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مشاهدة النسخة كاملة : X. v. THE GERMANY - 2303/64 [1966] ECHR 9 (17 December 1966)



هيثم الفقى
07-15-2009, 12:50 AM
X. v. THE GERMANY - 2303/64 [1966] ECHR 9 (17 December 1966)
THE FACTSWhereas the facts presented by the Applicant may be summarised asfollows:The Applicant is a German citizen, born in 1924, and living inUnna/Germany.On ... February, 1960, he fell and broke a leg in a snow-coveredstreet. As a result, he was treated in a hospital for approximately4 months. By letter of ... March, 1960, the Applicant presented aclaim for damages to the Town of Unna, submitting that the accidentoccurred on the sidewalk in front of a municipal school which heintended to hold liable, as well as the school housekeeper responsible.The competent insurance company to which the municipal authoritiestransmitted his letter, rejected the claim by reason of absence ofnegligence on the part of the municipality and its employee.Subsequent letters of the Applicant reiterating the claim were withoutsuccess.On ... February, 1963, the Applicant addressed to the Regional Court(Landgericht) of Dortmund a petition for legal aid to sue the Townof Unna and, on a subsidiary basis, its employee. He did not includethe appropriate proof of his lack of means but filed at the same timea claim against both defendants, drawn up and signed by him personally.He also stated that he was ill and wanted to submit additional legalarguments after his recovery.The defendants submitted that the 3 years' period of limitation underGerman law for actions in tort had expired. The Court held, on ...March, 1963, that, for this reason, the proposed action did not havea sufficient chance of success and therefore denied legal aid. Inits decision the Court found, on the one hand, that the Applicanthad not been prevented from petitioning for legal aid at a time whenit was still possible to obtain a decision before the time-limitexpired.It found, on the other hand, that the statement of claim (Klageschrift)filed at the same time as the petition did not constitute a propercause of action lodged in due time as it was not signed by a lawyeras required in actions before a Regional Court.On ... April, 1963, the Applicant brought a new petition for legalaid together with a formal statement of claim signed by a lawyer andwith proof of lack of means. This petition, however, was rejected,both by the Regional Court of ... June, 1963 and, on appeal(Beschwerde), by the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) of Hamm on ...August, 1963 on the ground that the action, although now lodged inproper form was, in any event, too late as the time-limit had alreadyexpired.The Applicant then appealed against the first decision of the RegionalCourt of ... March, 1963 but, again, the Court of Appeal upheld thedecision on ... November, 1963, and this was notified to the Applicanton ... December, 1963.Against the latter decision the Applicant lodged a constitutionalappeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) on the ground of a violation of Articles3, 20 paragraph 1, and 103 paragraph 1 of the German Basic Law. Theconstitutional appeal was dated 11th January, 1964 (Saturday) and,according to the Applicant, posted on that same day but it arrivedat the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on14th January, 1964, which was one day too late. The Applicanttherefore asked that the time-limit for filing a constitutional appealshould be extended by reason of this unforeseeable delay. Withoutgoing into this question the Federal Constitutional Court, by aunanimous decision of a Group of Three under Article 93 bis, paragraph3, of the Law on the Federal Constitutional Court(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz), on ... February, 1964, rejected theappeal without stating further reasons as manifestly ill-founded.The Applicant alleges violations of Article 6, paragraph 1 firstsentence, of the Convention and Article 1, paragraph 1, of the FirstProtocol to the Convention. Under Article 50 of the Convention heasks for compensation to be paid by the Federal Republic of Germanyin the amount of his original claim against the Town of Unna includinginterest and expenses during the various proceedings.He argues that he has not been granted a fair hearing by the RegionalCourt, because his petition for legal aid and the statement of claimjoined to it and signed by him personally were not considered to havethe same effect as a claim filed immediately by an attorney. He isof the opinion that a poor person, as well as a person who is ableto pay his lawyer's fees, must enjoy the full period of limitationand should not be forced to petition for legal aid before theexpiration of the time-limit in order to obtain from the Court adecision on the question of legal aid.The Applicant further submits that the Regional Court has deniedhim a fair hearing by failing to wait for the additional legalarguments he had mentioned in his statement of claim.For these reasons the original decision