the Commission may only deal with amatter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to thegenerally recognised rules of international law; whereas Swedish lawprovides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal (hovrätt) and for afurther appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) in respect ofthe refusal of a lower court to let a third person participate in civilproceedings (Chapter 49, sections 4 and 5, and Chapter 54, section 3,of the Swedish Code of Procedure); and whereas the Applicantapparently failed to appeal from the Expropriation Court's decision of.. December, 1965 which included the Court's refusal to recognise himas party in the proceedings concerned; whereas, therefore, he has notexhausted the remedies available to him under Swedish law; whereas,moreover, an examination of the case as it has been submitted does notdisclosethe existence of any special circumstances which might haveabsolved the Applicant, according to the generally recognised rules ofinternational law, from exhausting the domestic remedies at hisdisposal; whereas, therefore, the condition as to the exhaustion ofdomestic remedies laid down in Articles 26 and 27, paragraph (3)(Art. 26, 27-3),of the Convention has not been complied with by theApplicant.Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.