of the Regional Court andthe later decisions upholding it constitute, in the opinion of theApplicant, a deprivation of his possessions, viz. of his claim againstthe Town of Unna and its employee, violating the general principlesof international law. In support of his opinion, the Applicant quotesfrom Böckstiegel's treatise on Article 1 of the Protocol to theConvention (Die allgemeinen Grundsätze des Völkerrechts überEigentumsentziehung, eine Untersuchung zu Artikel 1 desZusatzprotokolls zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, Berlin1963).THE LAWWhereas the Applicant complains of the refusal of free legal aidin respect of certain civil proceedings; whereas he further complainsthat the time taken by the court proceedings in the determinationof an application for free legal aid makes it necessary for anapplicant to institute such proceedings at a date which will allow himsubsequently enough time to institute civil proceedings before theexpiration of the time-limit therefor; whereas he states that, in fact,he only applied for legal aid very shortly before the expiration ofsuch time-limit and that the Court's decision in this respect was givenafter, and on the ground of, the expiration of that time-limit whichhad made the institution of civil proceedings impossible; whereas hesubmits that an application for legal aid should be equivalent to aninstitution of civil proceedings and that, when such application ismade before the expiration of the time-limit for the institution ofcivil proceedings, the Applicant should be considered to have compliedwith that time-limit;Whereas otherwise he is prejudiced in his application for legal aid;Whereas Article 6, paragraph (3) (c) (Art. 6-3-c), of the Conventionprovides for the granting of free legal aid in criminal case***clusively and where the interests of justice so require; whereas theCommission has frequently stated (see inter alia decision onApplication No. 727/60,Yearbook Volume III, page 308) that the rightto free legal aid in civil cases is not as such guaranteed by theConvention;Whereas the Applicant has, however, expressly invoked Article 6,paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention; whereas it may be that,in certain circumstances, the refusal of free legal aid could amountto a denial of a "fair hearing" in the determination of civil rightswithin the meaning of this provision; whereas, however, in the presentcase, the Applicant's request for free legal aid was rejected on theground that his civil claim had no longer any hope of success as he hadfailed to comply with the conditions established by law, in particular,to institute such civil proceedings before the relevant time-limit hadexpired; whereas the imposition of such conditions for the grantingof free legal aid cannot be considered to be a denial of a "fairhearing";Whereas therefore, in this respect, the Application is manifestlyill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)(Art. 27-2),of the Convention;Whereas the Applicant further complains that the Regional Court,when rejecting his request for free legal aid filed on ... February,1963, failed to await the arrival of his additional legal argumentsand that the Court thereby denied him a "fair hearing"; whereas,in this respect, it is to be observed that the Court, on ... February,1963, invited the Applicant to make any further submissions withinten days and whereas the Court announced its decision on ... March,1963;Whereas the Commission is thus satisfied that the Applicant had fullopportunity to present his case before the Court; whereas, therefore,in this respect, the Application is also manifestly ill-founded withinthe meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2),of the Convention;Whereas, finally, the Applicant alleges that the dismissal of hisclaim for damages was an act depriving him of his possessions inviolation of the general principles of international law as guaranteedin Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention (P1-1); whereas thefirst paragraph of this Article (P1-1-1) provides that "every naturalor legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of hispossessions" and that "no one shall be deprived of his possession***cept in the public interest and subject to the conditions providedfor by law and by the general principles of international law"; whereasit does not appear that the Regional Court, in deciding that theApplicant's claim was barred by the statute of limitation, eitherinterfered with the Applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of hispossessions or deprived him of them;Whereas, in any event, the general principles of international lawinvoked by the Applicant do not apply to the protection of the propertyof nationals of the State against which the claim is made (see decisionNo. 511/59, X. v. Iceland, Yearbook III, page 424);Whereas it follows that, in this respect, the Application is alsomanifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 paragraph (2)(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.